"Mission accomplished," George Bush famously proclaimed in reference to the defeat of Saddam Hussein's military organization. However, as recent events in Iraq have once again demonstrated, it is much easier to start a war than it is to end it.

"Every War Must End," which Colin Powell credits in his autobiography with having shaped his thinking on how to end the first Gulf War, analyzes the many critical obstacles to ending a war& mdash;an aspect of military strategy that is frequently and tragically overlooked. This book explores the difficult and often painful process through which wars in the modern age have been brought to a close and what this process means for the future. IklA(c) considers a variety of examples from twentieth-century history and examines specific strategies that effectively "won the peace," including the Allied policy in Germany and Japan after World War II.

In the new preface to his classic work, IklA(c) explains how U.S. political decisions and military strategy and tactics in Iraq -- the emphasis on punishing Iraqi leaders, not seeking a formal surrender, and the failure to maintain law and order-have delayed, and indeed jeopardized, a successful end to hostilities.

"Mission accomplished," George Bush famously proclaimed in reference to the defeat of Saddam Hussein's military organization. However, as recent events in Iraq have once again demonstrated, it is much easier to start a war than it is to end it.

"Every War Must End," which Colin Powell credits in his autobiography with having shaped his thinking on how to end the first Gulf War, analyzes the many critical obstacles to ending a war& mdash;an aspect of military strategy that is frequently and tragically overlooked. This book explores the difficult and often painful process through which wars in the modern age have been brought to a close and what this process means for the future. IklA(c) considers a variety of examples from twentieth-century history and examines specific strategies that effectively "won the peace," including the Allied policy in Germany and Japan after World War II.

In the new preface to his classic work, IklA(c) explains how U.S. political decisions and military strategy and tactics in Iraq -- the emphasis on punishing Iraqi leaders, not seeking a formal surrender, and the failure to maintain law and order-have delayed, and indeed jeopardized, a successful end to hostilities.

Since we live in the shadow of nuclear warfare, we must face its probable consequences and be prepared to cope with potentially gruesome and large-scale destruction, says author Fred Charles Ikle. Much has been written about the physical and biological effects of nuclear warfare, but the effect of bombing on the functioning of society - on the lives and activities of city dwellers, on the operation of industries, and even on the organization of a nation - has been largely neglected. This is the first book to deal with the sociological and demographic impact of widespread bomb destruction. The physical effects of nuclear destruction are related to their social consequences, which are ultimately decisive for political and military strategy, as well as civil defense. Ikle's findings are based on an extensive analysis of World War II data from Germany, Japan, Poland, and other countries. He also examined many other types of disasters in order to predict the results of nuclear bombing - from medieval plagues to the evacuation in Holland during the floods of 1953. Statistical comparisons show how different degrees of destruction affect cities or nations. The Social Impact of Bomb Destruction is required reading for all civil defense workers and military personnel, as well as government leaders and civilians who would be informed on the social consequences of bombing - and ways to deal with those consequences.