In this new study, Dr. James Lebovic challenges the widely held view that many current US adversaries cannot be deterred. He maintains that deterrence is not a relic of the Cold War period and that it should shape US policies toward even so-called rogue states and terror groups. Prof Lebovic makes the case that deterrence principles continue to apply by focusing upon the "three pillars" of the Bush administration's national security policy:
(1) missile defense which preoccupied the administration until September 11, 2001;
(2) preemption which became the US focus with the September 11 attacks and US success in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan; and
(3) homeland security which the administration has portrayed as more a natural response to threat than an aspect of policy that must be reconciled with the other pillars.
The author asserts that bad offenses and defenses have been endemic to the current US policy approach. As a consequence, US policymakers have pursuedpolicies that require the US to do everything, as if more is always better, without adequate concern for resource trade-offs, overreach, and unintended consequences.
This book will be of great interest to students of US foreign policy, national and international security, terrorism and international relations in general.

In this new study, Dr. James Lebovic challenges the widely held view that many current US adversaries cannot be deterred. He maintains that deterrence is not a relic of the Cold War period and that it should shape US policies toward even so-called rogue states and terror groups. Prof Lebovic makes the case that deterrence principles continue to apply by focusing upon the "three pillars" of the Bush administration's national security policy:
(1) missile defense which preoccupied the administration until September 11, 2001;
(2) preemption which became the US focus with the September 11 attacks and US success in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan; and
(3) homeland security which the administration has portrayed as more a natural response to threat than an aspect of policy that must be reconciled with the other pillars.
The author asserts that bad offenses and defenses have been endemic to the current US policy approach. As a consequence, US policymakers have pursuedpolicies that require the US to do everything, as if more is always better, without adequate concern for resource trade-offs, overreach, and unintended consequences.
This book will be of great interest to students of US foreign policy, national and international security, terrorism and international relations in general.

In this book, the author shows that, although current military missions are adapted to post-Cold War realities, the self-defeating bias of bureaucrats and military services toward Cold War weaponry is still prevalent. He examines the impact of this bias on the armed services. .

With the end of the Cold War and the erosion of the Soviet threat, the United States is reevaluating its defense policy and its acquisition of weapons. James Lebovic shows that, although current military missions are adapted to post-Cold War realities, the self-defeating bias of bureaucrats and military services toward Cold War weaponry is still prevalent. He examines the impact of this bias on the armed services as they assess threat, generate requirements, develop and change weapon concepts, set production rates, and engage in testing. The author asserts that bias compromises service interests and broader military objectives and he offers general policy recommendations to put U.S. weapons acquisition on a more effective track.

James H. Lebovic explores the logic of seeking peace in an arms race. Flawed Logics offers a compelling intellectual history of U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms control. Lebovic thoroughly reviews the critical role of ideas and assumptions in U.S. arms control debates, tying them to controversies over U.S. nuclear strategy from the birth of the atomic age to the present. Each nuclear arms treaty - from the Truman to the Obama administration - is assessed in depth and the positions of proponents and opponents are systematically presented, discussed, and critiqued. Lebovic concludes that the terms of these treaties with the Russians were never as good as U.S. proponents claimed nor as bad as opponents feared. The comprehensive analysis in Flawed Logics is objective and balanced, challenging the logic of hawks and doves, Democrats and Republicans, and theorists of all schools with equal vigor. Lebovic's controversial argument will promote debate as to the very plausibility of arms control.

This political analysis exposes the fanciful logic that the United States can use nuclear weapons to vanquish nuclear adversaries or influence them when employing various coercive tactics. During the Cold War, American policymakers sought nuclear advantages to offset an alleged Soviet edge. Policymakers hoped that US nuclear capabilities would safeguard deterrence, when backed perhaps by a set of coercive tactics. But policymakers also hedged their bets with plans to fight a nuclear war to their advantage should deterrence fail. In The False Promise of Superiority, James H. Lebovic argues that the US approach was fraught with peril and remains so today. He contends that the United States can neither simply impose its will on nuclear adversaries nor safeguard deterrence using these same coercive tactics without risking severe, counterproductive effects. As Lebovic shows, the current faith in US nuclear superiority could produce the disastrous consequences that US weapons and tactics are meant to avoid. This book concludes that US interests are best served when policymakers resist the temptation to use, or prepare to use, nuclear weapons first or to brandish nuclear weapons for coercive effect.

The United States national-security establishment is vast, yet the United States has failed to meet its initial objectives in almost every one of its major, post-World War II conflicts. Of these troubled efforts, the US wars in Vietnam (1965-73), Iraq (2003-11), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and miscalculated decisions. Because overarching policy goals are distant and open to interpretation, policymakers ground their decisions in the immediate world of short-term objectives, salient tasks, policy constraints, and fixed time schedules. As a consequence, they exaggerate the benefits of their preferred policies, ignore the accompanying costs and requirements, and underappreciate the benefits of alternatives. In Planning to Fail, James H. Lebovic argues that a profound myopia helps explain US decision-making failures. In each of the wars explored in this book, he identifies four stages of intervention. First and foremost, policymakers chose unwisely to go to war. After the fighting began, they inadvisably sought to extend or expand the mission. Next, they pursued the mission, in abbreviated form, to suboptimal effect. Finally, they adapted the mission to exit from the conflict. Lebovic argues that US leaders were effectively planning to fail whatever their hopes and thoughts were at the time the intervention began. Decision-makers struggled less than they should have, even when conditions allowed for good choices. Then, when conditions on the ground left them with only bad choices, they struggled furiously and more than could ever matter. Policymakers allowed these wars to sap available capabilities, push US forces to the breaking point, and exhaust public support. They finally settled for terms of departure that they (or their predecessors) would have rejected at the start of these conflicts. Offering a far-ranging and detailed analysis, this book identifies an unmistakable pattern of failure and highlights lessons we can learn from it.

This political analysis exposes the fanciful logic that the United States can use nuclear weapons to vanquish nuclear adversaries or influence them when employing various coercive tactics. During the Cold War, American policymakers sought nuclear advantages to offset an alleged Soviet edge. Policymakers hoped that US nuclear capabilities would safeguard deterrence, when backed perhaps by a set of coercive tactics. But policymakers also hedged their bets with plans to fight a nuclear war to their advantage should deterrence fail. In The False Promise of Superiority, James H. Lebovic argues that the US approach was fraught with peril and remains so today. He contends that the United States can neither simply impose its will on nuclear adversaries nor safeguard deterrence using these same coercive tactics without risking severe, counterproductive effects. As Lebovic shows, the current faith in US nuclear superiority could produce the disastrous consequences that US weapons and tactics are meant to avoid. This book concludes that US interests are best served when policymakers resist the temptation to use, or prepare to use, nuclear weapons first or to brandish nuclear weapons for coercive effect.