This volume aims to provoke reflection on the English conception and treatment of prisoners' rights, through juxtaposition with the conception of prisoners' rights in Germany. First, the German and English understandings of prisoners' legal status are examined; secondly these understandings are placed against the background of broader social, political, and legal factors; and thirdly, the methodological problems of comparative law are addressed. English and German approaches to prisoners' rights present illuminating contrasts. In England, despite significant judicial activity in the development of a jurisprudence of prisoners' rights, protection of prisoners' rights remains partial and equivocal. Many aspects of prison life are left within the realm of executive discretion. This equivocal commitment to rights in England is juxtaposed with Germany's highly articulated rights culture and its ambitious system of prisoners' rights protection under the Prison Act 1976. The German Prison Act sets out foundational principles of prison administration, affords prisoners positive rights, defines the limitations of prisoners' constitutional rights, and provides prisoners with recourse to a Prison Court. Moreover, these rights and principles have been developed and refined in a substantial body of prison law jurisprudence over the last thirty years.

This book is about judicial reasoning in human rights cases. The aim is to explore the question: how is it that notionally universal norms are reasoned by courts in such significantly different ways? What is the shape of this reasoning; which techniques are common across the transnational jurisprudence; and which are particular? The book, comprising contributions by a team of world-leading human rights scholars, moves beyond simply addressing the institutional questions concerning courts and human rights, which often dominate discussions of this kind, seeking instead a deeper examination of the similarities and divergence of reasonings by different courts when addressing comparable human rights questions. These differences, while partly influenced by institutional concerns, cannot be attributed to them alone. This book explores the diverse and rich underlying spectrum of human rights reasoning, as a distinctive and particular form of legal reasoning, evident in the case studies across the selected jurisdictions.

This book is about judicial reasoning in human rights cases. The aim is to explore the question: how is it that notionally universal norms are reasoned by courts in such significantly different ways? What is the shape of this reasoning; which techniques are common across the transnational jurisprudence; and which are particular? The book, comprising contributions by a team of world-leading human rights scholars, moves beyond simply addressing the institutional questions concerning courts and human rights, which often dominate discussions of this kind, seeking instead a deeper examination of the similarities and divergence of reasonings by different courts when addressing comparable human rights questions. These differences, while partly influenced by institutional concerns, cannot be attributed to them alone. This book explores the diverse and rich underlying spectrum of human rights reasoning, as a distinctive and particular form of legal reasoning, evident in the case studies across the selected jurisdictions.