This provocative book seeks to answer a most crucial-and embarrassing-question concerning the U.S. military: why the United States is so often stymied in military confrontations with seemingly weaker opponents, despite its "superpower" status. This fascinating book examines a question that continues to puzzle soldiers, statesmen, and scholars: why do major powers-including the ostensible superpower United States-repeatedly perform poorly against seemingly overmatched adversaries? And what can they, and the United States, do to better achieve their military objectives? How Wars are Won and Lost: Vulnerability and Military Power argues that beyond relying solely on overwhelming military might, the United States needs to focus more on exploiting weaknesses in their adversaries-such as national will, resource mobilization, and strategic miscues-just as opposing forces have done to gain advantage over our military efforts. The author tests the "vulnerability theory" by revisiting six conflicts from the Philippine War of 1899-1902 to the ongoing actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, showing again and again that victory often depends more on outthinking the enemy than outmuscling them. Interviews and data drawn from the author's personal experiences as a U.S. Army officer Six case study chapters on U.S. conflicts where military superiority alone was not the decisive factor in the outcome (the Philippines, World War II, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan)

John A. Gentry and Joseph S. Gordon update our understanding of strategic warning intelligence analysis for the twenty-first century. Strategic warning—the process of long-range analysis to alert senior leaders to trending threats and opportunities that require action—is a critical intelligence function. It also is frequently misunderstood and underappreciated. Gentry and Gordon draw on both their practitioner and academic backgrounds to present a history of the strategic warning function in the US intelligence community. In doing so, they outline the capabilities of analytic methods, explain why strategic warning analysis is so hard, and discuss the special challenges strategic warning encounters from senior decision-makers. They also compare how strategic warning functions in other countries, evaluate why the United States has in recent years emphasized current intelligence instead of strategic warning, and recommend warning-related structural and procedural improvements in the US intelligence community. The authors examine historical case studies, including postmortems of warning failures, to provide examples of the analytic points they make. Strategic Warning Intelligence will interest scholars and practitioners and will be an ideal teaching text for intermediate and advanced students.

John A. Gentry and Joseph S. Gordon update our understanding of strategic warning intelligence analysis for the twenty-first century. Strategic warning-the process of long-range analysis to alert senior leaders to trending threats and opportunities that require action-is a critical intelligence function. It also is frequently misunderstood and underappreciated. Gentry and Gordon draw on both their practitioner and academic backgrounds to present a history of the strategic warning function in the US intelligence community. In doing so, they outline the capabilities of analytic methods, explain why strategic warning analysis is so hard, and discuss the special challenges strategic warning encounters from senior decision-makers. They also compare how strategic warning functions in other countries, evaluate why the United States has in recent years emphasized current intelligence instead of strategic warning, and recommend warning-related structural and procedural improvements in the US intelligence community. The authors examine historical case studies, including postmortems of warning failures, to provide examples of the analytic points they make. Strategic Warning Intelligence will interest scholars and practitioners and will be an ideal teaching text for intermediate and advanced students.