The insistence on UAVs in today's counter-insurgency (COIN) fight is monumental. The demand for UAVs exceeds supply and will continue to exceed it, even after the Services have built all of their programmed UAVs. Within this context and the context of pre-QDR 2010 roles and missions debate between the Services, the Services must achieve an optimal medium altitude UAV force balance in support of COIN operations. The Army's validated requirement and procurement of the MQ-1C Sky Warrior Extended Range Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) fuels a possible dilemma that the Air Force faces: encroachment of the ground forces into the "USAF-owned" air domain versus optimal UAS support to the joint forces commander (JFC). Finding the right balance between directly supporting ground forces and employing Air Force capabilities in other operational areas is critical to achieving the JFC's desired end state and is best accomplished through a strategy framework of means, ways, and ends. The means are Air Force and Army UAVs; the ways are doctrine; and the ends are support to the JFC and to the warfighter. As long as the joint force maintains unity of command and unity of effort, and adheres to centralized control and decentralized execution, the Army's procurement and use of medium altitude UAVs for use in today's COIN fight does not change Air Force UAS force structure requirements. Consequently, JFC capability is increased and the Army gets more direct support.