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This is a collection of recent novel contributions in game theory
from a group of prominent authors in the field. It covers
Non-cooperative Games, Equilibrium Analysis, Cooperative Games and
Axiomatic Values in static and dynamic contexts.Part 1:
Non-cooperative Games and Equilibrium AnalysisIn game theory, a
non-cooperative game is a game with competition between individual
players and in which only self-enforcing (e.g. through credible
threats) alliances (or competition between groups of players,
called 'coalitions') are possible due to the absence of external
means to enforce cooperative behavior (e.g. contract law), as
opposed to cooperative games. In fact, non-cooperative games are
the foundation for the development of cooperative games by acting
as the status quo. Non-cooperative games are generally analysed
through the framework of equilibrium, which tries to predict
players' individual strategies and payoffs. Indeed, equilibrium
analysis is the centre of non-cooperative games. This volume on
non-cooperative games and equilibrium analysis contains a variety
of non-cooperative games and non-cooperative game equilibria from
prominent authors in the field.Part 2: Cooperative Games and
Axiomatic ValuesIt is well known that non-cooperative behaviours,
in general, would not lead to a Pareto optimal outcome. Highly
undesirable outcomes (like the prisoner's dilemma) and even
devastating results (like the tragedy of the commons) could appear
when the involved parties only care about their individual
interests in a non-cooperative situation. Cooperative games offer
the possibility of obtaining socially optimal and group efficient
solutions to decision problems involving strategic actions. In
addition, axiomatic values serve as guidance for establishing
cooperative solutions. This volume on cooperative games and
axiomatic values presents a collection of cooperative games and
axiomatic values from prominent authors in the field.
After several decades of rapid technological advancement and
economic growth, alarming levels of pollution and catastrophe-bound
environmental degradations are emerging all over the world. Even
sizable reduction in industrial pollutant emissions would only slow
down the accumulation of pollution. Given the complexity of the
problem and the over-simplicity of international environmental
initiatives (like the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal Protocol and Paris
Agreement, which focused mainly on emissions reduction and
regulations), limited success has been observed. The design of a
comprehensive solution for solving this globally devastating
problem is very much in order. Research in developing
environmentally clean technology into efficient and affordable
means of production plays a key role to effectively solving the
continual worsening global industrial pollution problem and meeting
the industrial growth needs. An essential element for success is
that the participating nations well-being must not be worse than
their non-cooperative well-being throughout the cooperation
duration. In addition, for the cooperative scheme to be
sustainable, the agreed-upon optimality principle in sharing the
cooperative benefits must be upheld at every stage of the
cooperation plan -- this condition is known as subgame consistency.
This book provides an effective means for resolving the
catastrophe-bound environmental problem through a Building
Environmentally Sustainable Technology with Subgame Consistent,
Optimal, Rational and Economically-viable Scheme (BEST SCORES). In
particular, the solution scheme involves: (i) A set of policy
instruments which includes levies on industrial pollution,
royalties on natural resources, coordinated pollutant abatement
efforts, cooperative development of clean technology, and transfer
payments leading to an optimal cooperation solution; (ii) Joint
development of environmentally sustainable technology and an
optimal technology pattern over time; (iii) A cooperative
maximisation program yielding the optimal (highest) joint payoff;
(iv) An economically viable scheme for each participating nation
with a cooperative payoff higher than its non-cooperative payoff
through transfer payments; (v) A subgame consistent payoff
distribution procedure, which ensures that the original agreed upon
optimality principle in gain sharing will be maintainedl; (vi) An
institutional mechanism design to guide the construction of
relevant institutions and agencies to implement the cooperative
scheme.
Economics is a science which studies human behaviours as a
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative
uses. Since economic resources are scarce, optimisation forms an
integral part in the study of economics. In addition, in the
presence of imperfect market structure, externalities, imperfect
information or public goods, the market fails to provide an
efficient allocation mechanism. Optimisation of economic activities
provides an effective remedial measure for market failures. This
contributed volume collects advances in the studies of economics
and optimisation. Contributions cover areas on analysis of optimal
allocation of economic resources, economic optimisation techniques,
the interface economics and optimisation, optimisation under market
mechanism and history of development of optimisation techniques.
The studies assembled in this volume are dedicated to the memory of
a pioneering researcher and Nobel Laureate in the field of economic
optimisation -- Leonid Vitalyevich Kantorovich. In his 100th
birthday tribute in 2012, the International Conference Mathematics,
Economic, Management: Kantorovich-100 in St-Petersburg was held in
his memory. Selected papers from the conference are included in
this Volume. In addition, contributed papers from authors who had
worked closely with Kantorovich are also contained.
This book is the first treatise on consumer theory in a dynamic
framework. It expands the conventional static consumer theory into
a stochastic dynamic framework accommodating various combinations
of uncertainties in future income, life-span and future
preferences. These extensions incorporate realistic and intrinsic
characteristics of the consumer decision into the analysis of
consumer theory. Novel innovations to the field of consumer theory
presented in the book include wealth-dependent ordinary demand,
inter-temporal indirect utility function, wealth compensated
demand, wealth expenditure function and inter-temporal Roy's
identity under uncertainty. A prominent highlight of the book is
the derivation of a series of stochastic dynamic Slutsky equations.
New optimal consumption paradigms presented include: (i) utility
maximisation in a dynamic framework, duality and wealth compensated
demand, and dynamic Slutsky equations, (ii) dynamic consumption
under random horizon and income, (iii) consumption amid
uncertainties in income, life span and preferences, and (iv)
stochastic future prices and consumption decision. The mathematical
foundation of the book provides a fertile ground for the analysis
of dynamic consumption under stochastic dynamic environments. The
book paves the way for a new phase in optimal consumption analysis
and will be of interest to economics and mathematics students,
economists, mathematicians and researchers in consumer behaviour.
This book is an important and innovative addition to textbooks in
game theory. It provides a detailed discourse on the extension of
two of the worlds most prominent cooperative game solutions the
seminal Shapley value in games with transferrable payoffs and the
classic Nash bargaining scheme in games with non-transferrable
payoffs to a dynamic framework. The extension of these two classic
cooperative solution concepts into a dynamic setting is not just of
theoretical interest, but also allows many real-life cooperation
situations like global environmental management, nuclear
disarmament, disease control, trade disputes and political unions
to be analyzed in an effective way. This book provides: (i) A
compendium of dynamic optimization techniques used in its analysis;
(ii) a detailed disquisition on cooperative dynamic consistency;
(iii) the extension of the Shapley Value to a dynamic framework;
(iv) the establishment of a dynamic Nash bargaining paradigm; and
(v) the incorporation of stochastic elements into the analyses.
Interesting solvable examples are provided to illustrate the
practicality and applicability of the dynamic Shapley value and
dynamic Nash bargaining scheme in dynamic cooperation.
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