This book discusses the question of whether legal interpretation is a scientific activity. The law's dependency on language, at least for the usual communication purposes, not only makes legal interpretation the main task performed by those whose work involves the law, but also an unavoidable step in the process of resolving a legal case. This task of decoding the words and sentences used by normative authorities while enacting norms, carried out in compliance with the principles and rules of the natural language adopted, is prone to all of the difficulties stemming from the uncertainty intrinsic to all linguistic conventions. In this context, seeking to determine whether legal interpretation can be scientific or, in other words, can comply with the requirements for scientific knowledge, becomes a central question. In fact, the coherent application of the law depends on a knowledge regarding the meaning of normative sentences that can be classified (at least) as being structured, systematically organized and tendentially objective. Accordingly, this book focuses on analyzing precisely these problems; its respective contributions offer a range of revealing perspectives on both the problems and their ramifications.

This book addresses the principle of proportionality, which is currently one of the most important instruments of judicial review, from both analytical and theory of law perspectives. As such, the analysis provided is far more comprehensive and can be applied to all areas of law, not just constitutional law. On the one hand, the volume offers a broad perspective on several aspects related to proportionality, such as its structure, the balancing methodology and the distinction between rules and principles. On the other, it provides an innovative, normativist and analytical approach to proportionality, helping readers understand its structure and behaviour.

This book addresses the principle of proportionality, which is currently one of the most important instruments of judicial review, from both analytical and theory of law perspectives. As such, the analysis provided is far more comprehensive and can be applied to all areas of law, not just constitutional law. On the one hand, the volume offers a broad perspective on several aspects related to proportionality, such as its structure, the balancing methodology and the distinction between rules and principles. On the other, it provides an innovative, normativist and analytical approach to proportionality, helping readers understand its structure and behaviour.

This book discusses the question of whether legal interpretation is a scientific activity. The law's dependency on language, at least for the usual communication purposes, not only makes legal interpretation the main task performed by those whose work involves the law, but also an unavoidable step in the process of resolving a legal case. This task of decoding the words and sentences used by normative authorities while enacting norms, carried out in compliance with the principles and rules of the natural language adopted, is prone to all of the difficulties stemming from the uncertainty intrinsic to all linguistic conventions. In this context, seeking to determine whether legal interpretation can be scientific or, in other words, can comply with the requirements for scientific knowledge, becomes a central question. In fact, the coherent application of the law depends on a knowledge regarding the meaning of normative sentences that can be classified (at least) as being structured, systematically organized and tendentially objective. Accordingly, this book focuses on analyzing precisely these problems; its respective contributions offer a range of revealing perspectives on both the problems and their ramifications.