The last two decades have seen a slow but steady increase in nuclear armed states, and in the seemingly less constrained policy goals of some of the newer "rogue" states in the international system. The authors of"On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century" argue that a time may come when one of these states makes the conscious decision that using a nuclear weapon against the United States, its allies, or forward deployed forces in the context of a crisis or a regional conventional conflict may be in its interests. They assert that we are unprepared for these types of "limited" nuclear wars and that it is urgent we rethink the theory, policy, and implementation of force related to our approaches to this type of engagement.
Together they critique Cold War doctrine on limited nuclear war and consider a number of the key concepts that should govern our approach to limited nuclear conflict in the future. These include identifying the factors likely to lead to limited nuclear war, examining the geopolitics of future conflict scenarios that might lead to small-scale nuclear use, and assessing strategies for crisis management and escalation control. Finally, they consider a range of strategies and operational concepts for countering, controlling, or containing limited nuclear war.

The last two decades have seen a slow but steady increase in nuclear armed states, and in the seemingly less constrained policy goals of some of the newer "rogue" states in the international system. The authors of"On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century" argue that a time may come when one of these states makes the conscious decision that using a nuclear weapon against the United States, its allies, or forward deployed forces in the context of a crisis or a regional conventional conflict may be in its interests. They assert that we are unprepared for these types of "limited" nuclear wars and that it is urgent we rethink the theory, policy, and implementation of force related to our approaches to this type of engagement.
Together they critique Cold War doctrine on limited nuclear war and consider a number of the key concepts that should govern our approach to limited nuclear conflict in the future. These include identifying the factors likely to lead to limited nuclear war, examining the geopolitics of future conflict scenarios that might lead to small-scale nuclear use, and assessing strategies for crisis management and escalation control. Finally, they consider a range of strategies and operational concepts for countering, controlling, or containing limited nuclear war.

Historical Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament provides a historical review of key themes and issues in international security and arms control, focusing on efforts in the 20th century to control the spread and use of armaments and to prevent war. This book summarizes the rich and proud traditions of arms control and disarmament, their critical role in ensuring a non-catastrophic course throughout history (especially the dangerous period of the Cold War), and their continuing relevance and role in the emerging post-Cold War world. It also seeks to reinforce a broad perspective of key terms in order to capture the scope and range of their application yesterday, today, and tomorrow. Given this combined tradition and focus, this Dictionary serves two purposes. As a historical dictionary, it chronicles key terms, personalities, events, and agreements as a ready reference from which to launch a more extensive investigation. But it also seeks to capture the breadth of current and future applications by presenting the vocabulary of traditional and non-traditional approaches. The book includes a large dictionary of more than 1,000 key terms, as well as a comprehensive bibliography divided into multiple categories, an extensive chronology, and a timeline. This book can also serve as a useful desk reference for the policy practitioner. The pace and intensity of the practice of arms control often eliminates the luxury of conventional study of past or related arms control efforts. The dictionary seeks to provide a relevant sampling of treaty and agreement details and of the specific terms of reference of arms control to allow productive progress in a policy work environment. Researchers and students will also find the dictionary to be a useful reference tool. Much of the formal literature in the field, such as treaty texts and policy pronouncements, is written in technical language without elaboration. Also, many references to agreements are posed in shorthand intended only for the policy practi

This edited volume explores stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations (SSTR), highlighting the challenges and opportunities they create for the US Navy.

The book argues that SSTR operations are challenging because they create new missions and basing modes, and signal a return to traditional naval methods of operation. Mission accomplishment requires collaboration with a wide range of actors representing governmental, non-governmental and commercial organizations, which often creates politically and bureaucratically charged issues for those involved. However, although from a traditional warfighting perspective, stability operations might be viewed as having little to do with preparing for high-intensity conventional combat, these kinds of operations in fact correspond to traditional missions related to diplomacy, engagement, maritime domain awareness, piracy and smuggling, and intervention to quell civil disturbances. SSTR operations can be therefore depicted as a return to traditional naval operations, albeit operations that might not be universally welcomed in all quarters.

Whether one is interested in learning about anthrax, sarin, the neutron bomb-or any other weapon of mass destruction-this thorough and detailed reference is the place to find answers. The threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), whether nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological, is the number-one topic of concern for the intelligence community, first responders, policymakers, and myriad non-governmental organizations-and many members of the general public. This authoritative reference will serve all of those parties by covering the full spectrum of mass-casualty weapons. The guide will not only enable people to educate themselves, but also to separate the truth from the spurious information that abounds. The book offers an A-to-Z listing of major topics, making finding information about concepts, scientific theories, and realities of WMD fast and easy. While the framework of WMD goes back centuries, the major focus of this reference is on weapons that date from the use of chemical warfare in World War I. The book also covers WMD from the early nuclear era (World War II), the Cold War, and the present (Syria, North Korea, etc.). Each entry is written in a clear, accessible style and includes crucial background information, making this book an essential resource for both lay readers and specialists. Armed with this portable database, readers will have the confidence to deal with, discuss, or write about WMD of all kinds based on an understanding of relevant concepts, policies, and scientific fundamentals. Includes a comprehensive A-to-Z listing and discussion of significant weapons of mass destruction in their historical and present-day contexts Offers straightforward narratives that place these threats into a practical framework Presents the most crucial aspects about each WMD topic, distilling decades of research and analysis Features non-technical discussions of the fundamental concepts as well as the basic science concerning each WMD threat Analyzes the real and perceived threats of WMD from their beginnings in World War I into the future Provides primary source documents, including a full listing of Australia Group export controlled substances, technologies, and biological agents

A unique overview of the United States' current nuclear command, control, and communications system and its modernization for the digital age Concerns about the security of nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems are not new, but they are becoming more urgent. While modernization is crucial to the future success of NC3 systems, the transition from analog to digital technologies has the potential to introduce vulnerabilities and unintended consequences. Nuclear infrastructure and command could be penetrated, corrupted, destroyed, or spoofed, leading to a loss of positive control (the ability to fire weapons) or negative control (the ability to prevent unauthorized or accidental use). Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications explores the current NC3 system and its vital role in ensuring effective deterrence, contemporary challenges posed by cyber threats, new weapons technologies, and the consensus across the nuclear enterprise of the need to modernize the United States' Cold War-era system of systems. This volume, edited by James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, offers the first overview of US NC3 since the 1980s. Part 1 provides an overview of the history, strategy, and technology associated with NC3 and how it enables deterrence strategy as the basis of national defense. Parts 2 and 3 identify how the US military's NC3 works, the challenges of introducing digital technologies and the potential security threats, and how the system could fail if these considerations are not taken into account. Part 4 explains the progress NC3 has made thus far, and how we might move forward. During this critical juncture, policymakers, practitioners, and scholars will find this an invaluable resource to understanding our current NC3 system, its relationship to effective deterrence, what must be done to modernize NC3, and how to ensure this transition is undertaken safely and successfully.

This edited volume explores stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations (SSTR), highlighting the challenges and opportunities they create for the US Navy. The book argues that SSTR operations are challenging because they create new missions and basing modes, and signal a return to traditional naval methods of operation. Mission accomplishment requires collaboration with a wide range of actors representing governmental, non-governmental and commercial organizations, which often creates politically and bureaucratically charged issues for those involved. However, although from a traditional warfighting perspective, stability operations might be viewed as having little to do with preparing for high-intensity conventional combat, these kinds of operations in fact correspond to traditional missions related to diplomacy, engagement, maritime domain awareness, piracy and smuggling, and intervention to quell civil disturbances. SSTR operations can be therefore depicted as a return to traditional naval operations, albeit operations that might not be universally welcomed in all quarters.

The Naval War College Review was established in 1948 and is a forum for discussion of public policy matters of interest to the maritime services. The forthright and candid views of the authors are presented for the professional education of the readers. Articles published are related to the academic and professional activities of the Naval War College. They are drawn from a wide variety of sources in order to inform, stimulate, and challenge readers, and to serve as a catalyst for new ideas. Articles are selected primarily on the basis of their intellectual and literary merits, timeliness, and usefulness and interest to a wide readership. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the U.S. Navy Department or the Naval War College.

A unique overview of the United States' current nuclear command, control, and communications system and its modernization for the digital age Concerns about the security of nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems are not new, but they are becoming more urgent. While modernization is crucial to the future success of NC3 systems, the transition from analog to digital technologies has the potential to introduce vulnerabilities and unintended consequences. Nuclear infrastructure and command could be penetrated, corrupted, destroyed, or spoofed, leading to a loss of positive control (the ability to fire weapons) or negative control (the ability to prevent unauthorized or accidental use). Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications explores the current NC3 system and its vital role in ensuring effective deterrence, contemporary challenges posed by cyber threats, new weapons technologies, and the consensus across the nuclear enterprise of the need to modernize the United States' Cold War-era system of systems. This volume, edited by James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, offers the first overview of US NC3 since the 1980s. Part 1 provides an overview of the history, strategy, and technology associated with NC3 and how it enables deterrence strategy as the basis of national defense. Parts 2 and 3 identify how the US military's NC3 works, the challenges of introducing digital technologies and the potential security threats, and how the system could fail if these considerations are not taken into account. Part 4 explains the progress NC3 has made thus far, and how we might move forward. During this critical juncture, policymakers, practitioners, and scholars will find this an invaluable resource to understanding our current NC3 system, its relationship to effective deterrence, what must be done to modernize NC3, and how to ensure this transition is undertaken safely and successfully.