Much of the work that has been done on virtue has been devoted to getting virtue ethics a seat at the theoretical table. It has been concerned with showing that virtue ethics can provide a satisfactory account of right action to rival accounts offered by consequentialism and deontology. This volume of essays explores the nitty-gritty details of particular virtues. It includes original contributions from a number of leading scholars in virtue ethics. Most of the virtues discussed – such as ambition, cheerfulness, creativity, magnificence, pride, wit, and wonder – have been almost wholly neglected by contemporary ethicists. The volume also includes coverage of other virtues that have received a fair amount of attention in recent years, such as charity, hope, justice, practical wisdom, and temperance. Here the essays address largely ignored dimensions of these virtues and show how these discussions can enrich our understanding of neglected virtues. Neglected Virtues is a welcome addition to the scholarly literature on virtue ethics. Its focus on individual virtues, while not meant to be exhaustive, will open new avenues for future research in this rapidly growing area of ethics and moral philosophy.

Christine Swanton offers a new, comprehensive theory of virtue ethics which addresses the major concerns of modern ethical theory from a character-based perspective. The book departs in significant ways from classical virtue ethics and neo-Aristotelianism, employing insights from Nietzsche and other sources, resulting in a highly distinctive and original brand of virtue ethics.

Although our moral lives would be unrecognisable without them, roles have received little attention from analytic moral philosophers. Roles are central to our lives and to our engagement with one another, and should be analysed in connection with our core notions of ethics such as virtue, reason, and obligation. This volume aims to redress the neglect of role ethics by confronting the tensions between conceptions of impartial morality and role obligations in the history of analytic philosophy and the Confucian tradition. Different perspectives on the ethical significance of roles can be found by looking to debates within professional and applied ethics, by challenging existing accounts of how roles generate reasons, by questioning the hegemony of ethical reasons, and by exploring the relation between expertise and virtue. The essays tackle several core questions related to these debates: What are roles and what is their normative import? To what extent are roles and the ethics of roles central to ethics as opposed to virtue in general, and obligation in general? Are role obligations characteristically incompatible with ordinary morality in professions such as business, law, and medicine? How does practical reason function in relation to roles? Perspectives in Role Ethics is an examination of a largely neglected topic in ethics. It will appeal to a broad range of scholars in normative ethics, virtue ethics, non-Western ethics, and applied ethics interested in the importance of roles in our moral life.

Much of the work that has been done on virtue has been devoted to getting virtue ethics a seat at the theoretical table. It has been concerned with showing that virtue ethics can provide a satisfactory account of right action to rival accounts offered by consequentialism and deontology. This volume of essays explores the nitty-gritty details of particular virtues. It includes original contributions from a number of leading scholars in virtue ethics. Most of the virtues discussed - such as ambition, cheerfulness, creativity, magnificence, pride, wit, and wonder - have been almost wholly neglected by contemporary ethicists. The volume also includes coverage of other virtues that have received a fair amount of attention in recent years, such as charity, hope, justice, practical wisdom, and temperance. Here the essays address largely ignored dimensions of these virtues and show how these discussions can enrich our understanding of neglected virtues. Neglected Virtues is a welcome addition to the scholarly literature on virtue ethics. Its focus on individual virtues, while not meant to be exhaustive, will open new avenues for future research in this rapidly growing area of ethics and moral philosophy.

Although our moral lives would be unrecognisable without them, roles have received little attention from analytic moral philosophers. Roles are central to our lives and to our engagement with one another, and should be analysed in connection with our core notions of ethics such as virtue, reason, and obligation. This volume aims to redress the neglect of role ethics by confronting the tensions between conceptions of impartial morality and role obligations in the history of analytic philosophy and the Confucian tradition. Different perspectives on the ethical significance of roles can be found by looking to debates within professional and applied ethics, by challenging existing accounts of how roles generate reasons, by questioning the hegemony of ethical reasons, and by exploring the relation between expertise and virtue. The essays tackle several core questions related to these debates: What are roles and what is their normative import? To what extent are roles and the ethics of roles central to ethics as opposed to virtue in general, and obligation in general? Are role obligations characteristically incompatible with ordinary morality in professions such as business, law, and medicine? How does practical reason function in relation to roles? Perspectives in Role Ethics is an examination of a largely neglected topic in ethics. It will appeal to a broad range of scholars in normative ethics, virtue ethics, non-Western ethics, and applied ethics interested in the importance of roles in our moral life.

Christine Swanton offers a new, comprehensive theory of virtue ethics which addresses the major concerns of modern ethical theory from a character-based perspective. Discussion of many problems in moral theory, such as moral constraints, rightness of action, the good life, the demandingness of ethics, the role of the subjective, and the practicality of ethics, has been dominated by Kantian and Consequentialist theories, with their own distinctive conceptual apparatus. Virtue Ethics shows how a different framework can shed new light on these intractable issues. Swanton's approach is distinctive in departing in siginificant ways from classical versions of virtue ethics derived primarily from Aristotle. Employing insights from Nietzsche and other sources, she argues against both eudaimonistic virtue ethics and traditional virtue ethical conceptions of rightness. In developing a pluralistic view, she shows how different 'modes of moral acknowledgement' such as love, respect, appreciation, and creativity, are embedded in the very fabric of virtue, the moral life, and the good life.

Virtue ethics in its contemporary manifestation is dominated by neo Aristotelian virtue ethics primarily developed by Rosalind Hursthouse. This version of eudaimonistic virtue ethics was ground breaking, but has been subject to considerable critical attention. Christine Swanton shows that the time is ripe for new developments and alternatives. The target centred virtue ethics proposed by Swanton is opposed to orthodox virtue ethics in two major ways. First, it rejects the 'natural goodness' metaphysics of Neo Aristotelian virtue ethics owed to Philippa Foot in favour of a 'hermeneutic ontology' of ethics inspired by the Continental tradition and McDowell. Second, it rejects the well -known 'qualified agent' account of right action made famous by Hursthouse in favour of a target centred framework for assessing rightness of acts. Swanton develops the target centred view with discussions of Dancy's particularism, default reasons and thick concepts, codifiability, and its relation to the Doctrine of the mean. Target Centred Virtue Ethics retains the pluralism of Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (2003) but develops it further in relation to a pluralistic account of practical reason. This study develops other substantive positions including the view that target centred virtue ethics is developmental, suitably embedded in an environmental ethics of "dwelling"; and incorporates a concept of differentiated virtue to allow for roles, narrativity, cultural and historical location, and stage of life.