Explaining Value is a selection of the best of Gilbert Harman's shorter writings in moral philosophy. The thirteen essays are divided into four sections, which focus in turn on moral relativism, values and valuing, character traits and virtue ethics, and ways of explaining aspects of morality. Harman's distinctive approach to moral philosophy has provoked much interest; this volume offers a fascinating conspectus of his most important work in the area.

Gilbert Harman presents a selection of his writings on fundamental issues in analytic philosophy. He discusses basic principles of reasoning and rationality; sets out his view of meaning, knowledge, and truth; examines the relation between language and thought; and develops these themes in an investigation of the nature of mind. Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind offers an integrated presentation of this rich and influential body of work.

The idea that prompted the conferenee for which many of these papers were written, and that inspired this book, is stated in the Editorial Introduction reprinted below from Volume 21 of Synthese. The present volume contains the artieles in Synthese 21, Numbers 3-4 and Synthese 22, Numbers 1-2. In addition, it ineludes new papers by Saul Kripke, James McCawley, John R. Ross, and Paul Ziff, and reprints 'Grammar and Philosophy' by P. F. Strawson. Strawson's artiele first appeared in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, and is reprinted with the kind permission of the author and the Aristotelian Society. We also repeat our thanks to the Olivetti Companyand Edizione di Comunita of Milan for permission to inelude the paper by Dana Scott; it also appeared in Synthese 21. DONALO DAVIDSON GILBERT HARMAN EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION The success of linguistics in treating naturallanguages as formal syntactic systems has aroused the interest of a number of linguists in a paralleI or related development of semantics. For the most part quite independ ently, many philosophers and logicians have reeently been applying formai semantic methods to structures increasingly like naturallanguages. While differenees in training, method and vocabulary tend to veil the fact, philosophers and linguists are converging, it seerns, on a common set of interrelated probiems. Sinee philosophers and linguists are working on the same, or very similar, probiems, it would obviously be instructive to compare notes."

This volume is a direct result of a conference held at Princeton University to honor George A. Miller, an extraordinary psychologist. A distinguished panel of speakers from various disciplines -- psychology, philosophy, neuroscience and artificial intelligence -- were challenged to respond to Dr. Miller's query: "What has happened to cognition? In other words, what has the past 30 years contributed to our understanding of the mind? Do we really know anything that wasn't already clear to William James?" Each participant tried to stand back a little from his or her most recent work, but to address the general question from his or her particular standpoint. The chapters in the present volume derive from that occasion.

This volume is a direct result of a conference held at Princeton University to honor George A. Miller, an extraordinary psychologist. A distinguished panel of speakers from various disciplines -- psychology, philosophy, neuroscience and artificial intelligence -- were challenged to respond to Dr. Miller's query:
"What has happened to cognition? In other words, what has the past 30 years contributed to our understanding of the mind? Do we really know anything that wasn't already clear to William James?"
Each participant tried to stand back a little from his or her most recent work, but to address the general question from his or her particular standpoint. The chapters in the present volume derive from that occasion.

Originally published in 1990. This study argues that scepticism is an intelligible view and that the issue scepticism raises is whether or not certain sceptical hypotheses are as plausible as the ordinary views we accept. It discusses psychological concepts, definitions of knowledge, belief and hypothetic inference (inference to the best explanation). Starting from 'Is skepticism a problem for epistemology', the book takes us through the argument for the possibility of scepticism, including looking at sense data and considering memory and perception.

Originally published in 1990. This study argues that scepticism is an intelligible view and that the issue scepticism raises is whether or not certain sceptical hypotheses are as plausible as the ordinary views we accept. It discusses psychological concepts, definitions of knowledge, belief and hypothetic inference (inference to the best explanation). Starting from 'Is skepticism a problem for epistemology', the book takes us through the argument for the possibility of scepticism, including looking at sense data and considering memory and perception.

The idea that prompted the conferenee for which many of these papers were written, and that inspired this book, is stated in the Editorial Introduction reprinted below from Volume 21 of Synthese. The present volume contains the artieles in Synthese 21, Numbers 3-4 and Synthese 22, Numbers 1-2. In addition, it ineludes new papers by Saul Kripke, James McCawley, John R. Ross, and Paul Ziff, and reprints 'Grammar and Philosophy' by P. F. Strawson. Strawson's artiele first appeared in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, and is reprinted with the kind permission of the author and the Aristotelian Society. We also repeat our thanks to the Olivetti Companyand Edizione di Comunita of Milan for permission to inelude the paper by Dana Scott; it also appeared in Synthese 21. DONALO DAVIDSON GILBERT HARMAN EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION The success of linguistics in treating naturallanguages as formal syntactic systems has aroused the interest of a number of linguists in a paralleI or related development of semantics. For the most part quite independ ently, many philosophers and logicians have reeently been applying formai semantic methods to structures increasingly like naturallanguages. While differenees in training, method and vocabulary tend to veil the fact, philosophers and linguists are converging, it seerns, on a common set of interrelated probiems. Sinee philosophers and linguists are working on the same, or very similar, probiems, it would obviously be instructive to compare notes."

Explaining Value is a selection of the best of Gilbert Harman's shorter writings in moral philosophy. The thirteen essays are divided into four sections, which focus in turn on moral relativism, values and valuing, character traits and virtue ethics, and ways of explaining aspects of morality. Harman's distinctive approach to moral philosophy has provoked much interest; this volume offers a fascinating conspectus of his most important work in the area.

Gilbert Harman presents a selection of his writings on fundamental issues in analytic philosophy. He discusses basic principles of reasoning and rationality; sets out his view of meaning, knowledge, and truth; examines the relation between language and thought; and develops these themes in an investigation of the nature of mind. Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind offers an integrated presentation of this rich and influential body of work.

This book is a philosophical introduction to ethics. It differs from existing texts by focusing on a basic philosophical problem about morality, its apparent immunity from observational testing. Other texts either ignore this issue altogether, in order to concentrate on interesting but largely nonphilosophical discussions of moral problems, or treat the issue as only one of several highly technical questions in something called 'meta-ethics.'

The implications for philosophy and cognitive science of developments in statistical learning theory. In Reliable Reasoning, Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni-a philosopher and an engineer-argue that philosophy and cognitive science can benefit from statistical learning theory (SLT), the theory that lies behind recent advances in machine learning. The philosophical problem of induction, for example, is in part about the reliability of inductive reasoning, where the reliability of a method is measured by its statistically expected percentage of errors-a central topic in SLT. After discussing philosophical attempts to evade the problem of induction, Harman and Kulkarni provide an admirably clear account of the basic framework of SLT and its implications for inductive reasoning. They explain the Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension of a set of hypotheses and distinguish two kinds of inductive reasoning. The authors discuss various topics in machine learning, including nearest-neighbor methods, neural networks, and support vector machines. Finally, they describe transductive reasoning and suggest possible new models of human reasoning suggested by developments in SLT.

Change in View offers an entirely original approach to the philosophical study of reasoning by identifying principles of reasoning with principles for revising one's beliefs and intentions and not with principles of logic. This crucial observation leads to a number of important and interesting consequences that impinge on psychology and artificial intelligence as well as on various branches of philosophy, from epistemology to ethics and action theory.