This book explores the extent to which fuzzy set logic can overcome some of the shortcomings of public choice theory, particularly its inability to provide adequate predictive power in empirical studies. Especially in the case of social preferences, public choice theory has failed to produce the set of alternatives from which collective choices are made. The book presents empirical findings achieved by the authors in their efforts to predict the outcome of government formation processes in European parliamentary and semi-presidential systems.Using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), the authors propose a new approach that reinterprets error in the coding of CMP data as ambiguity in the actual political positions of parties on the policy dimensions being coded. The range of this error establishes parties fuzzy preferences. The set of possible outcomes in the process of government formation is then calculated on the basis of both the fuzzy Pareto set and the fuzzy maximal set, and the predictions are compared with those made by two conventional approaches as well as with the government that was actually formed. The comparison shows that, in most cases, the fuzzy approaches outperform their conventional counterparts."

America's debt is in the trillions--and yet, like those who worry about borrowing five dollars but not about their unaffordable mortgage, Americans fail to pay attention to this serious situation. The press hovers over annual budgets and the associated deficits (and rare surpluses), but pays little attention to the national debt and even less to the interest spent serving it. Federal politicians seem as powerless to control the debt as they are uninformed about its nature. After tracing fluctuations in the finances of the country from its beginning until 1940, this book examines the administrations of the next 12 presidents (FDR through George W. Bush) and the annual budget deficits and interest expenses that fed the national debt. The startup debt of each administration is shown; then the change in debt through the end of the administration is analyzed to show what areas of government incurred overspending and how much was overspent. Also included are brief biographies of each president, and discussions of foreign and domestic situations, including judicial decisions and sociological changes, that affected fiscal policies and fueled the urge to overspend.

This book explores the extent to which fuzzy set logic can overcome some of the shortcomings of public choice theory, particularly its inability to provide adequate predictive power in empirical studies. Especially in the case of social preferences, public choice theory has failed to produce the set of alternatives from which collective choices are made. The book presents empirical findings achieved by the authors in their efforts to predict the outcome of government formation processes in European parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), the authors propose a new approach that reinterprets error in the coding of CMP data as ambiguity in the actual political positions of parties on the policy dimensions being coded. The range of this error establishes parties’ fuzzy preferences. The set of possible outcomes in the process of government formation is then calculated on the basis of both the fuzzy Pareto set and the fuzzy maximal set, and the predictions are compared with those made by two conventional approaches as well as with the government that was actually formed. The comparison shows that, in most cases, the fuzzy approaches outperform their conventional counterparts.