B. Brune et al.: Protein Thiol Modification and Apoptotic Cell Death as cGMP-Independent Nitric Oxide. H. Esterbauer and P. Ramos: Chemistry and Pathophysiology of Oxidation of LDL. C. Gotz and M. Montenarh: DNA Damage, DNA Repair, and Apoptosis. E.R. Werner et al.: Biosynthesis of Nitric Oxide: Dependence on Pteridine Metabolism. R. Bernhardt: Cytochrome P450: Structure, Function, and Generation of Reactive Oxygen Species. B. Epe. DNA Damage Profiles Induced by Oxidizing Agents

In 1987, an unmanned Atlas-Centaur-67 launched from the Cape triggered a lightning discharge that disabled the on-board guidance system and Range Control destroyed the platform. This incident spurred the review and revision of the natural and triggered lightning launch commit criteria (LCC). The LCC are a set of eleven complex rules that are constantly evaluated by the Launch Weather Team (LWT) of 45th Weather Squadron (45WS). Unfortunately, the 45WS LWT does not have either a descriptive or conditional climatology for many of the LCC. This thesis addresses the lightning and the cumulus LCC. A descriptive climatology for both the lightning and the cumulus LCC is presented for the 1989 to 1998 period. Additionally, the climate of the Cape is divided into four seasons, and a conditional climatology is introduced for the cumulus LCC. The conditional climatology procedure uses a season-specific discriminant function to classify the radiosonde observations into either the violation or no violation group for the four seasons.

This monograph determines whether the US Army is sufficiently training, organizing, and equipping fire support elements to utilize naval surface fire support. Its scope is restricted to fire support elements in airborne, air assault and light infantry units. This study came as a result of the Marine Corps' decision to deactivate their ANGLICO units, which had habitually provided the expertise to Army forced and early entry units to utilize naval surface fire support. Without these units, the Army must rely on its organic fire supporters to request and control naval fires. To accomplish this, they must first be properly trained, organized, and equipped. This topic becomes increasingly important as the Army moves to a force projection structure. The Army has put enormous strain on its own helicopter lift as well as the Air Force's strategic lift assets. To preclude having to use these assets to initially transport artillery and ammunition to support early ground maneuver, the Army must prepare to use naval fire support when available. The Navy is currently developing a suite of systems to provide naval fire support to support Marine Corps Operational Maneuver from the Sea doctrine. The Army must plan now to utilize these systems in the future. The monograph studies the historical aspects of naval gunfire and the units that were created to request it. This leads into a study of training, organization, and equipment of both ANGLICO and Army fire support elements to determine critical variances between them that would limit the Army's ability to control naval surface fires. Major findings show that while the Army is organized properly to perform this mission if manned at 100 percent strength, current equipping and training of fire support elements is inadequate. Equipment shortfalls are being addressed in the near term by installation of SINCGARS on Navy ships. In the long term, the future fielding of the Joint Tactical Radio System will ensure joint communications comp