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As millions of Americans struggle to find work in the wake of the
Great Recession, politicians from both parties look to regulation
in search of an economic cure. Some claim that burdensome
regulations undermine private sector competitiveness and job
growth, while others argue that tough new regulations actually
create jobs at the same time that they provide other benefits. Does
Regulation Kill Jobs? reveals the complex reality of regulation
that supports neither partisan view. Leading legal scholars,
economists, political scientists, and policy analysts show that
individual regulations can at times induce employment shifts across
firms, sectors, and regions-but regulation overall is neither a
prime job killer nor a key job creator. The challenge for
policymakers is to look carefully at individual regulatory
proposals to discern any job shifting they may cause and then to
make regulatory decisions sensitive to anticipated employment
effects. Drawing on their analyses, contributors recommend methods
for obtaining better estimates of job impacts when evaluating
regulatory costs and benefits. They also assess possible ways of
reforming regulatory institutions and processes to take better
account of employment effects in policy decision-making. Does
Regulation Kills Jobs? tackles what has become a heated partisan
issue with exactly the kind of careful analysis policymakers need
in order to make better policy decisions, providing insights that
will benefit both politicians and citizens who seek economic growth
as well as the protection of public health and safety, financial
security, environmental sustainability, and other civic goals.
Contributors: Matthew D. Adler, Joseph E. Aldy, Christopher
Carrigan, Cary Coglianese, E. Donald Elliott, Rolf Fare, Ann
Ferris, Adam M. Finkel, Wayne B. Gray, Shawna Grosskopf, Michael A.
Livermore, Brian F. Mannix, Jonathan S. Masur, Al McGartland,
Richard Morgenstern, Carl A. Pasurka, Jr., William A. Pizer, Eric
A. Posner, Lisa A. Robinson, Jason A. Schwartz, Ronald J.
Shadbegian, Stuart Shapiro.
In the search for explanations for three of the most pressing
crises of the early twenty-first century (the housing meltdown and
financial crisis, the Gulf oil spill, and the nuclear disaster at
Fukushima), commentators pointed to the structure of the regulatory
agencies charged with overseeing the associated industries, noting
that the need to balance competing regulatory and non-regulatory
missions undermined each agency's ability to be an effective
regulator. Christopher Carrigan challenges this critique by
employing a diverse set of research methods, including a
statistical analysis, an in-depth case study of US regulatory
oversight of offshore oil and gas development leading up to the
Gulf oil spill, and a formal theoretical discussion, to
systematically evaluate the benefits and concerns associated with
either combining or separating regulatory and non-regulatory
missions. His analysis demonstrates for policymakers and scholars
why assigning competing non-regulatory missions to regulatory
agencies can still be better than separating them in some cases.
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