With full color maps and illustrations. Center of Military History publication 59-2-1. Global War on Terrorism Series. This first in-depth study of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq during the troop surge examines the war in the Multi-National Division-Center, an area of operations established in the spring of 2007 to focus on the insurgent sanctuaries and supply lines south of the Iraqi capital. It provides a valuable perspective for the ongoing counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

CMH Publication 59-2-1. Global War on Terrorism Series. From the foreword: "By late 2006, 31/2 years after the dramatic capture of Baghdad by U.S. and coalition forces, the war in Iraq was going badly. Sectarian tensions had erupted into violence and American public support for the war was at an all-time low. For better or worse, the George W. Bush administration decided to gamble on a troop increase, sending thirty thousand additional U.S. troops to Iraq in order to stop the bloodshed and bring stability to Baghdad and the surrounding area. By June 2007, they were all in place, and the so-called surge began. "Surging South of Baghdad" covers this crucial period in the Iraq war from the perspective of a single division operating in the region south of the Iraqi capital. Before the surge, this slice of territory between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers had become an insurgent safe haven where the enemy cached weapons and built bombs that fueled sectarian violence in Baghdad. Placing the 3d Infantry Division there bolstered a flagging coalition presence in the area and began the process of stabilization and rebuilding. This account offers a snapshot of the surge, its successes and shortcomings, and shows how the Army coped with the changing demands of the modern combat environment

During the Vietnam war, the United States sought to undermine Hanoi's subversion of the Saigon regime by sending Vietnamese operatives behind enemy lines. A secret to most Americans, this covert operation was far from secret in Hanoi: all of the commandos were killed or captured, and many were turned by the Communists to report false information.

"Spies and Commandos" traces the rise and demise of this secret operation-started by the CIA in 1960 and expanded by the Pentagon beginning in1964-in the first book to examine the program from both sides of the war. Kenneth Conboy and Dale Andrade interviewed CIA and military personnel and traveled in Vietnam to locate former commandos who had been captured by Hanoi, enabling them to tell the complete story of these covert activities from high-level decision making to the actual experiences of the agents.

The book vividly describes scores of dangerous missions-including raids against North Vietnamese coastal installations and the air-dropping of dozens of agents into enemy territory-as well as psychological warfare designed to make Hanoi believe the "resistance movement" was larger than it actually was. It offers a more complete operational account of the program than has ever been made available-particularly its early years-and ties known events in the war to covert operations, such as details of the "34-A Operations" that led to the Tonkin Gulf incidents in 1964. It also explains in no uncertain terms why the whole plan was doomed to failure from the start.

One of the remarkable features of the operation, claim the authors, is that its failures were so glaring. They argue that the CIA, and later the Pentagon, was unaware for years that Hanoi had compromised the commandos, even though some agents missed radio deadlines or filed suspicious reports. Operational errors were not attributable to conspiracy or counterintelligence, they contend, but simply to poor planning and lack of imagination.

Although it flourished for ten years under cover of the wider war, covert activity in Vietnam is now recognized as a disaster. Conboy and Andrade's account of that episode is a sobering tale that lends a new perspective on the war as it reclaims the lost lives of these unsung spies and commandos.

In the spring of 1972, North Vietnam launched a massive military offensive designed to deliver the coup de grce to South Vietnam and its rapidly disengaging American ally. But an overconfident Hanoi misjudged its opponents who, led by American military advisers and backed by American airpower, were able to hold off the North's onslaught in what became the biggest battle of a very long war. Dale Andrad rescues this epic engagement from its previous neglect to tell a riveting tale of heroism against great odds. "One of the best books on the Vietnam War."--Washington Post Book World Dale Andrad, a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, is the author of Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War and coauthor of Spies and Commandos: How America Lost the Secret War in North Vietnam.