This volume centers on the exploration of the ways in which the canonical texts and thinkers of the phenomenological and existential tradition can be utilized to address contemporary, concrete philosophical issues. In particular, the included essays address the key facets of the work of Charles Guignon, and as such, honor and extend his thought and approach to philosophy. To this end, the four main sections of the volume deal with the question of authenticity, i.e. what it means to be an authentic person, the ways in which the phenomenological and existential traditions can impact the sciences, how best to understand the fact of human mortality, and, finally, the ways philosophical reflection can help address current questions of value. The volume is designed primarily to serve as a secondary resource for students and specialists interested in rediscovering the practical application of existential and phenomenological thought. The collection of scholarly essays, then, could be used in conjunction with some of the more recent scholarship concerning the practical value of philosophy. Along with contributing to previous scholarship, the essays in this proposed volume attempt to update and expand the scope of phenomenological and existential inquiry.

This book employs Heidegger's work of the 1920s and early 1930s to develop distinctively Heideggerian accounts of agency, freedom, and responsibility, making the case that Heidegger's thought provides a compelling alternative to the mainstream philosophical accounts of these concepts. Hans Pedersen demonstrates that Heidegger's thought can be fruitfully used to develop a plausible alternative understanding of agency that avoids the metaphysical commitments that give rise to the standard free-will debate. The first several chapters are devoted to working out an account of the ontological structure of human agency, specifically focusing on the Heideggerian understanding of the role of mental states, causal explanations, and deliberation in human agency, arguing that action need not be understood in terms of the causal efficacy of mental states. In the following chapters, building on the prior account of agency, Pedersen develops Heideggerian accounts of freedom and responsibility. Having shown that action need not be understood causally, the Heideggerian view thereby avoids the conflict between free will and determinism that gives rise to the problem of free will and the correlative problem of responsibility.

This volume centers on the exploration of the ways in which the canonical texts and thinkers of the phenomenological and existential tradition can be utilized to address contemporary, concrete philosophical issues.  In particular, the included essays address the key facets of the work of Charles Guignon, and as such, honor and extend his thought and approach to philosophy. To this end, the four main sections of the volume deal with the question of authenticity, i.e. what it means to be an authentic person, the ways in which the phenomenological and existential traditions can impact the sciences, how best to understand the fact of human mortality, and, finally, the ways philosophical reflection can help address current questions of value. The volume is designed primarily to serve as a secondary resource for students and specialists interested in rediscovering the practical application of existential and phenomenological thought. The collection of scholarly essays, then, could be used in conjunction with some of the more recent scholarship concerning the practical value of philosophy. Along with contributing to previous scholarship, the essays in this proposed volume attempt to update and expand the scope of phenomenological and existential inquiry. ​

This book employs Heidegger's work of the 1920s and early 1930s to develop distinctively Heideggerian accounts of agency, freedom, and responsibility, making the case that Heidegger's thought provides a compelling alternative to the mainstream philosophical accounts of these concepts. Hans Pedersen demonstrates that Heidegger's thought can be fruitfully used to develop a plausible alternative understanding of agency that then avoids the main problems of the standard free will debate. Part I is dedicated to working out a general Heideggerian conception of agency, specifically focusing on the roles of causality, mental states, and deliberation in human agency. In Part II, based on the account of agency worked out in Part I, Pedersen develops Heideggerian accounts of freedom and responsibility that are not based on the causal efficacy of explicit mental states in human action, thereby avoiding the conflict between free will and determinism that gives rise to the standard philosophical debate over free will.