Advises how the United Kingdom should best use modern outsourcing and outfitting practices for shipbuilding in the years to come. The United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence (MOD) is preparing for the construction of the Royal Navy's two new Future Aircraft Carriers (CVFs), slated to enter service in 2012 and 2015, respectively. The CVFs will be the largest warships built in the United Kingdom in decades. At the request of the MOD, the RAND Corporation looked at the risks of current contractor plans and estimated the cost implications of using alternative manufacturing options in the coming years.

This volume presents a set of lessons learned from Australia's Collins submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Collins was the first submarine built in Australia. RAND investigated how operational requirements were set for the Collins class; explored the acquisition, contracting, design, and build processes that the program employed; and assessed the activities surrounding integrated logistics support for the class.

The United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers. This volume presents an overview of five submarine programs in the three countries - the UK's Astute program; the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia programs; and Australia's Collins program - and identifies lessons that apply to all of them.

This volume presents a set of lessons learned from the United Kingdom's Astute submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Designing and building a submarine requires careful management and oversight and a delegation of roles and responsibilities that recognizes which party - the shipbuilder or the government - is best positioned to manage risks.

C4I systems have evolved rapidly over the last few decades, and the cost of keeping these products up-to-date on new and in-service U.S. Navy ships is high due to configuration, integration, testing, and other challenges. Looking across a specific set of completed C4I upgrades, the authors found evidence of cost improvement, a high level of variability in costs, and a trend toward overestimating the installation-labor costs of certain upgrades.

Nuclear submarine design resources at the shipyards, their suppliers, and the Navy may erode for lack of demand. Analysis of alternative workforce and workload management options suggests that the U.S. Navy should stretch out the design of the next submarine class and start it early or sustain design resources above the current demand, so that the next class may be designed on time, on budget, and with low risk.

RAND was assigned to assess alternative acquisition strategies for the Navy's new family of destroyers. The authors drew on the history of competition in acquisition programs to examine a rich array of options. They concluded that for the program that existed in 2003 competition among primes would be impractical, that splitting the work should sustain the industrial base, and that a mixed strategy using different contract forms would work best.

The United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence (MOD) moved from a position of significant authority and responsibility in submarine design and development to one in which its acquisition responsibilities were largely transferred to a prime contractor. Now it is trying to re-engage. This book recommends measures and structures the UK Ministry of Defence can adopt to better manage its risks and responsibilities in the acquisition of nuclear submarines.

Explores the reasons for and ways to anticipate schedule delays in shipbuilding programmes. 450-character abstract: The Defence Procurement Agency, part of the UK Ministry of Defence, asked Rand to analyze how major shipbuilders and contractors monitor programme progress, to consider what information would be useful for shipbuilders to provide the agency, and to understand why ships are delivered late and why commercial shipbuilders maintain a much better schedule performance than do military builders. This monograph presents the researchers' findings and recommendations, which was based on surveys of major US, UK, and other European shipbuilders and other extensive industry research.

Examines ways in which the UK Ministry of Defence can reduce the whole-life costs and manpower requirements of the Royal Navy's two Future Aircraft Carriers (CVFs). In 2012 and 2015, respectively, the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence will replace its three Invincible-class aircraft carriers with two Future Aircraft Carriers (CVFs), the largest ships ever constructed for the Royal Navy. The research described in this report focuses on possible reductions in whole-life costs and manpower requirements of the carriers.

Examines current and prospective use of simulation in training for US Navy Ships. A number of naval exercises can be conducted in port, using various forms of simulation, rather than at sea. Some groups, such as commercial shipping, already rely more heavily on such training than the US Navy does. Can the US Navy do the same, yet still maintain or improve readiness? The authors look at current uses of simulation and suggest ways to best use underway and simulation training time and strategies for implementation.

Building on prior RAND research, this monograph explores the need for and retention of technical skills in the UK1s maritime industry, particularly among designers and engineers involved with surface ship and submarine acquisition and support. The results reveal that the UK1s future naval programme likely will have to be modified or augmented to sustain these technical skills in the long term.