Welcome to Loot.co.za!
Sign in / Register |Wishlists & Gift Vouchers |Help | Advanced search
|
Your cart is empty |
|||
Showing 1 - 3 of 3 matches in All Departments
The Cuban Missile Crisis is the closest the United States came to nuclear war during the Cold War era. Facing down the buildup of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, President John F. Kennedy took a calculated risk and succeeded in negotiating the removal of those weapons after weeks of teetering on the brink of war. This riveting narrative and ready-reference guide captures the drama of that crisis. Eleven chapters trace the unfolding of events from the United States, Cuban, and Soviet perspectives. Ready reference features include: a blow-by-blow chronology of daily events during the Crisis, lengthy biographical profiles of the nine key players, including Cuba's Fidel Castro, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and key Kennedy Cabinet members who were part of Kennedy's Crisis team; the text of 19 primary documents, including conversations in the Oval Office and memoranda that put the reader inside the crisis room, and Kennedy's speeches to the nation; and an annotated bibliography of print and electronic sources suitable for student research. James Nathan, an expert on the Cuban Missile Crisis, provides an interesting narrative with all the high drama of the Crisis, along with a contemporary historical perspective that will help readers to gain an understanding of the event that symbolized the height of the Cold War and its long-term significance.
The increasing capacity of states to muster violence, the concomitant rise of military power as a meaningful instrument of foreign policy, and the frequent episodic collapse of that power are considered in this examination of force, order, and diplomacy. Nathan points to periods of relative order and stability in international relations-the time immediately prior to the rise of Frederick the Great, for example, or the half century after the Napoleonic Wars-as times when states have been most vulnerable to "spoilers" and "rogues." Only the power of the Cold War blocs fostered durable order. Now, notwithstanding novel elements of globalization, international relations appear as dependent as ever on the prudent management of force. Students, scholars, and soldiers are frequently exposed to Clausewitz, Westphalia, Napoleon, World War I, and the like. But what makes these events and individuals so important? This book is Clausewitz's successor, insisting that soldiers and statesmen know and master the integrative potential of force. Nathan provides a narrative account of the people and events that have shaped international relations since the onset of the state system. He asserts that an understanding of the limits and utility of persuasion, as well as the corresponding limits and utility of force, will help assure national security in a world filled with more uncertainties than ever in the last 50 years.
The increasing capacity of states to muster violence, the concomitant rise of military power as a meaningful instrument of foreign policy, and the frequent episodic collapse of that power are considered in this examination of force, order, and diplomacy. Nathan points to periods of relative order and stability in international relations-the time immediately prior to the rise of Frederick the Great, for example, or the half century after the Napoleonic Wars-as times when states have been most vulnerable to spoilers and rogues. Only the power of the Cold War blocs fostered durable order. Now, notwithstanding novel elements of globalization, international relations appear as dependent as ever on the prudent management of force. Students, scholars, and soldiers are frequently exposed to Clausewitz, Westphalia, Napoleon, World War I, and the like. But what makes these events and individuals so important? This book is Clausewitz's successor, insisting that soldiers and statesmen know and master the integrative potential of force. Nathan provides a narrative account of the people and events that have shaped international relations since the onset of the state system. He asserts that an understanding of the limits and utility of persuasion, as well as the corresponding limits and utility of force, will help assure national security in a world filled with more uncertainties than ever in the last 50 years.
|
You may like...
|