Lon L Fuller's account of what he termed 'the internal morality of law' is widely accepted as the classic twentieth century statement of the principles of the rule of law. Much less accepted is his claim that a necessary connection between law and morality manifests in these principles, with the result that his jurisprudence largely continues to occupy a marginal place in the field of legal philosophy. In 'Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller', Kristen Rundle offers a close textual analysis of Fuller's published writings and working papers to explain how his claims about the internal morality of law belong to a wider exploration of the ways in which the distinctive form of law introduces meaningful limits to lawgiving power through its connection to human agency. By reading Fuller on his own terms, 'Forms Liberate' demonstrates why his challenge to a purely instrumental conception of law remains salient for twenty-first century legal scholarship.

This Element offers an accessible introduction to theoretical writing on the rule of law for anyone who wants to understand more about how we think and write about this central idea of legal and political thought. Part 1, 'Approaching the Rule of Law', examines the methods through which the idea of the rule of law is typically approached by those who set out to theorise it. Part 2, 'Untangling the Rule of Law', asks whether it is possible to untangle the rule of law from the various contributions, companions, connections, conflations and controversies with which it tends to be associated. Part 3, 'Revisiting the Rule of Law', signals to new frontiers of rule of law thought by addressing the assumptions about legal form that shape its theoretical treatment, and by investigating what we know about the people who carry its burdens and benefit from its offerings.

Lon L Fuller's account of what he termed 'the internal morality of law' is widely accepted as the classic twentieth century statement of the principles of the rule of law. Much less accepted is his claim that a necessary connection between law and morality manifests in these principles, with the result that his jurisprudence largely continues to occupy a marginal place in the field of legal philosophy. In 'Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller', Kristen Rundle offers a close textual analysis of Fuller's published writings and working papers to explain how his claims about the internal morality of law belong to a wider exploration of the ways in which the distinctive form of law introduces meaningful limits to lawgiving power through its connection to human agency. By reading Fuller on his own terms, 'Forms Liberate' demonstrates why his challenge to a purely instrumental conception of law remains salient for twenty-first century legal scholarship.