The length, scale and intensity of the Battle of the Atlantic led the British and German navies to make substantial changes to their organisation, strategy and tactics. In this book, Dennis Haslop examines the pivotal lessons learned, and how these helped to determine the outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic Convoy War. He questions how well adapted the two organisations were to learn from the conflict, and how effective they were in identifying problems and producing remedies. Based on the in-depth analysis of British and German primary sources, this study provides an innovative basis against which to assess the German and British approach to changing warfare and provides important new insights into aspects of convoy warfare, in particular the virtually unknown subject of German 'Operational Research'.

This book examines the British and German approach to naval air power, describing the creation and development of the two naval air service organizations and doctrine. This work provides new insights as to how two naval air services were influenced by internal and political interventions, and how each was integrated into the organizational structures of the Royal Navy and the Kaiserlichemarine (KM). Both the Admiralty and the KM made substantial alterations to their organizations and doctrine in the process. Principal air doctrines employed are examined chronologically and the application of operational doctrine is described. While they adopted similar air doctrines, there were differences in operational doctrine, which they addressed according to their different requirements. This book is a comparative study about the development of organization and air power doctrine in the RNAS (Royal Naval Air Service) and the IGNAS (Imperial German Naval Air Service). It investigates public and political interventions and early concepts of air power, placing into context the factors which contributed to how naval theorists came to think about the best means of controlling its working medium, air space. Ultimately, it examines the similarities, and differences, between the RNAS and IGNAS understanding of naval air power, within the broader strategic and theoretical framework of their parent organizations. This book will be of great interest to students of air power, naval power, military history, strategic studies and IR in general.

The length, scale and intensity of the Battle of the Atlantic led the British and German navies to make substantial changes to their organisation, strategy and tactics. In this book, Dennis Haslop examines the pivotal lessons learned, and how these helped to determine the outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic Convoy War. He questions how well adapted the two organisations were to learn from the conflict, and how effective they were in identifying problems and producing remedies. Based on the in-depth analysis of British and German primary sources, this study provides an innovative basis against which to assess the German and British approach to changing warfare and provides important new insights into aspects of convoy warfare, in particular the virtually unknown subject of German 'Operational Research'.