The problem of cost growth in major weapon system acquisition programs has plagued the Department of Defense for several decades. This report examines the Air Force experience with should-cost reviews--a special form of contract cost analysis intended to identify contractor inefficiencies and lower costs to the government--and options for enhancing the Air Force's capability to conduct such reviews.

The U.S. Air Force asked RAND Project AIR FORCE to perform a congressionally required assessment of contractor versus organic management of F-22 air vehicle and F119 engine sustainment to determine the most cost-effective approach. The methodology involved the development of notional government sustainment organizations and a consideration of a variety of factors relevant to such a decision, including the asserted benefits of each approach.

Analysis of findings from case studies and structured interviews focused on determining the potential benefits and challenges of using price-based acquisition for Department of Defense procurement of major military-unique systems. Price-based acquisition (PBA), a major acquisition reform measure being used by the Department of Defense (DoD), is claimed to reduce costs and enhance acquisition efficiency. This study presents findings based on structured interviews and case studies to determine whether the claims are true and what potential benefits PBA may hold for DoD.

Assesses whether shipyards, other naval firms, and suppliers in the United Kingdom have sufficient capacity to meet the demands of the Ministry of Defence's construction of new ships and submarines over the next 15 years. The United Kingdom has many contracted and prospective shipbuilding programmes on the horizon over the next two decades. The UK Ministry of Defence wants to know whether its country's diminishing industrial base will be able to meet the requirements of this shipbuilding plan. Using extensive surveys and a breadth of data, RAND researchers look at the capacity of the UK shipbuilding industrial base and how alternative acquisition requirements, programmes, and schedules might affect this capability.

The United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence (MOD) moved from a position of significant authority and responsibility in submarine design and development to one in which its acquisition responsibilities were largely transferred to a prime contractor. Now it is trying to re-engage. This book recommends measures and structures the UK Ministry of Defence can adopt to better manage its risks and responsibilities in the acquisition of nuclear submarines.