Jürgen Habermas’s book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, first published in 1962, has long been recognized as one of the most important works of 20th century social thought.  Blending together philosophy and social history, he outlined a theory of the public sphere as a domain situated between civil society and the state, a domain in which citizens could scrutinize the activities of public officials and debate matters of common concern.  In his later works, Habermas would repeatedly question the role played by the public sphere in the safeguarding of democratic community. Now, in view of the crisis of democracy and the digital revolution, he returns to the same theme. The central concern of this new book is new media and their platform structure, which are increasingly relegating traditional mass media – significant drivers of the ‘old’ structural transformation – to the background. Habermas argues that the forms of communication associated with new media harm the self-awareness of the political public sphere, inducing a new structural transformation with grave consequences for deliberative democracy, the construction of public opinion and will formation.

Jürgen Habermas’s book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, first published in 1962, has long been recognized as one of the most important works of 20th century social thought.  Blending together philosophy and social history, he outlined a theory of the public sphere as a domain situated between civil society and the state, a domain in which citizens could scrutinize the activities of public officials and debate matters of common concern.  In his later works, Habermas would repeatedly question the role played by the public sphere in the safeguarding of democratic community. Now, in view of the crisis of democracy and the digital revolution, he returns to the same theme. The central concern of this new book is new media and their platform structure, which are increasingly relegating traditional mass media – significant drivers of the ‘old’ structural transformation – to the background. Habermas argues that the forms of communication associated with new media harm the self-awareness of the political public sphere, inducing a new structural transformation with grave consequences for deliberative democracy, the construction of public opinion and will formation.

This is the first volume of a ground-breaking new work by Jürgen Habermas on the history of philosophy.  Here Habermas sets out the ideas informing his systematic account of the history of Western philosophy as a genealogy of postmetaphysical thinking. His account goes far beyond a vindication of the enduring relevance of philosophical reflection founded on communicative reason as a source of orientation in the modern world. He contrasts this conception in the opening chapter with prominent diagnoses of the supposed crisis of Enlightenment reason and culture that seek redemption in the affirmation of traditional religious authority (Schmitt), the timeless validity of Greek metaphysics (Strauss), a numinous conception of nature (Löwith), or a happening of being that speaks to us from beyond the mists of pre-Socratic thought (Heidegger). Habermas situates Western thought in relation to the traditions of thought founded in the major world views (Judaism, Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism) that continue to shape contemporary culture and civilization. At the same time, he lays the groundwork for the analysis in the later volumes of the constitutive role played by the discourse on faith and knowledge in the development of Western philosophy which is the result of the unique symbiosis that Christianity entered into with Greek thought with the Christianization of the Roman Empire. Far from raising claims to exclusivity, completeness or closure, Habermas’s account, published in English in three volumes, opens up new lines of research and reflection that will influence the humanities and social sciences for decades to come.

This "Companion" brings together specially commissioned essays by distinguished international scholars that reflect both the diversity of Victorian poetry and the variety of critical approaches that illuminate it.
Approaches Victorian poetry by way of genre, production and cultural context, rather than through individual poets or poems
Demonstrates how a particular poet or poem emerges from a number of overlapping cultural contexts.
Explores the relationships between work by different poets
Recalls attention to a considerable body of poetry that has fallen into neglect
Essays are informed by recent developments in textual and cultural theory
Considers Victorian women poets in every chapter

For many liberals, the question "Do others live rightly?" feels inappropriate. Liberalism seems to demand a follow-up question: "Who am I to judge?" Peaceful coexistence, in this view, is predicated on restraint from morally evaluating our peers. But Rahel Jaeggi sees the situation differently. Criticizing is not only valid but also useful, she argues. Moral judgment is no error; the error lies in how we go about judging. One way to judge is external, based on universal standards derived from ideas about God or human nature. The other is internal, relying on standards peculiar to a given society. Both approaches have serious flaws and detractors. In Critique of Forms of Life, Jaeggi offers a third way, which she calls "immanent" critique. Inspired by Hegelian social philosophy and engaged with Anglo-American theorists such as John Dewey, Michael Walzer, and Alasdair MacIntyre, immanent critique begins with the recognition that ways of life are inherently normative because they assert their own goodness and rightness. They also have a consistent purpose: to solve basic social problems and advance social goods, most of which are common across cultures. Jaeggi argues that we can judge the validity of a society's moral claims by evaluating how well the society adapts to crisis-whether it is able to overcome contradictions that arise from within and continue to fulfill its purpose. Jaeggi enlivens her ideas through concrete, contemporary examples. Against both relativistic and absolutist accounts, she shows that rational social critique is possible.