This book tells the story of the UN's attempts to monitor and control the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq from the first Gulf War to the continuing search for them today. The non-disclosure and non-cooperation of Iraq in this process led the Allies to war in 2003 and the search for WMD after the deposition of Saddam Hussein has caused acute political embarrassment. Graham Pearson draws out the lessons that can be learned from the experience in Iraq for the control of weapons programs in other rogue states, and the lessons for the UN themselves.

This authoritative account details the doggedly persistent work of the UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission) on Iraq which has during the past eight years, in the face of continued Iraqi deception, gradually uncovered more and more of the scope of the Iraqi chemical and biological weapons programmes and established an ongoing monitoring and verification regime. Vital lessons are drawn for international security and for the strengthening of the non proliferation regimes for both chemical and biological weapons.

The Gulf War of 1990-91 saw a real danger that chemical or biological weapons might be used against coalition forces. This authoritative account details the doggedly persistent work of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq which was charged with overseeing the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and with establishing an ongoing verification and monitoring regime to ensure Iraq did not acquire such weapons. Vital lessons are drawn here for international security and for the strengthening of the non-proliferation regimes for both biological and chemical weapons.

This authoritative account explores the facts that lie behind the Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes in Iraq. Graham Pearson shows how these programmes were gradually uncovered through the efforts of UN specialist exerts, then by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC and finally by the Iraq Survey Group. The book analyses why there was no stockpile of chemical or biological weapons to be found in Iraq. Finally, it examines the lessons for inspection, verification and non-proliferation in the chemical and biological weapons prohibition regimes.

This authoritative account details the doggedly persistent work of the UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission) on Iraq which has during the past eight years, in the face of continued Iraqi deception, gradually uncovered more and more of the scope of the Iraqi chemical and biological weapons programmes and established an ongoing monitoring and verification regime. Vital lessons are drawn for international security and for the strengthening of the non-proliferation regimes for both chemical and biological weapons.