Despite the volatility and unpredictability North Korea has come to symbolize in international diplomacy and security issues, it represents only half of the potential danger on the Korean peninsula. In a notable departure from its past role as guarantor of stability on the Korean peninsula, the United States has, under the stewardship of the Bush administration, come to be regarded as, at best, an obstacle to peace and security, and at worst a potential trigger for hostility. The most immediate result of this shift on the Korean peninsula has been the U.S. failure to undertake an effective policy formulation process, which has manifested itself (on both sides of the 38th parallel) in more reactive and convulsive responses to challenges from the North Korean regime. Without such understanding there is little hope of advancing discussions or resolving North Korea's nuclear program. Fundamental to understanding North Korea's endgame is realizing that its nuclear weapons program, while menacing, is unlikely to be used offensively without major provocation; it functions as a tool of its diplomacy--missile diplomacy--to ensure survival of the regime. Working closely with South Korea, the United States must ensure that any potential resolution reached on North Korea's nuclear program does not undermine its longer-term objectives for securing broader peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Ideally, any resolution brokered over the North's nuclear weapons program will provide a synergistic effect in addressing the conventional war threat posed by North Korea on the Korean peninsula. In short, the United States must undertake constructive engagement. Steadfast unwillingness to engage withNorth Korea only provides more fodder for the regime to stall any action, and, as part of its endgame, makes U.S. behavior the issue. the issue, which is part of its endgame.

Since the conclusion of World War II, the Korean people and the international community have contemplated a unified peninsula, but a divided Korea remains one of the last visible vestiges of the Cold War. What will removing this specter entail? And with what should it be replaced?Similar to the unification of East and West Germany, merging North and South Korea is likely the only means of achieving stability and lasting peace on the peninsula. However, after decades of a divided existence with South Korea now thriving as a democracy and North Korea barely subsisting as a Stalinist dictatorship this task will be monumental. What form of government would likely emerge, given the North Korean regime s practice of completely controlling its population? How would its citizens, indoctrinated by decades of Juche ideology, be assimilated into a larger community of capitalists? What would become of North Korea s military of 1.2 million? How would a reunified government exercise control over the North s starving masses?These questions are only some of the core issues addressed in "Korean Unification: Inevitable Challenges." Jacques L. Fuqua Jr. argues that diplomatic, humanitarian, cultural, and military solutions must coincide to create peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula that could thus extend to elsewhere in Asia.