Some Implications of the Perceptgenetic Studies We should be most grateful to Professor Gudmund Smith for this compilation of studies on perceptgenesis (PG). Smith and his colleagues at Lund University are part of a small insurgency in psychology that has worked gamely and in relative obscurity to document the presence of subjective phases in the process leading to a perceptual object and the infrastructure of this process in the person ality. Smith describes ingenious methods to probe this hidden undersurface, and of a perceptual object is, in the ordinary demonstrate that the experiential content an object sense, pre-perceptual. That is, the feeling, meaning and recognition of are not attached to things out there in the world after they are perceived, but are phases ingredient in the process through which the perception occurs. To most psychologists, this statement would appear so radical as to be hardly worth refuting. A subjective approach to perception undermines the realism, consensual validation, and objectivity of a descriptive science of the mind. It is much simpler to interpret the 'psychic contribution' to object perception as an addition to physical nature. However, the idea that objects are assemblies of sensory bits linked to feeling and meaning, associated to memories for recognition and interpretation and then projected back into the world where we see them, though at first blush appealing to common sense, is so implausible that one is mystified by its universal acceptance."

This book is a joint effort of like-minded researchers to define the concept of process within a psychological setting. Although minor differences exist as regards choice of background theory, their common focus is on personality in a broad psychodynamic context. Their definition of personality rests on a series of test instruments that have been validated during decades of thorough and vigorous empirical work. These were originally designed to open up micro-processes underlying the adaptation to or construction of reality, and have subsequently proven diagnostically efficient. Coming from both sides of the Atlantic, the contributors have their background in psychological as well as medical institutions. The contributions in the book are examples of a vital source sustaining our efforts to get a more profound understanding of the vicissitudes of the human mind.

What is the scientific status and the "truth value" of the concept of defense mechanisms? Among contemporary psychologists, three types of answers to this question may be expected. Some would wholeheartedly endorse the theoretical, clinical, and research value of this notion; others would reject it outright. Between these two extremes, a large number of observers, perhaps the majority, would suspend their judgment. Their attitude, compounded of hope and doubt, would capitalize on defense as an interesting and promising concept. At the same time, these psy chologists would express skepticism and disappointment over its clinical limitations, theoretical ambiguity, and research failures. The present volume is primarily addressed to the audience of hopeful skeptics-those who have not given up on the notion of defense, yet have been frustrated by the difficulties of incorporating it into the modern, streamlined structure of psychology. To this end, we have brought together theoretical and empirical contributions germane to defense together with reports about their applications to clinical and personality assessment, especially in relation to psychopathology, psychosomatics, and psycho therapeutic intervention."

Some Implications of the Perceptgenetic Studies We should be most grateful to Professor Gudmund Smith for this compilation of studies on perceptgenesis (PG). Smith and his colleagues at Lund University are part of a small insurgency in psychology that has worked gamely and in relative obscurity to document the presence of subjective phases in the process leading to a perceptual object and the infrastructure of this process in the person ality. Smith describes ingenious methods to probe this hidden undersurface, and of a perceptual object is, in the ordinary demonstrate that the experiential content an object sense, pre-perceptual. That is, the feeling, meaning and recognition of are not attached to things out there in the world after they are perceived, but are phases ingredient in the process through which the perception occurs. To most psychologists, this statement would appear so radical as to be hardly worth refuting. A subjective approach to perception undermines the realism, consensual validation, and objectivity of a descriptive science of the mind. It is much simpler to interpret the 'psychic contribution' to object perception as an addition to physical nature. However, the idea that objects are assemblies of sensory bits linked to feeling and meaning, associated to memories for recognition and interpretation and then projected back into the world where we see them, though at first blush appealing to common sense, is so implausible that one is mystified by its universal acceptance."