This is a classic IEA text, first Published in 1983, but revised and expanded in 1997. Its critique of that type of 'development economics' highly influential in the early 1980s, which the author branded the 'dirigiste dogma', proved extremely controversial in the first few years of the book's life. Professor Lal concluded that the demise of the dogma would be beneficial to the health of 'both economics and the economies of developing countries'. The history of the last twenty years has demonstrated the force of the Lal critique. The dogma in its old form has gone, as Professor Lal shows in a postscript that brings the original text up to date both in terms of statistics and in terms of the history of ideas. Nevertheless, as he warns, dirigiste tendencies have not disappeared, but are emerging in new guises.

The twentieth century witnessed an explosion of new nations carved out of existing ramshackle empires and multiethnic states. Many observers contend that the creation of new states will continue indefinitely, with the two hundred of today becoming the four hundred of tomorrow as more groups seek independence. This provocative and compelling book explores the impact of globalization and terrorism on this trend, arguing convincingly that the era of national self-determination has finally come to an end. Examining the forces that determine the emergence of new nation-states, the distinguished contributors consider a rich array of specific cases from the Middle East, Asia, North America, Europe, and Russia where new states could be created. They contend that globalization, rather than expanding such opportunities, is not as friendly to new weak states with limited resources as it is to established rich nations. Given the vast sums circulating in the world market, few fledgling nations can be financially independent. They find it more prudent to shelter within the protective embrace of existing federations. Equally, governments of federal states can induce restive petitioners such as Quebec, Scotland, and the Basques to remain inside the metropolitan boundary through a system of tangible restraints and rewards. Those who reject the benefits, such as rebels in Chechnya and Aceh, will fail in their bids for independence. Taiwan poised on a knife-edge between integration with China and independence faces a series of costs and diminished returns if it seeks full statehood. Finally, terrorism has lost its legitimacy as a technique for gaining independence in the eyes of the international community. Despite the stall in new state formation, there has been no sign of successful military or imperial expansion by established countries toward consolidation into fewer, larger national units. Neither aggression by regional states such as the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990, nor intervention such as the U.S. occupation"

The twentieth century witnessed an explosion of new nations carved out of existing ramshackle empires and multiethnic states. Many observers contend that the creation of new states will continue indefinitely, with the two hundred of today becoming the four hundred of tomorrow as more groups seek independence. This provocative and compelling book explores the impact of globalization and terrorism on this trend, arguing convincingly that the era of national self-determination has finally come to an end. Examining the forces that determine the emergence of new nation-states, the distinguished contributors consider a rich array of specific cases from the Middle East, Asia, North America, Europe, and Russia where new states could be created. They contend that globalization, rather than expanding such opportunities, is not as friendly to new weak states with limited resources as it is to established rich nations. Given the vast sums circulating in the world market, few fledgling nations can be financially independent. They find it more prudent to shelter within the protective embrace of existing federations. Equally, governments of federal states can induce restive petitioners_such as Quebec, Scotland, and the Basques_to remain inside the metropolitan boundary through a system of tangible restraints and rewards. Those who reject the benefits, such as rebels in Chechnya and Aceh, will fail in their bids for independence. Taiwan_poised on a knife-edge between integration with China and independence_faces a series of costs and diminished returns if it seeks full statehood. Finally, terrorism has lost its legitimacy as a technique for gaining independence in the eyes of the international community. Despite the stall in new state formation, there has been no sign of successful military or imperial expansion by established countries toward consolidation into fewer, larger national units. Neither aggression by regional states_such as the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990, nor intervention_such as the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003, are likely to succeed. On balance, the book concludes, discontented national movements will have to find ways to exist within current geopolitical boundaries.

The Great Power coalition of the early 19th century succeeded in keeping the peace among the major states of England, France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria. For the last century and a half, however, no truly encompassing coalition has emerged, and in its absence the 20th century was plagued by world wars and peripheral conflicts. Only now, at the outset of the 21st century, is a new Great Power coalition possible. This book examines the prospect of a Great Power coalition that would be sustained by the development of 'overlapping international clubs.' The new set of Great Powers the United States, Japan, the European Union, China, and Russia can be increasingly bound together through a combination of status and economic incentives, international norms and regimes, and the emulation of national and regional 'best practices.' The construction of such a coalition presents special problems and opportunities for the United States. In the years ahead, America will need to adjust its policies to bring China and Russia into membership of such a group or see them progressively adopt recalcitrant and antagonistic attitudes toward world affairs.

"Reviving the Invisible Hand" is an uncompromising call for a global return to a classical liberal economic order, free of interference from governments and international organizations. Arguing for a revival of the invisible hand of free international trade and global capital, eminent economist Deepak Lal vigorously defends the view that statist attempts to ameliorate the impact of markets threaten global economic progress and stability. And in an unusual move, he not only defends globalization economically, but also answers the cultural and moral objections of antiglobalizers.

Taking a broad cross-cultural and interdisciplinary approach, Lal argues that there are two groups opposed to globalization: cultural nationalists who oppose not capitalism but Westernization, and "new dirigistes" who oppose not Westernization but capitalism. In response, Lal contends that capitalism doesn't have to lead to Westernization, as the examples of Japan, China, and India show, and that "new dirigiste" complaints have more to do with the demoralization of their societies than with the capitalist instruments of prosperity.

Lal bases his case on a historical account of the rise of capitalism and globalization in the first two liberal international economic orders: the nineteenth-century British, and the post-World War II American.

Arguing that the "new dirigisme" is the thin edge of a wedge that could return the world to excessive economic intervention by states and international organizations, Lal does not shrink from controversial stands such as advocating the abolishment of these organizations and defending the existence of child labor in the Third World.

This is a volume of essays in honour of Ian Little, who was Professor of Economics at Oxford until 1975, and whose seminal work in the discipline - notably in the areas of public policy and economic development - spans over 30 years and is still continuing. The authors, all well known economists, provide pointers to help and influence policymakers in areas crucial to the economies of developing countries. Each chapter provides a succinct summing up of the literature, conveying the main ideas in the chosen area in a way that is accessible to the layperson as well as to the professional economist, keeping technical matter to a minimum. The volume as a whole covers issues of concern in both microeconomic and macroeconomic policy. These include: exchange rate policy, trade policy, problems of industrialization, foreign investment, taxation strategies, capital flows, and aspects of the interface between politics and economic policy. The collection begins with a personal memoir by Francis Seton and concludes with a bibliography of Little's published work.

This wide-ranging book synthesises the findings of specially commissioned analytical economic histories of 21 developing countries from 1950 to 1985. It represents an ambitious interdisciplinary attempt to identify patterns in the interplay of initial conditions, institutions, interests, and ideas which can help explain the different growth and poverty alleviation outcomes in the Third World. The authors establish clear and innovative frameworks for comparative study, and marshall evidence to argue for the continuing relevance of the classical liberal viewpoint on public policies for development, and to show why, even so, nationalist ideologies are likely to be adopted and lead to cycles of interventionism and liberalism.

India is an emerging giant. This book explains its long economic stagnation and recent rise by examining its social, political and historical evolution in long term perspective. It explains how its distinct social system based on caste arose and why it still is of importance in its political and social arrangements, despite India's recent move from the plan to market.

Empires have unfairly gotten a bad name, not least in U.S. domestic politics. This is particularly unfortunate, as the world needs an American pax to provide both global peace and prosperity. The most urgent task in the new imperium is to bring the world of Islam into the modern world, without seeking to alter its soul. In this monograph, Deepak Lal gives reasons to believe the United States should be able to fulfill this imperial task. But is it willing? Given the continuing resonance of Wilsonian moralism in public discourse, Lal is doubtful. There must first be an acceptance in domestic politics that the United States is an imperial power, and then the real debate about how best to use that power can sensibly ensue.

This book is a collection of Professor Deepak Lal's papers and talks on issues related to Indian economic policy. It focuses on various economic, political and cultural aspects of India's continuing integration with the world economy.

The Pax Americana--the global order established after the collapse of the Soviet Empire--is increasingly being challenged especially by former imperial behemoths China and Russia. There is a growing chorus questioning the so-called 'Washington Consensus' in favour of a 'Beijing Consensus' in economic policy. As the US ceases to be the sole superpower willing and able to maintain a global PAX, today there is an increasing global 'disorder'. This book is a study of the causes and consequences for this disorder, examining alternative claims for a desirable future economic policy. The book argues that the origin of this increasing disorder lie, in part, in the great economic recession of 2008 in the US, which has tarnished the free market based capitalism of the West. It goes on to debate that there are four major imperial systems which are and will be involved in the new 'Great Game' in Eurasia--the US and its European outpost--the EU, China, Russia and India and, potentially, Japan as it seeks to alter its post-war pacifist constitution to act like Britain did for many centuries, as the offshore balancer in the struggle for the mastery of Asia, either as a partner or independent of the US. Their strategic decisions will determine whether we will see a repeat of the past, with another completely unnecessary world war like the First World War, or if they will succeed in eschewing this atavism.