Is there a reason for the busy citizen-leader to read about air and space history, theory, and doctrine? Yes, asserts David Mets, because without some vision of what the future is likely to bring, we enter new conflicts unarmed with any ideas and highly vulnerable to confusion and paralysis. He wrote this book to help the aspirant American leader build a theory of war and air and space power, including an understanding of what doctrine is, and what its utility and limitations are.

Since its earliest days, airpower has been one of the dominant forces used by the American military. American airmen, both Navy and Air Force, have been continually striving to achieve precision strikes in high altitude, at long range, or in darkness. The search for precision attack from standoff distances or altitudes has been imperative to national objectives with expenditure of American lives, treasure, and time.

This work covers the whole history of American aviation with special attention to the development of smart weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles and the influence they have had on the effectiveness of airpower. In a chronological treatment, emphasizing theory and doctrine, technology, tactics, and strategy. Mets also details both combat experience and intellectual processes, lethal and non-lethal, involved in the preparation of airpower. In addition to the narrative discussion, the work offers sidebars and feature sections that facilitate the understanding of key weapons systems and operational challenges. It also offers A Dozen-Book Sampler for Your Reading on Air and Space Theory and Doctrine. The work concludes with a brief look at information warfare and with some speculations about the future.

Through this thorough consideration of the evolution of American airpower and technology, Mets provides, not only a map of the past, but a guide to future generations of airpower and its potential for keeping the United States strong and safe.

This handbook provides a compact overview of the evolution of military airpower for young company-grade Airmen. It is designed as a primer and perhaps as a companion to a lifetime study of the profession. Military power has three main elements: ideas, people, and materiel. Each chapter follows that model. The narrative describes the main ideas, and a biographical sketch introduces someone who played a key role in that area. The illustrations portray some of the people and materiel involved. On the assumption that most Airmen know who airpower icons like Billy Mitchell and Hap Arnold were, the illustrations show some of the other important but less well-known figures. Of course, no short work can cover all the ideas, people, and materiel associated with each airpower topic, so each chapter also suggests some further reading that will start the officer on the lifetime study of his or her profession. The library call numbers of each work are given at the end of each entry. Air University Press, Air Force Research Institute.

It was inevitable that the airman's perspective regarding the employment of airpower in an operational theater would surface in North Africa, the first major American offensive of World War II. The publication of Field Manuals (FM) 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, and 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, was a manifestation of how airmen looked at the command of airpower, the selection of missions, and the assignment of priorities. The institutionalized conflict between soldiers and airmen over air employment that raised its head in Africa continues, regardless of the recorded combat experiences of, and the individual rapport among, field commanders. North Africa provided a stage to expose these deep-seated conflicting views of airpower. The soldier viewed the war in terms of brigades, divisions, corps, and armies; some saw the application of airpower as being in direct support of their own combat formations. The airman, on the other hand, saw the application of airpower in terms of the entire theater of operations; therefore, he saw it employed in situations and against enemy forces presenting the greatest threat in the theater. The establishment of three priorities for air missions-superiority, interdiction, and close air support- was a focus of his perspective of theater air operations. Historical experience greatly affected the advocacy of this theater-wide operational scheme, particularly the way airpower was initially commanded and employed in North Africa. Along with an air campaign needing a focus to gain control of the air and interdict the battlefield, there was a need to reorganize the command structure. In essence, the decision to establish a tactical and strategic air force under a single air commander (Northwest African Air Forces under Gen Carl A Spaatz) created a theater command structure with coequal air and ground commanders under Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower. By this arrangement, the air and ground component commanders received equal footing. Previously, tactical airpower was subordinated, thus limiting the ability of XII Air Support Command and RAF 242 Group to influence the determination of theater strategy, the employment of forces, and the assignment of priority in application. It is against this background that the long-standing ideas of airmen brightened, leading to the development and publication of FM 100-20 and, later, to revisions of the basic tactical doctrinal manual (FM 31-35). These manuals served the purpose, perhaps too shrilly in retrospect, of articulating what airmen believed about airpower and how their perspectives on its use related to the views of ground forces. These manuals continue even today to be the foundation of what airmen believe about airpower and its relationship to the other services in a combat theater. The North Africa experience provided a model for the organization and employment of tactical airpower in subsequent campaigns in Europe, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. In each of these campaigns, planners have continued to refine, expand, and improve the effectiveness of tactical air support for all forces in a theater. The priorities for employment are a function of the most pressing threat and the greatest opportunity for imposing a major effect on the fighting ability of the opposing forces. The flexibility of tactical air (its greatest asset) permits a shifting focus between air superiority, interdiction, and close air support in accordance with the priority established by the overall commander. Differences in opinion on the employment of forces will continue among air, ground, and sea commanders in combat situations. However, when the overall commander in the theater makes a decision on the strategy and priority of operations, the air component commander must and will apply his forces in accordance with that decision.

The stunning changes in the complexion of international politics that began late in the decade of the 1980s and continue today will profoundly affect the American military establishment as a whole, and the US Air Force in particular. Decisions about the future course of the military will be made in the early part of the 1990s, which will essentially determine the course of the US Air Force well into the next century. Decisions of such importance require thoughtful consideration of all points of view. This report is one in a special series of CADRE Papers, which address many of the issues that decision makers must consider when undertaking such momentous decisions. The list of subjects addressed in this special series is by no means exhaustive, and the treatment of each subject is certainly not definitive. However, the Papers do treat topics of considerable importance to the future of the US Air Force, treat them with care and originality, and provide valuable insights. We believe this special series of CADRE Papers can be of considerable value to policymakers at all levels as they plan for the US Air Force and its role in the so-called postcontainment environment.

Remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) are in a way merely the continuation of the old human longing for methods of striking or observing one's enemies while remaining safe. This essay explores the advantages and disadvantages of the systems, and briefly speculates about the future of unmanned systems. Precision-guided munitions, cruise missiles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles cannot be reused, and guidance and propulsion systems are consumed with each round. RPAs have had much in common in the development of the technology with those, but are intended for reuse of the power and guidance apparatus.

This is the sort of monograph a senior scholar of Prof. David R. Mets's stature should write. As its title says, the study is first of all an effort to place a consequential airpower thinker in the context of the discourse. Since Professor Mets has been researching and writing about airpower history and topical studies for over forty years, he is well qualified to do the job. Beyond its surface intent, however, this study is also a forum for Mets to give forth a little on the broader meaning of the discourse and on some of its specific parts. Consequently, what starts out as an essay on Col. John Warden's place in the pantheon of great airpower thinkers becomes also an opportunity to hear new things about the missions of air warfare, the historical processes that shaped airpower thought, and the reality and importance of the revolution in military affairs. In his straightforward approach to analysis, Professor Mets begins his discussions of three better-known airpower thinkers of the 1920s - Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, and Billy Mitchell - with a close examination of their personal backgrounds. He pays particular attention to their professional education and operation flying experience. Mets then lays out the salient elements of each thinker's aerial theories, again paying particular attention to the views of each on the relationship of air warfare to warfare in general, its potential for independent decisiveness, target priorities, the air arm's suitability for organization independence, command arrangements, and air superiority. With those bodies of theory laid out for easy summation and comparison, Dave then does the same thing for John Warden. His subsequent comparison of the four individuals - three who context included precision munitions and space surveillance - is revealing. Although Warden's professional education and direct operational experience far outshine those of his predecessors, his core theories reflect as much continuity with their ideas as they reflect differences and accommodations to contemporary technology. These relationships are obscured sometimes by terminology differences, however, and it is one of Professor Mets's more important contributions that he cuts through them to show where Warden draws more from his predecessors than is obvious at first.

The third world will continue to grow in importance to the United States. Often possessing a wealth of vital natural resources or a geographic position astride crucial lines of communications, third world nations have, in many cases, become the focal point or East-West confrontations. Additionally, the frequent political turmoil and economic crises that plague some of these third world nations often threaten the vital interest of the West. For all of these reasons it is imperative that we understand the utility and limitations of military power applied to crisis situations in the third world. Land-based air power is of particular importance in rapidly developing crises because of its range of action and speed of response. Dr. Mt's study focused on land based air power in a variety of these situations.

Dr. David R. Mets's "The Long Search for a Surgical Strike: Precision Munitions and the Revolution in Military Affairs" is a broad, though-provoking examination of the relationship between the advancement in conventional weapons guidance technology and the "revolution in military affairs" (RMA). He defines and RMA as a rapid change in military technology, doctrine, and organization leading to a sweeping new way that wars are fought. Dr. Mets then considers whether the improvement in conventional air weapons accuracy since World War II is the foundation, the main pillar, one of the principal supports, or is irrelevant to the RMA - which is said to be afoot. Clearly, the air theorists of the 1920s were fully persuaded that indeed a revolution was afoot. Equally clearly, the visions of Guilio Douhet, William "Billy" Mitchell, and the Air Corps Tactical School were no more than partially fulfilled in World War II. Dr. Mets also explores the degree to which the shortcomings of aerial weapons were responsible for the denial of their visions and the degree to which those inadequacies were overcome in the conflicts that followed. He closes with an estimate as to whether their dreams of a revolution are about to be fulfilled.

A historian's occupational disease is to find old precedents for practically everything new that comes along. And that is true for remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) as well. In one way they are merely the continuation of the millennia-old human longing for methods of striking or observing one's enemies while remaining safe. The purpose of this essay is to briefly explore that which is old, to dwell for a time on what seems to be new, and to conclude with some speculations about the future of unmanned systems. George Patton once remarked that the object is not to die for one's country, but rather to make the other guy die for his. Thus, one way of looking at the history of military development is seeing it as an eternal search for standoff and precision to discover what one's enemy might be doing, or to strike him blows with minimum risk to one's health. That is often achieved through skill with minimal force rather than brute strength as with David and Goliath. So, too, it is with Predator operators at Creech AFB, Nevada, reaching across the world to see and then strike with small Hellfire missiles launched from Predator or Reaper RPAs. Precision-guided munitions (PGM), cruise missiles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) have long shared these characteristics, but none of these can be reused-guidance and propulsion systems are consumed with each round. RPAs have had much in common in the development of the technology with those, but are intended for reuse of the power and guidance apparatus.

Tactical airlift has been playing an ever-increasing role in the United States' effort in Vietnam, since the first C-123s of the 315th Air Division arrived during January 1962. CHECO report, "Assault Airlift Operations," published on 23 February 1967, reviewed this tactical airlift effort through the last half of 1966. "Tactical Airlift in Vietnam" describes the conduct of tactical airlift operations since that time, discusses some of the problems which have arisen within the system, and sets forth solutions attempted, the extent to which they have succeeded or failed. The tactical airlift organization has been involved in many activities which have had little or nothing to do with airlift in the strictest sense of the word. Such activities include the conduct of flare FAC missions, the dispensing of herbicide on jungle cover or crops, the flying of Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center missions, the clearing of helipads by means of dropping bombs from C-130s, area denial missions through the dropping of contaminated petroleum in drums from C-130s, and the conduct of psychological warfare operations from C-130s. This is a recently declassified study, reprinted from the original typescript manuscript. All text is legible but not the same as modern lithograph quality. Originally published in 1969. 182 pages. ill.

In light of the age-old belief of Confucius that no idea is new, Dr. Mets examines the role of Colonel Warden in the Gulf War to determine if a revolution in military affairs had occurred. He relies on several twentieth-century antecedents to Warden, including Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, and Billy Mitchell to distill a pattern. Mets also addresses whether "the argument that antedated the Gulf War to the effect that such conflicts between states using conventional weapons and methods are a pressing phenomenon." Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, provides an overview of Mets's discussion.

The Challenge of Change examines how military institutions attempted to meet the demands of the new strategic, political, and technological realities of the turbulent era between the First and Second World Wars. The contributors chose France, Germany, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States as focus countries because their military institutions endeavored to develop both the material capacity and the conceptual framework for the conduct of modern industrialized warfare on a continental scale. Both editors are on the faculty of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Harold R. Winton is professor of military history and theory. He is the author of To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927-1938. David R. Mets is professor of technology and innovation. He is the author of several books, including The Air Campaign: John Warden and the Classical Airpower Theorists.