This comprehensive volume traces the evolution of Japanese military history-from 300 AD to present day foreign relations-and reveals how the country's cultural views of power, violence, and politics helped shape Japan's long and turbulent history of war. The legacy of Japanese warfare is steeped in honor, duty, and valor. Yet, some of the more violent episodes in this country's military history have tainted foreign attitudes toward Japan, oftentimes threatening the economic stability of the Pacific region. This book documents Japan's long and stormy history of war and military action, provides a thorough analysis of the social and political changes that have contributed to the evolution of Japan's foreign policy and security decisions, and reveals the truth behind the common myths and misconceptions of this nation's iconic war symbols and events, including samurais, warlords, and kamikaze attacks. Written by an author with military experience and insight into modern-day Japanese culture gained from living in Japan, A Military History of Japan: From the Age of the Samurai to the 21st Century examines how Japan's history of having warrior-based leaderships, imperialist governments, and dictators has shaped the country's concepts of war. It provides a complete military history of Japan-from the beginning of the Imperial institution to the post-Cold War era-in a single volume. This thoughtful resource also contains photos, maps, and a glossary of key Japanese terms to support learning. Compiles Japan's complete military history in one volume Reveals the strategic blunders and poor choices that led to Japan's surrender to the United States in 1945 Provides in-depth coverage of the popular and compelling Samurai, Imperial, and Shogun periods of history

This carefully researched book provides an operational level analysis of European warfare from 1792 to 1815 that includes the tactics, operations, and strategy of major conflicts of the time. 2015 marks the 200th anniversary of the famous Waterloo campaign, sparking a renewed interest in Napoleon's prowess as a military leader and acumen as a strategist. This in-depth analysis scrutinizes the complex campaigns and strategies of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, looking at how military genius-referred to in the book as "operational art"-shaded the panorama of 18th-century warfare. Drawing upon familiar battles as well as lesser-known campaigns, this sweeping reference uses 20th-century military theory to explain 19th-century events. Author John T. Kuehn discusses joint warfare and strategy found in the military movements of Marshal Suvorov in Italy and Switzerland in 1799; the early and later campaigns of Napoleon and Nelson; and the Duke of Wellington's campaigns in Spain, Portugal, and Belgium. The work also includes an entire chapter on theory and history of operational art spanning a variety of perspectives-from theorist Carl von Clausewitz to American air force pilot John Boyd. This book is a must-have for any military history collection. Integrates topics as diverse as naval warfare, maneuver warfare, compound warfare, and counterinsurgency Covers major campaigns during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars that reflect elements of operational art Includes short biographies of key figures that help add depth to readers' understanding of the players behind the battles Provides a chronology of major campaigns of the Napoleonic Wars Uses modern models to examine campaigns of the period

The 100 Worst Military Disasters in History is a fascinating collection that educators, students, and historians will all find useful in helping them understand the causes and consequences of the most infamous military failures in history. The dynamics of military disaster are equally, if not more, important as understanding how to achieve success on the battlefield. This comprehensive book covers the complete gamut of human history as it tells the compelling stories of the worst military debacles of all time. It covers battles, campaigns, and wars, starting with the ancient Persians and Greeks and finishing with the U.S. conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Not limited to land warfare, however, the book also includes a number of the most disastrous naval engagements and campaigns in world history. The 100 Worst Military Disasters in History opens with a detailed introduction illuminating the role military strategy and politics played in some of the worst battlefield failures throughout history. The entries are augmented with several engaging sidebars related to various military disasters. This eclectic collection includes coverage of many lesser known military disasters such as the Taiping Rebellion, during which 20 times more Chinese died than the number of people killed in the American Civil War. Provides readers with a global collection of the worst military disasters in history Offers a broad chronological review of military disasters across multiple conflicts Includes engaging sidebars that augment the entries Provides readers with an extensive resource list for further reading

Many myths have grown up around President Harry S. Truman’s decision to use nuclear weapons against Imperial Japan. In destroying these myths, Truman and the Bomb will discomfort both Truman’s critics and his supporters, and force historians to reexamine what they think they know about the end of the Pacific War. Myth: Truman didn’t know of the atomic bomb’s development before he became president.  Fact: Truman’s knowledge of the bomb is revealed in his own carefully worded letters to a Senate colleague and specifically discussed in the correspondence between the army officers assigned to his Senate investigating committee. Myth: The huge casualty estimates cited by Truman and Secretary of War Henry Stimson were a postwar creation devised to hide their guilt for killing thousands of defenseless civilians.  Fact: The flagrantly misrepresented “low� numbers are based on narrow slices of highly qualified—and limited—U.S. Army projections printed in a variety of briefing documents and are not from the actual invasion planning against Japan. Myth: Truman wanted to defeat Japan without any assistance from the Soviet Union and to freeze the USSR out of the postwar settlements.  Fact: President Franklin D. Roosevelt and President Truman desperately wanted Stalin’s involvement in the bloody endgame of World War II and worked diligently—and successfully—toward that end. Using previously unpublished material, D. M. Giangreco busts these myths and more. An award-winning historian and expert on Truman, Giangreco is perfectly situated to debunk the many deep-rooted falsehoods about the roles played by American, Soviet, and Japanese leaders during the end of the World War II in the Pacific. Truman and the Bomb, a concise yet comprehensive study of Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb, will prove to be a classic for studying presidential politics and influence on atomic warfare and its military and diplomatic components. Making this book particularly valuable for professors and students as well as for military, diplomatic, and presidential historians and history buffs are extensive primary source materials, including the planned U.S. naval and air operations in support of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. These documents support Giangreco’s arguments while enabling the reader to enter the mindsets of Truman and his administration as well as the war’s key Allied participants.

This study investigates the reasons for the success of the Sixth Coalition against Napoleon in 1813. Four critical principles emerge from U.S. joint doctrine that provide a means to examine coalition warfare: national goals, unity of effort, strategic plans, and adherence to plans. These principles illuminate the importance of coalition warfare in the defeat of Napoleon. The failure of an earlier coalition, the Second Coalition in 1799, underscores the importance of the principles of coalition warfare to the success or failure of the coalitions against Napoleon and the French. This coalition failed because of its lack of attention to the details of coalition warfare. Its basic flaw, lack of a common coalition goal, undermined its unity and resulted in defeat. The development of a common goal, the liberation of Germany, combined with the decline of the French and reforms by Napoleon's opponents led to a level playing field in 1813. The 1813 spring campaign resulted in a stalemate. The coalition used the subsequent armistice to further improve both politically and militarily. These improvements, particularly the adoption of a unified military strategy, resulted in improved unity of effort and provided the Sixth Coalition the margin for ultimate victory.