Since I first published Management of Foreign Exchange Risk (Lexington Books, 1978), financial innovation-spurred, in part, by exploding volatility in currency prices-has revolutionized the theory and praxis of foreign exchange risk management. Old-fashioned forward contracts have surrendered market share to currency swaps and options as well as to their perpetually multiplying derivatives. Interestingly, forex derivatives now provide a low cost and highly efficient method of transferring risk from the firms that are exposed to risk but which would rather not be (i. e. , risk-hedgers) to those which are not exposed but which-in exchange for a fee-would assume some exposure to risk (i. e. , risk bearers). Perhaps more importantly, foreign exchange risk management, which was once a fairly mechanical task confmed to the international treasury function, is now permeating global strategic management. Indeed, since the demise of the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates, the cost of forex hedging instruments has fallen so dramatically that firms can readily avail themselves of hedging products which can reduce unwanted risk, thereby potentially gaining a competitive advantage over rivals that do not. Management and Control of Foreign Exchange Risk has grown out of a fundamental revision of my earlier work published almost 20 years ago. In the process, my thinking about risk and its mathematics has greatly benefitted from my association with John Cozzolino and Charles Tapiero.

The central question addressed in Financial Innovations and the Welfare of Nations is how the transfer of financial innovations from developed to developing economies can nurture the dynamics of emerging capital markets. National capital markets can be positioned along a continuum ranging from embryonic to mature and emerged markets according to a decreasing "national cost of capital" criterion. In the introductory chapter Laurent Jacque argues that newly emerging countries are handicapped by a high cost of capital due to "incomplete" and inefficient financial markets. As capital markets graduate to higher level of "emergedness," their national firms avail themselves of a lower cost of capital that makes them more competitive in the global economy and spurs economic growth. Skillful transfer of financial innovations to emerging markets often encourages the deregulation of the country's financial services sector. This results into new conduits for a more efficient capital allocation process such as commercial paper, securitized consumer finance and other disintermediated modes of financing which out-compete traditional financial intermediaries (mostly commercial banks), reduce households' cost of living and conjointly fuel the dynamics of emerging markets. Our response to the central question of how the transfer of financial innovations can enhance the Wealth of Nations is to show that it reduces the cost of capital while not unduly increasing systemic risk. Part I examines the relationship between financial innovations and systemic risk of the international financial system.

This book analyzes in depth all major derivatives debacles of the last half century including the multi-billion losses and/or bankruptcy of Metallgesellschaft (1994), Barings Bank (1995), Long Term Capital Management (1998), Amaranth (2006), Societe Generale (2008) , AIG (2008) and JP Morgan-Chase (2012). It unlocks the secrets of derivatives by telling the stories of institutions which played in the derivative market and lost big. For some of these unfortunate organizations it was daring but flawed financial engineering which brought them havoc. For others it was unbridled speculation perpetrated by rogue traders whose unchecked fraud brought their house down.Should derivatives be feared 'as financial weapons of mass destruction' or hailed as financial innovations which through efficient risk transfer are truly adding to the Wealth of Nations? By presenting a factual analysis of how the malpractice of derivatives played havoc with derivative end-user and dealer institutions, a case is made for vigilance not only to market and counter-party risk but also operational risk in their use for risk management and proprietary trading. Clear and recurring lessons across the different stories in this volume call not only for a tighter but also 'smarter' control system of derivatives trading and should be of immediate interest to financial managers, bankers, traders, auditors and regulators who are directly or indirectly exposed to financial derivatives.The book groups cases by derivative category, starting with the simplest and building up to the most complex - namely, Forwards, Futures, Options and Swaps in that order, with applications in commodities, foreign exchange, stock indices and interest rates. Each chapter deals with one derivative debacle, providing a rigorous and comprehensive but non-technical elucidation of what happened.What is new in the second edition? A new chapter on JP Morgan-Chase's London Whale, an in-depth discussion of credit-default swaps, and an update of the revamped regulatory framework with Basel 2.5 and Basel III against the backdrop of the Euro crisis, along with a revised and expanded discussion of the AIG debacle.

This book analyzes in depth all major derivatives debacles of the last half century including the multi-billion losses and/or bankruptcy of Metallgesellschaft (1994), Barings Bank (1995), Long Term Capital Management (1998), Amaranth (2006), Societe Generale (2008) and AIG (2008). It unlocks the secrets of derivatives by telling the stories of institutions which played in the derivative market and lost big. For some of these unfortunate organizations it was daring but flawed financial engineering which brought them havoc. For others it was unbridled speculation perpetrated by rogue traders whose unchecked fraud brought their house down.Should derivatives be feared "as financial weapons of mass destruction" or hailed as financial innovations which through efficient risk transfer are truly adding to the Wealth of Nations? By presenting a factual analysis of how the malpractice of derivatives played havoc with derivative end-user and dealer institutions, a case is made for vigilance not only to market and counter-party risk but also operational risk in their use for risk management and proprietary trading. Clear and recurring lessons across the different stories call not only for a tighter but also "smarter" control system of derivatives trading and should be of immediate interest to financial managers, bankers, traders, auditors and regulators who are directly or indirectly exposed to financial derivatives.The book groups cases by derivative category, starting with the simplest and building up to the most complex - namely, Forwards, Futures, Options and Swaps in that order, with applications in commodities, foreign exchange, stock indices and interest rates. Each chapter deals with one derivative debacle, providing a rigorous and comprehensive but non-technical elucidation of what happened.The book is translated and available in French, Russian, Simplified Chinese and Korean.

This book analyzes in depth all major derivatives debacles of the last half century including the multi-billion losses and/or bankruptcy of Metallgesellschaft (1994), Barings Bank (1995), Long Term Capital Management (1998), Amaranth (2006), Societe Generale (2008) and AIG (2008). It unlocks the secrets of derivatives by telling the stories of institutions which played in the derivative market and lost big. For some of these unfortunate organizations it was daring but flawed financial engineering which brought them havoc. For others it was unbridled speculation perpetrated by rogue traders whose unchecked fraud brought their house down.Should derivatives be feared "as financial weapons of mass destruction" or hailed as financial innovations which through efficient risk transfer are truly adding to the Wealth of Nations? By presenting a factual analysis of how the malpractice of derivatives played havoc with derivative end-user and dealer institutions, a case is made for vigilance not only to market and counter-party risk but also operational risk in their use for risk management and proprietary trading. Clear and recurring lessons across the different stories call not only for a tighter but also "smarter" control system of derivatives trading and should be of immediate interest to financial managers, bankers, traders, auditors and regulators who are directly or indirectly exposed to financial derivatives.The book groups cases by derivative category, starting with the simplest and building up to the most complex - namely, Forwards, Futures, Options and Swaps in that order, with applications in commodities, foreign exchange, stock indices and interest rates. Each chapter deals with one derivative debacle, providing a rigorous and comprehensive but non-technical elucidation of what happened.The book is translated and available in French, Russian, Simplified Chinese and Korean.

The central question addressed in Financial Innovations and the Welfare of Nations is how the transfer of financial innovations from developed to developing economies can nurture the dynamics of emerging capital markets. National capital markets can be positioned along a continuum ranging from embryonic to mature and emerged markets according to a decreasing "national cost of capital" criterion. In the introductory chapter Laurent Jacque argues that newly emerging countries are handicapped by a high cost of capital due to "incomplete" and inefficient financial markets. As capital markets graduate to higher level of "emergedness", their national firms avail themselves of a lower cost of capital that makes them more competitive in the global economy and spurs economic growth. Skillful transfer of financial innovations to emerging markets often encourages the deregulation of the country's financial services sector. This results into new conduits for a more efficient capital allocation process such as commercial paper, securitized consumer finance and other disintermediated modes of financing which out-compete traditional financial intermediaries (mostly commercial banks), reduce households' cost of living and conjointly fuel the dynamics of emerging markets. Our response to the central question of how the transfer of financial innovations can enhance the Wealth of Nations is to show that it reduces the cost of capital while not unduly increasing systemic risk. Part I examines the relationship between financial innovations and systemic risk of the international financial system.

Since I first published Management of Foreign Exchange Risk (Lexington Books, 1978), financial innovation-spurred, in part, by exploding volatility in currency prices-has revolutionized the theory and praxis of foreign exchange risk management. Old-fashioned forward contracts have surrendered market share to currency swaps and options as well as to their perpetually multiplying derivatives. Interestingly, forex derivatives now provide a low cost and highly efficient method of transferring risk from the firms that are exposed to risk but which would rather not be (i. e. , risk-hedgers) to those which are not exposed but which-in exchange for a fee-would assume some exposure to risk (i. e. , risk bearers). Perhaps more importantly, foreign exchange risk management, which was once a fairly mechanical task confmed to the international treasury function, is now permeating global strategic management. Indeed, since the demise of the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates, the cost of forex hedging instruments has fallen so dramatically that firms can readily avail themselves of hedging products which can reduce unwanted risk, thereby potentially gaining a competitive advantage over rivals that do not. Management and Control of Foreign Exchange Risk has grown out of a fundamental revision of my earlier work published almost 20 years ago. In the process, my thinking about risk and its mathematics has greatly benefitted from my association with John Cozzolino and Charles Tapiero.

This book analyzes in depth all major derivatives debacles of the last half century including the multi-billion losses and/or bankruptcy of Metallgesellschaft (1994), Barings Bank (1995), Long Term Capital Management (1998), Amaranth (2006), Societe Generale (2008) , AIG (2008) and JP Morgan-Chase (2012). It unlocks the secrets of derivatives by telling the stories of institutions which played in the derivative market and lost big. For some of these unfortunate organizations it was daring but flawed financial engineering which brought them havoc. For others it was unbridled speculation perpetrated by rogue traders whose unchecked fraud brought their house down.Should derivatives be feared 'as financial weapons of mass destruction' or hailed as financial innovations which through efficient risk transfer are truly adding to the Wealth of Nations? By presenting a factual analysis of how the malpractice of derivatives played havoc with derivative end-user and dealer institutions, a case is made for vigilance not only to market and counter-party risk but also operational risk in their use for risk management and proprietary trading. Clear and recurring lessons across the different stories in this volume call not only for a tighter but also 'smarter' control system of derivatives trading and should be of immediate interest to financial managers, bankers, traders, auditors and regulators who are directly or indirectly exposed to financial derivatives.The book groups cases by derivative category, starting with the simplest and building up to the most complex - namely, Forwards, Futures, Options and Swaps in that order, with applications in commodities, foreign exchange, stock indices and interest rates. Each chapter deals with one derivative debacle, providing a rigorous and comprehensive but non-technical elucidation of what happened.What is new in the second edition? A new chapter on JP Morgan-Chase's London Whale, an in-depth discussion of credit-default swaps, and an update of the revamped regulatory framework with Basel 2.5 and Basel III against the backdrop of the Euro crisis, along with a revised and expanded discussion of the AIG debacle.