The most detailed and comprehensive examination to show how tiny Israel grew to be a global civil and military cyber power and offer the first detailed proposal for an Israeli National Cyber Strategy. Israel is the subject of numerous cyber attacks from foreign adversaries. As a consequence, it has built an extremely sophisticated cyber security system. Indeed, Israel is now regarded as one of the top cyber powers in the world. In Israel and the Cyber Threat, Charles D. ("Chuck") Freilich, Matthew S. Cohen, and Gabi Siboni provide a detailed and comprehensive study of Israel's cyber strategy, tracing it from its origins to the present. They analyze Israel's highly advanced civil and military cyber capabilities and organizational structures to offer insights into what other countries can learn from Israel's experience. To achieve this, they explore how and why Israel has been able to build a remarkable cyber ecosystem and turn itself, despite its small size, into a global cyber power. The book further examines the major cyber threats facing Israel, including the most in-depth look at Iranian cyber policies and attacks; Israel's defensive and offensive capabilities and the primary attacks it has conducted; capacity building; international cooperation; and the impact of Israel's strategic culture on its cyber prowess. By placing Israel's actions in the realm of international relations theory, the book sheds light on many of the major questions in the field regarding cyber policies. The most authoritative work to date on Israeli cyber strategy, this book provides a comprehensive look at the major actions Israel has taken in cyberspace. It also places them in the broader context of global cyber developments to help readers understand state behavior in cyberspace.

National security has been at the forefront of the Israeli experience for seven decades, with threats ranging from terrorism, to vast rocket and missile arsenals, and even existential nuclear dangers. Yet, despite its overwhelming preoccupation with foreign and defense affairs, Israel does not have a formal national security strategy. In Israeli National Security, Chuck Freilich presents an authoritative analysis of the military, diplomatic, demographic, and societal challenges Israel faces today, to propose a comprehensive and long-term Israeli national security strategy. The heart of the new strategy places greater emphasis on restraint, defense, and diplomacy as means of addressing the challenges Israel faces, along with the military capacity to deter and, if necessary, defeat Israel's adversaries, while also maintaining the resolve of its society. By bringing Israel's most critical debates about the Palestinians, demography, Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, US relations and nuclear strategy into sharp focus, the strategy Freilich proposes addresses the primary challenges Israel must address in order to chart its national course. The most comprehensive study of Israel's national security to date, this book presents the first public proposal for a comprehensive Israeli national security strategy and prescribes an actionable course forward.

In Zion's Dilemmas, a former deputy national security adviser to the State of Israel details the history and, in many cases, the chronic inadequacies in the making of Israeli national security policy. Chuck Freilich identifies profound, ongoing problems that he ascribes to a series of factors: a hostile and highly volatile regional environment, Israel's proportional representation electoral system, and structural peculiarities of the Israeli government and bureaucracy.

Freilich uses his insider understanding and substantial archival and interview research to describe how Israel has made strategic decisions and to present a first of its kind model of national security decision-making in Israel. He analyzes the major events of the last thirty years, from Camp David I to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, through Camp David II, the Gaza Disengagement Plan of 2000, and the second Lebanon war of 2006.

In these and other cases he identifies opportunities forgone, failures that resulted from a flawed decision-making process, and the entanglement of Israeli leaders in an inconsistent, highly politicized, and sometimes improvisational planning process. The cabinet is dysfunctional and Israel does not have an effective statutory forum for its decision-making most of which is thus conducted in informal settings. In many cases policy objectives and options are poorly formulated. For all these problems, however, the Israeli decision-making process does have some strengths, among them the ability to make rapid and flexible responses, generally pragmatic decision-making, effective planning within the defense establishment, and the skills and motivation of those involved. Freilich concludes with cogent and timely recommendations for reform. "

In Zion's Dilemmas, a former deputy national security adviser to the State of Israel details the history and, in many cases, the chronic inadequacies in the making of Israeli national security policy. Chuck Freilich identifies profound, ongoing problems that he ascribes to a series of factors: a hostile and highly volatile regional environment, Israel's proportional representation electoral system, and structural peculiarities of the Israeli government and bureaucracy.

Freilich uses his insider understanding and substantial archival and interview research to describe how Israel has made strategic decisions and to present a first of its kind model of national security decision-making in Israel. He analyzes the major events of the last thirty years, from Camp David I to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, through Camp David II, the Gaza Disengagement Plan of 2000, and the second Lebanon war of 2006.

In these and other cases he identifies opportunities forgone, failures that resulted from a flawed decision-making process, and the entanglement of Israeli leaders in an inconsistent, highly politicized, and sometimes improvisational planning process. The cabinet is dysfunctional and Israel does not have an effective statutory forum for its decision-making most of which is thus conducted in informal settings. In many cases policy objectives and options are poorly formulated. For all these problems, however, the Israeli decision-making process does have some strengths, among them the ability to make rapid and flexible responses, generally pragmatic decision-making, effective planning within the defense establishment, and the skills and motivation of those involved. Freilich concludes with cogent and timely recommendations for reform. "