Institutional and Financial Incentives for Social Insurance provides both an empirical and a theoretical account of the main difficulties presently threatening social insurance systems in most industrialized countries. It analyzes the remedies that have been discussed and sometimes introduced and addresses many questions still left largely unresolved: Are newly implemented or proposed reforms providing the correct incentives to all participants in the system? Is the quality of service improving and, if not, what can be done? How should the budgetary problems be solved considering both intra-generational and inter-generational redistributive policies?

The volume describes a number of studies of social security systems in various countries and assesses the effect of various policies, including welfare or unemployment benefits, training and other active labour market policies, the provision of pension, and competition and budget devolution in health care. It applies empirical tests to individual preferences concerning unemployment compensation, and it analyzes nonfunded and funded social security systems, the transition from one system to the other, and the willingness to pay for pensions.

This book will be of interest to academics, researchers and students in public, labour, health and welfare economics, as well as experts and researchers in social insurance.

This book provides a methodology for the analysis of oligopolistic markets from an equilibrium viewpoint, considering competition within and between groups of firms. It proposes a well-founded measure of competitive toughness that can be used in empirically relevant applications. This measure reflects the weight put by each firm on competition for market share relative to competition for market size - two dimensions of competition involving conflicting and convergent interests, respectively. It further explores several applications, such as the effect of tougher competition on innovation and of output market power on the emergence of involuntary unemployment, as well as the importance of strategic interactions for investment decisions. Relative to the dominant model of monopolistic competition, The Economics of Competition, Collusion and In-between aims to explore an alternative tractable model of firm competition opening the application of oligopoly theory to many fields in economics where general equilibrium features are crucial. It will be relevant to those interested in applied industrial organization, trade, macroeconomics (in particular macrodynamics) and quantitative economics.

This book provides a methodology for the analysis of oligopolistic markets from an equilibrium viewpoint, considering competition within and between groups of firms. It proposes a well-founded measure of competitive toughness that can be used in empirically relevant applications. This measure reflects the weight put by each firm on competition for market share relative to competition for market size - two dimensions of competition involving conflicting and convergent interests, respectively. It further explores several applications, such as the effect of tougher competition on innovation and of output market power on the emergence of involuntary unemployment, as well as the importance of strategic interactions for investment decisions. Relative to the dominant model of monopolistic competition, The Economics of Competition, Collusion and In-between aims to explore an alternative tractable model of firm competition opening the application of oligopoly theory to many fields in economics where general equilibrium features are crucial. It will be relevant to those interested in applied industrial organization, trade, macroeconomics (in particular macrodynamics) and quantitative economics.

The contents of this volume comprise the proceedings of the conference, "Equilibrium theory and applications." Some of the recent developments in general equilibrium theory in the perspective of actual and potential applications are presented. The conference was organized in honor of Jacques Drèze on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. Held at C.O.R.E., it was also the unanimous recognition, stressed by Gérard Debreu in his Address, of his role as "the architect and builder" of the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics. An introductory address by Gérard Debreu comprises Part 1 of the volume. The rest of the volume is divided into four parts spanning the scope of the conference. Part 2 is on incomplete markets, increasing returns, and information, Part 3 on equilibrium and dynamices, Part 4 on employment, imperfect competition, and macroeconomics, and Part 5 on applied general equilibrium models.

Institutional and Financial Incentives for Social Insurance provides both an empirical and a theoretical account of the main difficulties presently threatening social insurance systems in most industrialized countries. It analyzes the remedies that have been discussed and sometimes introduced and addresses many questions still left largely unresolved: Are newly implemented or proposed reforms providing the correct incentives to all participants in the system? Is the quality of service improving and, if not, what can be done? How should the budgetary problems be solved considering both intra-generational and inter-generational redistributive policies? The volume describes a number of studies of social security systems in various countries and assesses the effect of various policies, including welfare or unemployment benefits, training and other active labour market policies, the provision of pension, and competition and budget devolution in health care. It applies empirical tests to individual preferences concerning unemployment compensation, and it analyzes nonfunded and funded social security systems, the transition from one system to the other, and the willingness to pay for pensions.

The contents of this volume comprise the proceedings of the conference, "Equilibrium theory and applications." Some of the recent developments in general equilibrium theory in the perspective of actual and potential applications are presented. The conference was organized in honor of Jacques Dreze on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. Held at C.O.R.E., it was also the unanimous recognition, stressed by Gerard Debreu in his Address, of his role as "the architect and builder" of the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics. An introductory address by Gerard Debreu comprises Part 1 of the volume. The rest of the volume is divided into four parts spanning the scope of the conference. Part 2 is on incomplete markets, increasing returns, and information, Part 3 on equilibrium and dynamices, Part 4 on employment, imperfect competition, and macroeconomics, and Part 5 on applied general equilibrium models.