|
Showing 1 - 4 of
4 matches in All Departments
This collection, produced by a panel of international scholars from
various social science fields, will be useful to a new generation
of students formulating their own theories and research on
sociolegal behavior.
This collection, produced by a panel of international scholars from
various social science fields, will be useful to a new generation
of students formulating their own theories and research on
sociolegal behavior.
This book reconsiders the supposed impossibility of deriving
"Ought" from "Is". John R. Searle's 1964 article How to Derive
"Ought " from "Is'' sent shockwaves through the philosophical
community by offering a straightforward counterexample to this
claim of impossibility: from your promising something- and this is
an "is" - it simply follows that you "ought" to do it. This volume
opens with a brand new chapter from Searle who, in light of his
subsequent philosophical developments, expounds the reasons for the
validity of that derivation and its crucial significance for social
ontology and moral philosophy. Then, in a fresh interview with the
editors of this volume, Searle explores a range of topics including
how his derivation relates to constitutive rules, and how he views
Wittgenstein's philosophy, deontic logic, and the rationality of
action. The remainder of the volume is dedicated to a deep dive
into Searle's essay and its implications by international scholars
with diverse backgrounds ranging from analytic philosophy,
phenomenology, and logic, to moral philosophy and the philosophy
and sociology of law. With thirteen original chapters, the
contributors provide fresh and timely insights on hotly debated
issues: the nature of "Ought"; the logical structure of the social
world; and the possibility of deriving not only "Ought" from "Is",
but "Is" from "Ought".
This book reconsiders the supposed impossibility of deriving
"Ought" from "Is". John R. Searle's 1964 article How to Derive
"Ought " from "Is'' sent shockwaves through the philosophical
community by offering a straightforward counterexample to this
claim of impossibility: from your promising something- and this is
an "is" - it simply follows that you "ought" to do it. This volume
opens with a brand new chapter from Searle who, in light of his
subsequent philosophical developments, expounds the reasons for the
validity of that derivation and its crucial significance for social
ontology and moral philosophy. Then, in a fresh interview with the
editors of this volume, Searle explores a range of topics including
how his derivation relates to constitutive rules, and how he views
Wittgenstein's philosophy, deontic logic, and the rationality of
action. The remainder of the volume is dedicated to a deep dive
into Searle's essay and its implications by international scholars
with diverse backgrounds ranging from analytic philosophy,
phenomenology, and logic, to moral philosophy and the philosophy
and sociology of law. With thirteen original chapters, the
contributors provide fresh and timely insights on hotly debated
issues: the nature of "Ought"; the logical structure of the social
world; and the possibility of deriving not only "Ought" from "Is",
but "Is" from "Ought".
|
|