Disability & Justice: The Capabilities Approach in Practice examines the capabilities approach and how, as a matter of justice, the experience of disability is accounted for. It suggests that the capabilities approach is first, unable to properly diagnose both those who are in need as well as the extent to which assistance is required. Furthermore, it is suggested that counterfactually, if this approach to justice were capable of assessing need, that it would fail to be as stigma-sensitive as other approaches of justice. That is to say, the capabilities approach would have the possibility of further stigmatizing those requiring accommodation. Finally, Disability & Justice argues that health and the absence of disability belong in a category of functionings that are of special moral importance-a fact the Capabilities Approach fails to recognize.

From Disability Theory to Practice pays tribute to Professor Jerome Bickenbach's highly influential and immensely important work. Professor Bickenbach is a scholar, policy-maker, and activist, of international stature. This volume brings together ten friends, mentors, and mentees, who have penned eight chapters engaging in topics that range, as the title suggests and as Professor Bickenbach's work has spanned, from theory to practice. This volume begins, much as Professor Bickenbach's career has, by grappling with philosophical and sociological issues related to the definition of disability, its relation to health, and conceptions of justice for people with disabilities. Subsequently, these conceptions are utilized to advance policy suggestions that range from assisted dying legislation, mental health policy, and the implementation of the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health.

This book presents the argument that health has special moral importance because of the disadvantage one suffers when subjected to impairment or disabling barriers. Christopher A. Riddle asserts that ill health and the presence of disabling barriers are human rights issues and that we require a foundational conception of justice in order to promote the rights of people with disabilities. The claim that disability is a human rights issue is defended on the grounds that people with disabilities experience violations to their dignity, equality, and autonomy. Because human rights exist as a subset of other justice-based rights, Riddle contends that we must support a foundation of justice compatible with endorsing these three principles (equality, dignity, and autonomy). This volume argues that the "capabilities approach" is the best currency of justice for removing the disabling barriers that consistently violate approximately one billion people's human rights.

Disability & Justice: The Capabilities Approach in Practice examines the capabilities approach and how, as a matter of justice, the experience of disability is accounted for. It suggests that the capabilities approach is first, unable to properly diagnose both those who are in need as well as the extent to which assistance is required. Furthermore, it is suggested that counterfactually, if this approach to justice were capable of assessing need, that it would fail to be as stigma-sensitive as other approaches of justice. That is to say, the capabilities approach would have the possibility of further stigmatizing those requiring accommodation. Finally, Disability & Justice argues that health and the absence of disability belong in a category of functionings that are of special moral importance-a fact the Capabilities Approach fails to recognize.