Originally published in 1991, the essays in this volume are written by philosophers who were convinced that Wittgenstein's investigations in philosophical psychology were of direct relevance to current experimental psychology at the time. Rather than reflecting on the nature of psychological theory at a high level of abstraction, they examined leading theories and controversies in the experimental study of vision and of language in order to reveal the conceptual problems that they raise and the philosophical theories that have exerted an influence upon them. Under the section headings 'Language and Behaviour' and 'Perception and Representation', the essays examine the work of Chomsky, Gregory, Marr, Weiskrantz and others, and discuss problems ranging from artificial intelligence to animal communications, from blindsight to machine vision. The collection aims to demonstrate that philosophical investigations can contribute to psychological science by extirpating conceptual confusions which have been woven into the fabric of empirical research. The majority of the essays had been specially commissioned, and the contributors include several of the most distinguished exponents of Wittgenstein's philosophical legacy at the time.

Originally published in 1991, the essays in this volume are written by philosophers who were convinced that Wittgenstein's investigations in philosophical psychology were of direct relevance to current experimental psychology at the time. Rather than reflecting on the nature of psychological theory at a high level of abstraction, they examined leading theories and controversies in the experimental study of vision and of language in order to reveal the conceptual problems that they raise and the philosophical theories that have exerted an influence upon them. Under the section headings 'Language and Behaviour' and 'Perception and Representation', the essays examine the work of Chomsky, Gregory, Marr, Weiskrantz and others, and discuss problems ranging from artificial intelligence to animal communications, from blindsight to machine vision. The collection aims to demonstrate that philosophical investigations can contribute to psychological science by extirpating conceptual confusions which have been woven into the fabric of empirical research. The majority of the essays had been specially commissioned, and the contributors include several of the most distinguished exponents of Wittgenstein's philosophical legacy at the time.

Peter Hacker is one of the most notable interpreters of Wittgenstein's work, a powerful and sophisticated exponent of Wittgensteinian ideas, and a distinguished historian of the analytic tradition. Thirteen leading philosophers and Wittgenstein scholars offer specially written essays in honour of Hacker. Their contributions deal with a variety of themes associated with Wittgenstein. Some deal with issues of Wittgenstein scholarship and interpretation, including areas that have attracted an increasing amount of attention, such as ethics and religion. Others deal with central topics from the history of analytic philosophy. Finally there are essays that explore and assess Wittgensteinian ideas, in some cases as developed by Hacker, in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind, or in related areas such as the philosophy of action and the philosophy of neuroscience.

One of the most exciting developments in philosophy in the last fifty years is the resurgence in the philosophy of action. The concept of action now occupies a central place in ethics, metaphysics and jurisprudence. This collection of original essays, by some of the most astute and influential philosophers working in this area, covers the entire range of the philosophy of action. Topics covered include the nature of actions themselves; how the concepts of act, agent, cause and event are related to each other; self-knowledge, emotion, autonomy and freedom in human life; and the place of the concept of action in criminal law. The volume concludes with a major essay by one of America's leading authorities in the philosophy of law on 'the 3.5 billion dollar question': was the destruction of the World Trade Center one event or two?

This, in a nutshell, is the central problem in the theory of art. It has fascinated philosophers from Plato to Wittgenstein. And it fascinates artists and art historians, who have always drawn extensively on philosophical ideas about language and representation, and on ideas about vision and the visible world that have deep philosophical roots. John Hyman's "The Objective Eye" is a radical treatment of this problem, deeply informed by the history of philosophy and science, but entirely fresh. The questions tackled here are fundamental ones: Is our experience of color an illusion? How does the metaphysical status of colors differ from that of shapes? With great agility, Hyman considers what is different between a picture and a written text - and whether absolutely anything can be represented in a picture. For example, can a picture represent a thought or a feeling, or a sound or a smell, or must the things it represents have shapes and colors? Why are some pictures said to be more realistic than others? Is it because they are especially truthful or, on the contrary, because they deceive the eye? "The Objective Eye" explores the fundamental concepts we use constantly in our most innocent thoughts and conversations about art, as well as in the most sophisticated art theory. The book progresses from pure philosophy to applied philosophy and ranges from the metaphysics of color to Renaissance perspective, from anatomy in ancient Greece to impressionism in nineteenth-century France. Philosophers, art historians, and students of the arts will find "The Objective Eye" challenging and absorbing.