In recent years, the idea of a concept has become increasingly central to different areas of philosophy. This collection of original essays presents philosophical perspectives on the link between concepts and language, concepts and experience, concepts and know-how, and concepts and emotion. The essays span a variety of interrelated philosophical domains ranging from epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and the philosophy of emotions. Among the central questions addressed by the contributors are: What are concepts? What is nonconceptual content? Does perceptual experience have conceptual content? Is conceptual thought language dependent? How do we form new concepts? Does practical knowledge have propositional content? Is practical understanding conceptual (without being propositional)? Do emotions have a representational content and if so, is the representational content conceptual? Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion advances current debates about concepts and will interest scholars across a broad range of philosophical disciplines.

In recent years, the idea of a concept has become increasingly central to different areas of philosophy. This collection of original essays presents philosophical perspectives on the link between concepts and language, concepts and experience, concepts and know-how, and concepts and emotion. The essays span a variety of interrelated philosophical domains ranging from epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and the philosophy of emotions. Among the central questions addressed by the contributors are: What are concepts? What is nonconceptual content? Does perceptual experience have conceptual content? Is conceptual thought language dependent? How do we form new concepts? Does practical knowledge have propositional content? Is practical understanding conceptual (without being propositional)? Do emotions have a representational content and if so, is the representational content conceptual? Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion advances current debates about concepts and will interest scholars across a broad range of philosophical disciplines.

Die Beitrage dieses Bandes werfen die Frage nach dem Erkenntniswert der Literatur auf. Der erste Teil des Bandes enthalt Beitrage, welche die Frage nach dem Verhaltnis zwischen literarischen und anderen Weisen menschlicher Selbstverstandigung diskutieren. Im zweiten Teil des Buches finden sich Aufsatze, welche die verschiedenen Argumente, die in der Diskussion um die Frage nach dem kognitiven Wert der Literatur eine Rolle spielen, einer eingehenden Prufung unterziehen. Sie fragen danach, ob und inwieweit die Literatur Wissen vermittelt. Die Beitrage des dritten Teils vertiefen die Untersuchungen zum kognitiven Wert der Literatur, indem sie verschiedene Formen des Wissens behandeln. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit erhalten die Vergegenwartigungsleitung der Literatur, das propositionale Wissen, das Zeugniswissen und das begriffliche Wissen. Der vierte Teil des Buches schliesslich enthalt Aufsatze, die sich mit der Literatur als Quelle moralischen Wissens beschaftigen und den Beitrag der Literatur zu psychologischen Fragen diskutieren, welche das Verstandnis der Rolle der Gefuhle und die narrative Dimension der Selbstidentitat betreffen.