"German General Staff Officer Education and Current Challenges" examines the institutional education of German General Staff Officers, as experienced by the author, and offers a "Conceptual Competency-Skill-Framework" for professional development. Five competencies (Physical, Intrinsic Motivation, Intrapersonal, Interpersonal, and Cognitive Competency) and five skills (Deduction, Synthesis, Analysis, Induction, and Revaluation Skill) define this model through a process of theory and praxis. A case study of an operational planner for the first German Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan (2003) describes the experiences of the author and identifies competencies and skills that required improvisation, rather than reliance on a model of previous institutional, operational, and personal preparation. This monograph commends the balanced holistic approach of the German General Staff Officer course at the Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr (German General Staff Officer Academy), and recommends several educational venues to improve the specific competencies and skills in an institutional setting. The trinity of premier institutional education, operational experience and practical insight, and a dedicated life-long program for professional self-development, invigorates the military leader for emergent roles in national, regional, and global mission responsibilities. The ultimate value of a conceptual competency-skill framework is the personal assessment, evaluation, and integration for professional learning and performance that results in how to think, act, and lead.

Multinational operations under the direction of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) have become the norm rather than the exception. In the light of an emerging partnership between both organizations, this paper analyzes the NATO Strategic Concept 2010 and assesses it consequences for the operational level or war and effective operational art in multinational operations. In the light of changed fiscal realities in Europe, this paper identifies a widening strategic military capability gap between the United States and European countries and an increasing divergence between multinational ambitions and the reality of national military capability planning. The most significant outcomes for effective operational art in multinational operations are the following. First, the operational level of war needs to integrate civilian planning in campaign design, which requires an adaptation of NATO's command structure and NATO's operational level doctrine with the aim to bridge to and take advantage of EU civilian competencies in this field. Second, the study agues for an adaption of existing NATO standardization agreement provisions for efficient operational logistics in multinational operations and enhanced tactical military training among European countries. This will require, third, a high effort in armament cooperation to make military equipment more interoperable. In this field, the European Defense Agency has great potential to become key actor.

After ten years the ESDP has reached an important milestone in its development. It is one of the most dynamic policy areas in the framework of the European Union (EU) and is a substantial integration project. Behind this background the study analyzes the question, What has ESDP achieved in its main fields of action (capabilities, operations/missions and strategic partnership with NATO to include transatlantic relations) to meet the requirements of the European Security Strategy (ESS)? The ESS as the overarching strategic document for the ESDP claims an encompassing security approach and calls to be more capable, more active, more coherent and calls to intensify working with partners. Hence, the ESS together with its implementation report provides the criteria to measure the achievements of the ESDP. In regard to capability development in many respects progress has been made over the last ten years to be more capable. ESDP specifically has built up military and civilian rapid response capabilities (EU Battlegroups and Civilian Response Teams) and the EU has established a European Defense Agency (EDA). However, there is still a lack in military key capabilities and the military reform process in Europe remains slow. Further improvements are necessary focusing on spending money more efficiently and using the EDA to enhance pooling of assets. Operations and missions are the ESDP's figurehead to be more active and to meet the requirement of a global security actor. With twenty-two military operations and civilian missions since 2003 the footprint is considerable. ESDP engagements span almost the globe and cover a wide spectrum (stabilization, rule of law, anti-piracy). Nevertheless, they have been limited in scope and time and the ESDP is still untested in 'high end' operations. A key question for the future is less the number of ESDP engagements but there size, mandate and political ambition. To avoid an overextension of the ESDP clear priorities and regional strategies are needed. With regard to working with partners the current context of the EU - NATO partnership and the underlying transatlantic relations seem more favorable than in the recent years. The United States in principle wants a strong European partner and the ESDP with its civil-military tools is increasingly perceived as added value in a complementary role to NATO for crisis management. There is already close cooperation between EU/ESDP and NATO in the framework of 'Berlin Plus' (Bosnia) or in the way both are working alongside together (Afghanistan, Kosovo). However, despite a more constructive tone between both the unresolved Turkey-Cyprus issue is an obstacle to a true strategic partnership and urgently requires a political solution. In any case, the pull of events, such as Afghanistan, piracy or France's return to NATO's integrated structures, seems to be bringing NATO and the EU/ESDP inexorably closer together. The availability of all instruments - civil and military - makes the ESDP so attractive but coherent and efficient use is necessary. Initiatives to enhance the coherence of institutional structures and the coordination of the ESDP engagements and the EU Commission's activities have been made but they are not yet sufficient. The Lisbon Treaty in force since December 1st, 2009 includes regulations for further improvement of the ESDP and for better coherence but the implementation needs time and results can only be expected gradually. In summary, this study outlines that the ESDP has made significant progress in the main fields of action and has substantially increased the EU's contribution to international security. However, the ESDP is still a process in the making and a lot still needs to be done. Hence, at the threshold of the second decade of the ESDP this ever advancing process continues and will require all the commitment of its stakeholders.

The way the Bundeswehr as an organization collects, analyzes and disseminates lessons learned from its operational experiences is not only of utmost significance for force protection and effectiveness in missions but also gives critical indications for how effectively the German Army learns as part of the Bundeswehr. This monograph analyzes the German lessons learned process on the basis of the two most relevant directives of the German Ministry of Defense and Standing Operating Procedures of the Bundeswehr Operations Command. These papers describe in detail purpose, responsibilities, coordination measures, workflow and organizational structure. The research here does not address the issue whether human behavior and leadership culture in the Bundeswehr contribute to its learning capability. That research does not lie within the scope of this study. The monograph introduces current approaches to organizational learning and identifies ten normative facilitating factors that promote learning. The more each facilitating factor is prevalent in an organizational unit the more opportunity exists for learning. The main discussion focuses on relevant elements that process lessons learned in the Bundeswehr in general and the Army in particular. The elements can be categorized in three groups: elements that acquire information, elements that interpret and disseminate information, and elements that ensure the application of lessons learned. These three categories and their interaction with each other are assessed by means of the identified facilitating factors. It appears that the German way to acquire, interpret, disseminate and ensure the application of lessons learned fulfills by and large the requirements of the identified facilitating factors. Accordingly, the lessons learned system is appropriate to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions that allow learning to emerge and flourish. However, the research also reveals barriers to learning that hamper effective organizational learning. The authority to release new knowledge and make it available as a lesson learned lies solely with the executive staff of the German Army. The lengthy process and the complicated lessons learned organizational structure hamper rapid collection and dissemination. Two cost-effective measures might mitigate the effects of these learning barriers. An independent lessons learned center posted on a case by case basis during major operations would help to facilitate rapid collection and dissemination of lessons learned in theater and the utilization of Web 2.0 technologies would virtually flatten the lessons learned organizational relationships and speed up the learning cycle.