Without the internal application of standards of prudence in bank management, regulatory restraints will always be inadequate. A complete theory of prudence is developed in these pages, covering decision mechanisms and banking culture, using numerous specific examples of actual bank imprudence. The theory is applied across bank functions of credit, investments, funding, and management, creating practical principles accessible to bank managers, regulators, and all those dealing with banking issues in the public domain.

The shortcomings of the regulatory approach to bank supervision are discussed with particular attention given to recent acts of regulation. Historical bank examples, mostly recent, of bank imprudence are described. A strategy of decision-making, referred to as Recursive Managerialism (which is inherently prudential) is discussed in detail, and is prescribed as the preferred mode of decision in banking. The role of balance in the risks of banking in the pursuit of catastrophe avoidance is proposed as a negative form of prudence. This concept is shown to be associated with public interest issues, so serving similar goals to those presently sought through regulations. This structure provides the basis to evaluate decisions in specific areas of bank functions: credit, investments, funding, and management. In the course of the chapters in Part II, a positive version of prudence is advanced to complement the earlier negative version, and specific areas of modern banking issues--such as mergers and acquisitions--and the role of interstate banking, are given prudential treatment.

Financial leadership must not be confused with financial wealth, warns Jeremy Taylor in this compelling work--the most recent in his Quorum Books series. He sets up guideposts from history to point the way out of our current financial crisis and develops the concept of financial stewardship to show why private gain must be countered with public responsibility. In the course of U.S. history six leaders emerged to set the country on a balanced course--Alexander Hamilton, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Carter Glass, and Franklin Roosevelt. By exercising leadership, they were able to achieve the primary goal of finance--balancing private and public interests. Based on their successes and on an analysis of recent history, Taylor recommends specific actions for rebuilding a financial system with a sense of public responsibility.

Taylor chronicles how the great financial leaders in U.S. history succeeded in moving the country forward by serving as intermediaries between contradictory economic forces. He then discusses the series of financial failures that began in the 1970s--lack of monetary discipline, disturbances in commercial financial institutions, and budgetary irresponsibility. He concludes by proposing specific measure based on a sense of public responsibility. These include replacing multiple oversight boards with designated agencies and replacing laissez-faire policies with enforcement of prudent management policies in the private sector.

In this volume, Jeremy Taylor focuses on the recent changes in the U.S. banking system, analyzing the underlying reasons for these changes and proposing solutions to problems currently faced by the industry. Arguing that the banking industry is the medium through which pressures are transmitted from one part of the economy to another, Taylor shows that public lack of confidence in banking--brought on by crises such as the bailout of the savings and loan industry--can translate into a serious lack of confidence in the economy as a whole. He fully examines the current banking crisis against the background of historical changes in U.S. banking, demonstrating that banking change in this country is most often crisis driven--due primarily to the failure of the legislature and the government to solve major problems before they become major crises. The considerable influence of politics on the U.S. banking system is also explored in depth.

Divided into three parts, the book begins by examining the process of change in American banking. Taylor explores the role and significance of change in banking, offers a historical overview of the five major banking crises that have occurred since 1779, and discusses the theory of banking change. In the second section, the author looks at the problems caused by banking change. Particular attention is given to the present banking crisis and the insolvency of southern savings and loan institutions. Finally, Taylor addresses possible solutions to the problems of banking change. Before offering his own proposals, he demonstrates the relevance of Alexander Hamilton's ideas on banking to the present-day situation and compares the U.S. banking system with other major international banking centers. He concludes by calling for the creation of a new financial instrument that would allow investors to share in the ownership of bank loans, for amending the Glass-Steagal Act, and for the creation of debt-reduction summits for the m jor debtor nations of the Third World. Students of banking, policymakers, and banking executives will find Taylor an important new voice in debates about the causes of and solutions to the current banking crisis.

The terms system and industry are frequently used interchangeably--and with obfuscatory results. Members of Congress are especially prone to do so, and would profit from a perusal of the volume at hand. So will most bankers. The author, Jeremy Taylor, a bank officer, is typical of the younger breed of banking writers in combining hands-on practical experience with the ability to handle high-powered abstractions successfully. . . . This book is the latest in a useful series of publications by Quorum Books, generally dissident in both perspective and tone, yet thoroughly persuasive in substance. "Bankers Monthly"

The continuing rise in bank failures, including newsmaking crashes at such banks as Penn Square and Continental Illinois, along with the insolvency of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Fund, has eroded confidence in the nation's banking system. Taylor offers an analysis of the implications that events over the past years have had for the future operation of the U.S. banking system. In analyzing why the system is in such disequilibrium, Taylor presents a systemic view of banking operations and functions, a perspective he argues has been lacking in previous works on the subject. He also suggests ways to remedy the current crisis situation and restore individual and institutional customer confidence.

Taylor's systemic approach enables him to compare the present U.S. situation to the British banking crisis of 1973-1975. He analyzes a series of bank failures and explains that the FDIC has three alternatives to bank failures: payoffs, bailouts, and buyouts. He introduces a new model designed to help the financial and banking communities resolve certain difficulties and proposes new ways of dealing with credit risk and credit malfunction. Finally, Taylor stresses the importance of social consensus and the function played by public opinion in aiding or avoiding potential bank failures. An important addition to the banking and finance curriculum, this book will also benefit banking executives and policymakers concerned with today's unacceptably high level of bank failure.