""Specialists will learn much from the book, as will anyone interested in the renewal of political history more generally."" - The International History Review ""The essays focus on heretofore underappreciated issues . . . Although several anthologies about modern France have appeared recently, this collection is a particularly worthy contribution because of its approach and its analytical insights. Students and specialists of the history of France will benefit greatly." - History: Reviews of New Books ""The essays are worth reading, and some make very distinctive and important contributions to our understanding of modern French history." - H-France Since 1914, the French state has faced a succession of daunting and at times almost insurmountable crises. The turbulent decades from 1914 to 1969 witnessed near-defeat in 1914, economic and political crisis in 1926, radical political polarization in the 1930s, military conquest in 1940, the deep division of France during the Nazi Occupation, political reconstruction after 1944, de-colonization (with threatening civil war provoked by the Algerian crisis), and dramatic postwar modernization. However, this tumultuous period was not marked just by crises but also by tremendous change. Economic, social and political ""modernization"" transformed France in the twentieth century, restoring its confidence and its influence as a leader in global economic and political affairs. This combination of crises and renewal has received surprisingly little attention in recent years. The present collection show-cases significant new scholarship, reflecting greater access to French archival sources, and focuses on the role of crises in fostering modernization in areas covering politics, economics, women, diplomacy and war. Kenneth Moure is Professor of History at the University of California at Santa Barbara. Martin S. Alexander is Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK"

Since 1914, the French state has faced a succession of daunting and at times almost insurmountable crises. The turbulent decades from 1914 to 1969 witnessed near-defeat in 1914, economic and political crisis in 1926, radical political polarization in the 1930s, military conquest in 1940, the deep division of France during the Nazi Occupation, political reconstruction after 1944, de-colonization (with threatening civil war provoked by the Algerian crisis), and dramatic postwar modernization. However, this tumultuous period was not marked just by crises but also by tremendous change. Economic, social and political "modernization" transformed France in the twentieth century, restoring its confidence and its influence as a leader in global economic and political affairs. This combination of crises and renewal has received surprisingly little attention in recent years. The present collection show-cases significant new scholarship, reflecting greater access to French archival sources, and focuses on the role of crises in fostering modernization in areas covering politics, economics, women, diplomacy and war.

Did French gold policy cause the Great Depression? The Gold Standard Illusion draws on newly-available French records to test the gold standard interpretation of the Great Depression. It provides a history of French economic understanding, policy-making, and politics with regard to gold, monetary policy, and the key role of financial problems in political instability from 1914 to 1939.

Kenneth Moure shows how the black market in Vichy France developed not only to serve German exploitation, but also as an essential strategy for survival for commerce and consumers. His analysis explains how and why the black market became so prevalent and powerful in France and remained necessary after Liberation. Marche Noir draws on diverse French archives as well as diaries, memoirs and contemporary fiction, to highlight the importance of the black market in everyday life. Vichy's economic controls set the context for adaptations - by commerce facing economic and political constraints, and by consumers needing essential goods. Vichy collaboration in this realm seriously damaged the regime's legitimacy. Marche Noir offers new insights into the dynamics of black markets in wartime, and how illicit trade in France served not only to exploit consumer needs and increase German power, but also to aid communities in their strategies for survival.

Defense of the franc Poincaré dominated French economic policy during the Depression. While most countries took their currencies off gold to permit a wider range of domestic policies to foster recovery, in France policy makers resolved to preserve the gold parity of the franc by balancing the budget and lowering domestic prices. Novelty and experimentation were rejected in the conviction that a durable recovery was possible only through a return to strict neoclassical orthodoxy. Managing the franc Poincaré examines French monetary management from 1928 to 1936 in order to explain this stubborn determination to achieve recovery through deflation despite evidence of its failures abroad. Through evaluation of French understanding of the Depression, French economic diplomacy in an era of economic nationalism, the evolving roles of the French treasury and the Bank of France in monetary management and policy determination, and attention to the fractious politics of the Third Republic, French monetary policy is set within its ideological, institutional and political contexts.

Defence of the franc Poincare dominated French economic policy during the Depression. While most countries took their currencies off gold to permit a wider range of domestic policies to foster recovery, in France policy makers resolved to preserve the gold parity of the franc by balancing the budget and lowering domestic prices. Novelty and experimentation were rejected in the conviction that a durable recovery was possible only through a return to strict neoclassical orthodoxy. Managing the Franc Poincare examines French monetary management from 1928 to 1936 in order to explain this stubborn determination to achieve recovery through deflation despite evidence of its failures abroad.