In this insightful book, distinguished political scientist John G. Gunnell explores the relationship between social science and philosophy, and the range of problems that have attended this relationship. Gunnell argues that social science has turned to philosophy, especially to areas such as the philosophy of science and other sites of philosophical foundationalism, in search of cognitive identity and the grounds for normative and empirical judgment. Gunnell's emphasis is on political and social theory and the theoretical constitution of social phenomena. The Orders of Discourse will be of interest to political theorists, political philosophers, and social scientists.

In this book, 19 prominent representatives of each side in the basic division among Strauss's followers explore his contribution to political philosophy and Jewish thought. The volume presents the most extensive analysis yet published of Strauss's religious heritage and how it related to his work, and includes Strauss's previously unpublished 'Why We Remain Jews, ' an extraordinary essay concerned with the challenge posed to Judaism by modern secular thought. The extensive introduction interrelates the major themes of Strauss's thought

When social scientists and social theorists turn to the work of philosophers for intellectual and practical authority, they typically assume that truth, reality, and meaning are to be found outside rather than within our conventional discursive practices. John G. Gunnell argues for conventional realism as a theory of social phenomena and an approach to the study of politics. Drawing on Wittgenstein's critique of "mentalism" and traditional realism, Gunnell argues that everything we designate as "real" is rendered conventionally, which entails a rejection of the widely accepted distinction between what is natural and what is conventional. The terms "reality" and "world" have no meaning outside the contexts of specific claims and assumptions about what exists and how it behaves. And rather than a mysterious source and repository of prelinguistic meaning, the "mind" is simply our linguistic capacities. Taking readers through contemporary forms of mentalism and realism in both philosophy and American political science and theory, Gunnell also analyzes the philosophical challenges to these positions mounted by Wittgenstein and those who can be construed has his successors.

John G. Gunnell argues that a distinctive feature of Ludwig Wittgenstein's work after 1930 was his turn to a conception of philosophy as a form of social inquiry and that Thomas Kuhn's approach to the philosophy of science exemplified this conception. He further contends that their work addresses foundational issues in the social and human sciences and particularly the vision of social inquiry as an interpretive endeavor, as well as the distinctive cognitive and practical relationship between social inquiry and its subject matter.

Gunnell speaks directly to philosophers and practitioners of the social and human sciences. The issues he tackles include the demarcation between natural and social science; the nature of social phenomena; the concept and method of interpretation; the relationship between language and thought; the problem of knowledge of other minds; and the character of descriptive and normative judgments about practices that are the object of inquiry. Though Wittgenstein and Kuhn are often criticized as initiating a modern descent into relativism, this book shows that the true effect of their work was to undermine the basic assumptions of contemporary social and human science practice. It also problematized the authority of philosophy and other forms of social inquiry to specify the criteria for judging such matters as truth and justice. When Wittgenstein stated that "philosophy leaves everything as it is," he did not mean that philosophy would be left as it was or that philosophy would have no impact on what it studied, but rather that the activity of inquiry did not, simply by virtue of its performance, transform the object of inquiry.

This provocative work reveals the origins and development of political theory as it is presently understood--and misunderstood. Tracing the evolution of the field from the nineteenth century to the present, John G. Gunnell shows how current controversies, like those over liberalism or the relationship of theory to practice, are actually the unresolved legacy of a forgotten past. By uncovering this past, Gunnell exposes the forces that animate and structure political theory today.
Gunnell reconstructs the evolution of the field by locating it within the broader development of political science and American social science in general. During the behavioral revolution that swept political science in the 1950s, the relationship between political theory and political science changed dramatically, relegating theory to the margins of an increasingly empirical discipline. Gunnell demonstrates that the estrangement of political theory is rooted in a much older quarrel: the authority of knowledge versus political theory is rooted in a much older quarrel: the authority of knowledge versus political authority, academic versus public discourse. By disclosing the origin of this dispute, he opens the way for a clearer understanding of the basis and purpose of political theory.
As critical as it is revelatory, this thoughtful book should be read by any one interested in the history of political theory or science--or in the relationship of social science to political practice in the United States.