"The Port Royal Experiment" builds on classic scholarship to present not a historical narrative but a study of what is now called development and nation-building. The Port Royal Experiment was a joint governmental and private effort begun during the Civil War to transition former slaves to freedom and self-sufficiency. Port Royal Harbor and the Sea Islands off the coast of South Carolina were liberated by Union Troops in 1861. As the Federal advance began, the white plantation owners and residents fled, abandoning approximately 10,000 black slaves. Several private Northern charity organizations stepped in to help the former slaves become self-sufficient. Nonetheless, the Point Royal Experiment was only a mixed success and was contested by efforts to restore the status quo of white dominance. Return to home rule then undid much of what the experiment accomplished.

While the concept of development is subject to a range of interpretations, in this context it means positive, continuously improving, and sustained change across a variety of human social conditions. Clearly such an effort was at the heart of the Port Royal Experiment. While the term "nation-building" may seem misplaced given that no "nation" was the beneficiary of these efforts, the requirement to build institutions critical to nation-building operations was certainly a large part of the Port Royal Experiment and offers many lessons for modern efforts at nation building.

"The Port Royal Experiment" divides into ten chapters, each of which is designed to treat a particular aspect of the experience. Topics include planning considerations, philanthropic society activity, civil society, economic development, political development, and resistance. Each chapter presents the case study in the context of more recent developmental and nation-building efforts in such places as Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan and incorporates recent scholarship in the field. Modern readers will see that the challenges that faced the Port Royal Experiment remain relevant, even as their solutions remain elusive.

Nation-building enterprises by the United States and the broader international community have run the gamut of success and failure. Some have enjoyed overwhelming support and others debilitating controversy. Some are motivated by national security interests; others by humanitarian concerns. They have seemingly exploded since the end of the Cold War but in fact have long been used as a foreign policy tool. What they all have in common is a substantial investment of troops, treasure and time. There is no formula for success-each operation is unique, with lessons to be learned and trends to be noted. Examining the history of America's experience in nation-building, this book describes the mechanisms behind what often appears to be a haphazard enterprise.

Although the twin Federal victory at Gettysburg often captures more popular attention, many scholars consider Vicksburg to be the Civil War's decisive action. The Vicksburg Campaign builds on the campaign's well-established literature, including the author's Leadership Lessons: The Campaign for Vicksburg, 1862-63 (Casemate, 2011), to provide a readable narrative that synthesizes other scholarship. It is designed to be an introductory survey of the campaign for those new to the subject, as well as a convenient single-volume reference for the more seasoned reader. Sufficient background information is contained in introductory chapters that identify the key Federal and Confederate players and the strategic setting that brought Vicksburg to the forefront of the Western Theater. The action is then traced from such early failed attempts as Farragut's navy only effort and Grant's series of canal schemes to the brilliant campaign of manoeuvre that left Pemberton besieged inside Vicksburg. In addition to the narrative account, The Vicksburg Campaign includes information about Vicksburg National Military Park, the Federal and Confederate Orders of Battle, and the Medal of Honor at Vicksburg as appendices.

Francis Marion is certainly the stuff of which legends are made. His nickname "The Swamp Fox," bestowed upon him by one of his fiercest enemies, captures his wily approach to battle. The embellishment of his exploits in Parson Weems' early biography make separation of fact from fiction difficult, but certainly represents the awe, loyalty, and attraction he produced in those around him. His legacy is enshrined in the fact that more places in the United States have been named after him than any other soldier of the American Revolution, with the sole exception of George Washington. Even today's U.S. Army Rangers include Marion as one of their formative heroes. Surely much about leadership can be learned from such an intriguing personality. Leading like the Swamp Fox: The Leadership Lessons of Francis Marion unlocks those lessons. Divided into three parts, the book first presents the historical background and context necessary to appreciate Marion's situation. The main body of the book then examines Marion's leadership across eight categories, with a number of vignettes demonstrating Marion's competency. The summary then captures some conclusions about how leadership impacted the American Revolution in the South Carolina Lowcountry. An appendix provides some information about how the reader might explore those physical reminders of Marion and his exploits that exist today. Readers interested in history or leadership, or both, will all find something for them in Leading like the Swamp Fox.

The Port Royal Experiment builds on classic scholarship to present not a historical narrative but a study of what is now called development and nation building. The Port Royal Experiment was a joint governmental and private effort begun during the Civil War to transition former slaves to freedom and self-sufficiency. Port Royal Harbor and the Sea Islands off the coast of South Carolina were liberated by Union Troops in 1861. As the Federal advance began, the white plantation owners and residents fled, abandoning approximately 10,000 black slaves. Several private northern charity organizations stepped in to help the former slaves become self-sufficient. Nonetheless, the Port Royal Experiment was only a mixed success and was contested by efforts to restore the status quo of white dominance. Return to home rule then undid much of what the experiment accomplished. The Port Royal Experiment divides into ten chapters, each of which is designed to treat a particular aspect of the experience. Topics include planning considerations, philanthropic society activity, civil society, economic development, political development, and resistance. Each chapter presents the case study in the context of more recent developmental and nation-building efforts in such places as Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Modern readers will see that the challenges that faced the Port Royal Experiment remain relevant, even as their solutions remain elusive.

A great many commanders in the American Civil War (1861-1865) served in the Mexican War (1846-1848). "Civil War Leadership and Mexican War Experience" explores the influence of the earlier war on those men who would become leaders of Federal and Confederate forces. Military historian Kevin Dougherty sets the context with a discussion of professional soldiering before both wars. He then depicts the unique experiences of twenty-six men in Mexico, thirteen who would later serve the Confederacy and thirteen who would remain with the Union. He traces how tactics they used and reactions they had to Civil War combat reveal a remarkable connection to what they learned campaigning against Santa Anna and other Mexican generals.

Personalities discussed range from well-known leaders such as Ulysses S. Grant to lesser-known figures such as John Winder; from geniuses such as Robert E. Lee to mediocrities such as Gideon Pillow; and from aged heroes such as Winfield Scott to developing practitioners such as William Sherman. No other volume so exclusively and thoroughly focuses on connections of service in both wars.

Two appendixes in the book list 194 Federal generals and 142 Confederate generals who served in Mexico. The impact of these experiences on major tactical decisions in the Civil War is far-reaching.

The largest offensive of the Civil War, involving army, navy, and marine forces, the Peninsula Campaign has inspired many history books. No previous work, however, analyzes Union general George B. McClellan's massive assault toward Richmond in the context of current and enduring military doctrine. "The Peninsula Campaign of 1862: A Military Analysis" fills this void. Background history is provided for continuity, but the heart of this book is military analysis and the astonishing extent to which the personality traits of generals often overwhelm even the best efforts of their armies.

The Peninsula Campaign lends itself to such a study. Lessons for those studying the art of war are many. On water, the first ironclads forever changed naval warfare. At the strategic level, McClellan's inability to grasp Lincoln's grand objective becomes evident. At the operational level, Robert E. Lee's difficulty in synchronizing his attacks deepens the mystique of how he achieved so much with so little. At the tactical level, the Confederate use of terrain to trade space for time allows for a classic study in tactics.

Moreover, the campaign is full of lessons about the personal dimension of war. McClellan's overcaution, Lee's audacity, and Jackson's personal exhaustion all provide valuable insights for today's commanders and for Civil War enthusiasts still debating this tremendous struggle. Historic photos and detailed battle maps make this study an invaluable resource for those touring the many battlegrounds from Young's Mill and Yorktown through Fair Oaks to the final throes of the Seven Days' Battles.

After World War II, the United States military increasingly found itself involved in operations that have been described variously as limited wars, small wars, low intensity conflicts, operations other than war, support and stability operations, and the like. The name common for such operations throughout much of the 1990s was ""operations other than war"" (OOTW). During this period there was an explosion of doctrinal material on the subject, including an official field manual, FM 100-5, which appeared in 1993 and listed six principles of OOTW: objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint and security. The author of the present work examines four successful OOTWs (the Greek Civil War, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua/Honduras) and four failed ones (Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia, and Haiti) and concludes that there is a positive correlation between adherence to the principles and the operation's outcome. Furthermore, the author suggests that some of the principles serve as ""necessary conditions"" for others.

President Bill Clinton, speaking as might any commander-in-chief, on the eve of his decision to deploy ground troops to Bosnia in 1995, declared he had ""no responsibility more grave than putting soldiers in harm's way [and, it should be noted, in today's operational environment this means civilians as well]."" Such a statement suggests that a study of the decision-making process associated with the weighty matters of using force would be enlightening. Indeed, it is. The decision-making process is far from standardised nor is it simple. While all individuals associated with important decisions about national security and the lives of America's service members take their responsibilities seriously, the processes by which they reach their conclusions are varied and complicated. This book traces traditional and emerging theories of decision-making by first explaining the components of each model and then analysing its practical application through three case studies. Each chapter concludes with a discussion of the utility and explanatory power of the particular theory. Because even at their very best a particular decision-making theory can only explain some cases, the chapter then segues to another theory with different characteristics.