The defeat of South Vietnam was arguably America's worst foreign policy disaster of the 20th Century. Yet a complete understanding of the endgame--from the 27 January 1973 signing of the Paris Peace Accords to South Vietnam's surrender on 30 April 1975--has eluded us. Black April addresses that deficit. A culmination of exhaustive research in three distinct areas: primary source documents from American archives, North Vietnamese publications containing primary and secondary source material, and dozens of articles and numerous interviews with key South Vietnamese participants, this book represents one of the largest Vietnamese translation projects ever accomplished, including almost one hundred rarely or never seen before North Vietnamese unit histories, battle studies, and memoirs. Most important, to celebrate the 30th Anniversary of South Vietnam's conquest, the leaders in Hanoi released several compendiums of formerly highly classified cables and memorandum between the Politburo and its military commanders in the south. This treasure trove of primary source materials provides the most complete insight into North Vietnamese decision-making ever complied. While South Vietnamese deliberations remain less clear, enough material exists to provide a decent overview. Ultimately, whatever errors occurred on the American and South Vietnamese side, the simple fact remains that the country was conquered by a North Vietnamese military invasion despite written pledges by Hanoi's leadership against such action. Hanoi's momentous choice to destroy the Paris Peace Accords and militarily end the war sent a generation of South Vietnamese into exile, and exacerbated a societal trauma in America over our long Vietnam involvement that reverberates to this day. How that transpired deserves deeper scrutiny.

Drawn Swords in a Distant Land showcases the fascinating, untold story of the rise and fall of the Republic of Vietnam. Putting aside outdated ideological debates, it offers the first in-depth review of the South Vietnamese successes and failures in building and defending their state. Drawn Swords highlights the career of President Nguyen Van Thieu, who in many ways embodied the hopes, dreams, and innumerable tragedies of the South Vietnamese people. It details the extent to which the Vietnamese Nationalists under his leadership built a viable state after the 1968 Tet Offensive; weaves together the policy decisions made in Washington, Hanoi, and Saigon that significantly determined the course of the war; and explains why South Vietnam was defeated in April 1975. Equally important, it provides stunning new details about how the coup against Ngo Dinh Diem was almost halted, describes the backroom maneuvering that chose Thieu for the presidency over Nguyen Cao Ky, and demonstrates that Richard Nixon was not the instigator of a conspiracy with Thieu known as the “Chennault Affair” to win the 1968 election. Even more explosive, Drawn Swords reveals the last, great secret of the Vietnam War: a plot by France during the last days, in conjunction with one of Hanoi’s allies, to prevent North Vietnam from conquering Saigon. This previously unknown scheme, along with many other intriguing new insights, sheds fresh light on the tumultuous struggle called the Vietnam War. Drawn Swords is the definitive and much overdue account of Thieu and the Second Republic.