Aerial warfare has dominated war-making for over 100 years, and despite regular announcements of its demise, it shows no sign of becoming obsolete. In this Very Short Introduction Frank Ledwidge offers a sweeping look at the history of aerial warfare, introducing the major battles, crises, and controversies where air power has taken centre stage, and the changes in technology and air power capabilities over time. Highlighting the role played by air power in the First and Second World Wars, he also sheds light on the lesser-known theatres where the roles of air forces have been clearly decisive in conflicts, in Africa, South America, and Asia. Along the way, Ledwidge asks key questions about the roles air power can deliver, and whether it is conceptually different from other forms of combat. Considering whether bombing has ever been truly effective, he discusses whether wars can be won from the air, and concludes by analysing whether there is a future for manned air power, or if it is inevitable that drones will dominate 21st century war in the air. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable. Previously published in hardback as Aerial Warfare: The Battle for the Skies.

This new edition of Frank Ledwidge's eye-opening analysis of British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan unpicks the causes and enormous costs of military failure. Updated throughout, and with fresh chapters assessing and enumerating the overall military performance since 2011-including Libya, ISIS, and the Chilcot findings-Ledwidge shows how lessons continue to go unlearned. "A brave and important book; essential reading for anyone wanting insights into the dysfunction within the British military today, and the consequences this has on the lives of innocent civilians caught up in war."-Times Literary Supplement

In most societies, courts are where the rubber of government meets the road of the people. If a state cannot settle disputes and ensure that its decisions are carried out, for practical purposes it is no longer in charge. This is why successful rebels put courts and justice at the top of their agendas. Rebel Law examines this key weapon in the armory of insurgent groups, ranging from the Ireland of the 1920s, where the IRA sapped British power using 'Republican Tribunals' to today's 'Caliphate of Law' -- the Islamic State, by way of Algeria in the 1950s and the Afghan Taliban. Frank Ledwidge tells how insurgent courts bleed legitimacy from government, decide cases and enforce judgments on the battlefield itself. Astute counterinsurgents, especially in 'ungoverned space,' can ensure that they retain the initiative. The book describes French, Turkish and British colonial 'judicial strategy' and contrasts their experience with the chaos of more recent 'stabilization operations' in Iraq and Afghanistan, drawing lessons for contemporary counterinsurgents. Rebel Law builds on his insights and shows that the courts themselves can be used as weapons for both sides in highly unconventional warfare.

In this follow-up to the extremely successful Losing Small Wars, Frank Ledwidge analyses the cost - both financial and human - of Britain's involvement in the Afghanistan war. With the aid of interviews, on-the-ground research and countless Freedom of Information requests, he pieces together the enormous burden the Afghan intervention has placed on the shoulders of British soldiers and their families, UK taxpayers and - by far the greatest sufferers - Afghan civilians. Amongst other issues, he highlights the soldiers left horribly maimed, UK funds poured into the corrupt black hole that is the Afghan government, refugees driven out of Helmand province into disease-ridden camps, and the long-term damage to the international reputation of the UK military. Ledwidge argues that the only true beneficiaries of the conflict are development consultants, Afghan drugs kingpins and international arms companies. This is both an extraordinary piece of investigative journalism and a heart-breaking account of military adventurism gone horribly wrong. A new afterword brings the analysis up to date.