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Through much of the twentieth century, philosophical thinking about
works of art, design, and other aesthetic products has emphasized
intuitive and reflective methods, often tied to the idea that
philosophy's business is primarily to analyze concepts. This
'philosophy from the armchair' approach contrasts with methods used
by psychologists, sociologists, evolutionary thinkers, and others
who study the making and reception of the arts empirically. How far
should philosophers be sensitive to the results of these studies?
Is their own largely a priori method basically flawed? Are their
views on aesthetic value, interpretation, imagination, and the
emotions of art to be rethought in the light of best science? The
essays in this volume seek answers to these questions, many through
detailed studies of problems traditionally regarded as
philosophical but where empirical inquiry seems to be shedding
interesting light. No common view is looked for or found in this
volume: a number of authors argue that the current enthusiasm for
scientific approaches to aesthetics is based on a misunderstanding
of the philosophical enterprise and sometimes on misinterpretation
of the science; others suggest various ways that philosophy can and
should accommodate and sometimes yield to the empirical approach.
The editors provide a substantial introduction which sets the scene
historically and conceptually before summarizing the claims and
arguments of the essays.
Through much of the twentieth century, philosophical thinking about
works of art, design, and other aesthetic products has emphasized
intuitive and reflective methods, often tied to the idea that
philosophy's business is primarily to analyze concepts. This
'philosophy from the armchair' approach contrasts with methods used
by psychologists, sociologists, evolutionary thinkers, and others
who study the making and reception of the arts empirically. How far
should philosophers be sensitive to the results of these studies?
Is their own largely a priori method basically flawed? Are their
views on aesthetic value, interpretation, imagination, and the
emotions of art to be rethought in the light of best science? The
essays in this volume seek answers to these questions, many through
detailed studies of problems traditionally regarded as
philosophical but where empirical inquiry seems to be shedding
interesting light. No common view is looked for or found in this
volume: a number of authors argue that the current enthusiasm for
scientific approaches to aesthetics is based on a misunderstanding
of the philosophical enterprise and sometimes on misinterpretation
of the science; others suggest various ways that philosophy can and
should accommodate and sometimes yield to the empirical approach.
The editors provide a substantial introduction which sets the scene
historically and conceptually before summarizing the claims and
arguments of the essays.
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