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This expanded edition of John Stuart Mill's 'Utilitarianism'
includes the text of his 1868 speech to the British House of
Commons defending the use of capital punishment in cases of
aggravated murder. The speech is significant both because its topic
remains timely and because its arguments illustrate the
applicability of the principle of utility to questions of
large-scale social policy.
Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory is an outstanding
anthology of the most important topics, theories and debates in
ethics, compiled by one of the leading experts in the field. It
includes sixty-six extracts covering the central domains of ethics:
why be moral? the meaning of moral language morality and
objectivity consequentialism deontology virtue and character value
and well-being moral psychology applications: including abortion,
famine relief and consent. Included are both classical extracts
from Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant and Mill, as well as contemporary
classics from philosophers such as Thomas Nagel, Thomas Scanlon,
Martha Nussbaum, Derek Parfit, and Peter Singer. A key feature of
the anthology is that it covers the perennial topics in ethics as
well as very recent ones, such as moral psychology, responsibility
and experimental philosophy. Each section is introduced and placed
in context by the editor, making this an ideal anthology for anyone
studying ethics or ethical theory.
Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory is an outstanding
anthology of the most important topics, theories and debates in
ethics, compiled by one of the leading experts in the field. It
includes sixty-six extracts covering the central domains of ethics:
* why be moral? * the meaning of moral language * morality and
objectivity * consequentialism * deontology * virtue and character
* value and well-being * moral psychology * applications: including
abortion, famine relief and consent. Included are both classical
extracts from Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant and Mill, as well as
contemporary classics from philosophers such as Thomas Nagel,
Thomas Scanlon, Martha Nussbaum, Derek Parfit, and Peter Singer. A
key feature of the anthology is that it covers the perennial topics
in ethics as well as very recent ones, such as moral psychology,
responsibility and experimental philosophy. Each section is
introduced and placed in context by the editor, making this an
ideal anthology for anyone studying ethics or ethical theory.
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Desert (Paperback)
George Sher
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R1,133
R1,030
Discovery Miles 10 300
Save R103 (9%)
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Ships in 12 - 17 working days
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'A complex and subtle depiction of a highly irregular conceptual
terrain. ...Sher's discussion in sure to play an important part in
future thinking about desert. It has many virtues, foremost among
them its thoroughness and clarity and its refusal to dodge
difficulties. It represents a stimulating and educative
contribution to several different areas of philosophical debate,
and on all these grounds deserves to be widely read.'
This book offers a new and compelling account of distributive
justice and its relation to choice. Unlike luck egalitarians, who
treat unchosen differences in people's circumstances as sources of
unjust inequality to be overcome, Sher views such differences as
pervasive and unavoidable features of the human situation.
Appealing to an original account of what makes us moral equals, he
argues that our interest in successfully negotiating life's
ever-shifting contingencies is more basic than our interest in
achieving any more specific goals. He argues, also, that the
state's obligation to promote this interest supports a principled
version of the view that what matters about resources, opportunity,
and other secondary goods is only that each person have enough. The
book opens up a variety of new questions, and offers a distinctive
new perspective for scholars of political theory and political
philosophy, and for those interested in distributive justice and
luck egalitarianism.
Can unexpressed thoughts be morally wrong? Are people subject to
moral condemnation not only for their malicious, biased, and cruel
actions, but also for their private malice, biased beliefs, and
ugly fantasies? Although many would answer "yes," George Sher
argues in A Wild West of the Mind that none of the main approaches
to morality support this view and that to accept it would be to
relinquish an essential aspect of our mental freedom. To preserve
that freedom, we must allow our beliefs to follow the evidence
wherever it leads and must give our private feelings, attitudes,
and fantasies free rein. As so understood, the realm of the purely
mental is a morality-free zone, one within which no thoughts or
attitudes are either forbidden or required. Even when our beliefs
are irrational or repugnant and our desires reflect badly on our
character, it is never morally wrong for us to have them. A Wild
West of the Mind advances a provocative thesis of normative ethics
and offers a powerful defense of freedom of mind. Broad in scope
and tightly argued, the book will have much to offer philosophers
working in ethics, free will, and epistemology.
How do we punish others socially, and should we do so? In her 2018
Descartes Lectures for Tilburg University, Linda Radzik explores
the informal methods ordinary people use to enforce moral norms,
such as telling people off, boycotting businesses, and publicly
shaming wrongdoers on social media. Over three lectures, Radzik
develops an account of what social punishment is, why it is
sometimes permissible, and when it must be withheld. She argues
that the proper aim of social punishment is to put moral pressure
on wrongdoers to make amends. Yet the permissibility of applying
such pressure turns on the tension between individual desert and
social good, as well as the possession of an authority to punish.
Responses from Christopher Bennett, George Sher and Glen Pettigrove
challenge Radzik's account of social punishment while also offering
alternative perspectives on the possible meanings of our responses
to wrongdoing. Radzik replies in the closing essay.
How do we punish others socially, and should we do so? In her 2018
Descartes Lectures for Tilburg University, Linda Radzik explores
the informal methods ordinary people use to enforce moral norms,
such as telling people off, boycotting businesses, and publicly
shaming wrongdoers on social media. Over three lectures, Radzik
develops an account of what social punishment is, why it is
sometimes permissible, and when it must be withheld. She argues
that the proper aim of social punishment is to put moral pressure
on wrongdoers to make amends. Yet the permissibility of applying
such pressure turns on the tension between individual desert and
social good, as well as the possession of an authority to punish.
Responses from Christopher Bennett, George Sher and Glen Pettigrove
challenge Radzik's account of social punishment while also offering
alternative perspectives on the possible meanings of our responses
to wrongdoing. Radzik replies in the closing essay.
This book offers a new and compelling account of distributive
justice and its relation to choice. Unlike luck egalitarians, who
treat unchosen differences in people's circumstances as sources of
unjust inequality to be overcome, Sher views such differences as
pervasive and unavoidable features of the human situation.
Appealing to an original account of what makes us moral equals, he
argues that our interest in successfully negotiating life's
ever-shifting contingencies is more basic than our interest in
achieving any more specific goals. He argues, also, that the
state's obligation to promote this interest supports a principled
version of the view that what matters about resources, opportunity,
and other secondary goods is only that each person have enough. The
book opens up a variety of new questions, and offers a distinctive
new perspective for scholars of political theory and political
philosophy, and for those interested in distributive justice and
luck egalitarianism.
To be responsible for their acts, agents must both perform those
acts voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of
these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much
discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less
attention. In Who Knew? George Sher seeks to rectify that
imbalance. The book is divided in two halves, the first of which
criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the
epistemic condition, while the second seeks to develop a more
adequate alternative. It is often assumed that agents are
responsible only for what they are aware of doing or bringing
about--that their responsibility extends only as far as the
searchlight of their consciousness. The book criticizes this
"searchlight view" on two main grounds: first, that it is
inconsistent with our attributions of responsibility to a broad
range of agents who should but do not realize that they are acting
wrongly or foolishly, and, second, that the view is not
independently defensible. The book's positive view construes the
crucial relation between an agent and his failure to recognize the
wrongness or foolishness of what he is doing in causal terms: the
agent is responsible when, and because, his failure to respond to
his reasons for believing that he is acting wrongly or foolishly
has its origins in the same constitutive psychology that generally
does render him reason-responsive.
To be responsible for their acts, agents must both perform those
acts voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of
these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much
discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less
attention. In Who Knew? George Sher seeks to rectify that
imbalance. The book is divided in two halves, the first of which
criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the
epistemic condition, while the second seeks to develop a more
adequate alternative. It is often assumed that agents are
responsible only for what they are aware of doing or bringing
about--that their responsibility extends only as far as the
searchlight of their consciousness. The book criticizes this
"searchlight view" on two main grounds: first, that it is
inconsistent with our attributions of responsibility to a broad
range of agents who should but do not realize that they are acting
wrongly or foolishly, and, second, that the view is not
independently defensible. The book's positive view construes the
crucial relation between an agent and his failure to recognize the
wrongness or foolishness of what he is doing in causal terms: the
agent is responsible when, and because, his failure to respond to
his reasons for believing that he is acting wrongly or foolishly
has its origins in the same constitutive psychology that generally
does render him reason-responsive.
Blame is an unpopular and neglected notion: it goes against the
grain of a therapeutically-oriented culture and has been far less
discussed by philosophers than such related notions as
responsibility and punishment. This book seeks to show that neither
the opposition nor the neglect is justified. The book's most
important conclusion is that blame is inseparable from morality
itself--that any considerations that justify us in accepting a set
of moral principles must also call for the condemnation of those
who violate the principles. Properly understood, blame and morality
must stand or fall together.
Because blame has not received much sustained attention, the book
works its way toward its conclusions by first raising, and then
seeking to resolve, a series of conceptual and normative questions.
These questions include: How are blameworthy acts related to the
characters of the agents who perform them? Can agents deserve blame
for their bad traits as well as their bad acts? Is blame best
understood as a kind of action, a kind of belief, a kind of
feeling, a combination of these elements, or something different
entirely? What sort of normative concept is blameworthiness? How do
blame and blameworthiness--correlative notions--fit together?
Considered as a group, the questions yield a unified and
comprehensive theory of both blame and blameworthiness. In
developing that theory, the book both criticizes and draws
inspiration from the two most important previous treatments of its
topic: Hume's discussion of the relation between character and
blame and Strawson's landmark discussion of the "reactive
attitudes." However, the theory that emerges is neither Humean nor
Strawsonion: it is anew theory that seeks to do more justice than
its predecessors to the indispensable role that blame plays in our
moral lives.
In this book, distinguished philosopher George Sher explores the
normative moral and social problems that arise from living in a
decidedly non-ideal world_a world that contains immorality, evil,
and injustice, and in which resources (including knowledge) are
often inadequate. Sher confronts difficult issues surrounding
preferential treatment and equal opportunity, compensatory justice
and punishment, the allocation of goods by lottery, and abortion
and moral compromise. In each case, Sher asks not what an ideal
society would involve, but how we should deal with failures to live
up to individual or social ideals. Challenging current academic
orthodoxy, Sher's work is sure to incite discussion among students
and scholars alike. Approximate Justice is an engaging and
provocative book that will excite anyone with interest in social
and political philosophy, justice, and law.
Many people, including many contemporary philosophers, believe that
the state has no business trying to improve people's characters,
elevating their tastes, or preventing them from living degraded
lives. They believe that governments should remain absolutely
neutral when it comes to the consideration of competing conceptions
of the good. One fundamental aim of George Sher's book is to show
that this view is indefensible. A second complementary aim is to
articulate a conception of the good that is worthy of promotion by
the state. The first part of the book analyses attempts to ground
the neutrality thesis in the value of autonomy, respect for
autonomy, the dangers of a non-neutral state, and scepticism about
the good. The second part defends an objective conception of the
good which remains sensitive to some of the considerations that
make subjectivism attractive.
Many people, including many contemporary philosophers, believe that
the state has no business trying to improve people's characters,
elevating their tastes, or preventing them from living degraded
lives. They believe that governments should remain absolutely
neutral when it comes to the consideration of competing conceptions
of the good. One fundamental aim of George Sher's book is to show
that this view is indefensible. A second complementary aim is to
articulate a conception of the good that is worthy of promotion by
the state. The first part of the book analyses attempts to ground
the neutrality thesis in the value of autonomy, respect for
autonomy, the dangers of a non-neutral state, and scepticism about
the good. The second part defends an objective conception of the
good which remains sensitive to some of the considerations that
make subjectivism attractive.
Blame is an unpopular and neglected notion: it goes against the
grain of a therapeutically-oriented culture and has received
relatively little philosophical attention. This book discusses
questions about its nature, normative status, and relation to
character. The book's most important conclusion is that blame is
inseparable from morality itself.
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