This collection of original essays brings together leading legal historians and theorists to explore the oft-neglected but important relationship between these two disciplines. Legal historians have often been sceptical of theory. The methodology which informs their own work is often said to be an empirical one, of gathering information from the archives and presenting it in a narrative form. The narrative produced by history is often said to be provisional, insofar as further research in the archives might falsify present understandings and demand revisions. On the other side, legal theorists are often dismissive of historical works. History itself seems to many theorists not to offer any jurisprudential insights of use for their projects: at best, history is a repository of data and examples, which may be drawn on by the theorist for her own purposes. The aim of this collection is to invite participants from both sides to ask what lessons legal history can bring to legal theory, and what legal theory can bring to history. What is the theorist to do with the empirical data generated by archival research? What theories should drive the historical enterprise, and what wider lessons can be learned from it? This collection brings together a number of major theorists and legal historians to debate these ideas.

This multi-disciplinary, multi-jurisdictional collection offers the first ever full-scale analysis of legal fictions. Its focus is on fictions in legal practice, examining and evaluating their roles in a variety of different areas of practice (e.g. in Tort Law, Criminal Law and Intellectual Property Law) and in different times and places (e.g. in Roman Law, Rabbinic Law and the Common Law). The collection approaches the topic in part through the discussion of certain key classical statements by theorists including Jeremy Bentham, Alf Ross, Hans Vaihinger, Hans Kelsen and Lon Fuller. The collection opens with the first-ever translation into English of Kelsen's review of Vaihinger's As If. The 17 chapters are divided into four parts: 1) a discussion of the principal theories of fictions, as above, with a focus on Kelsen, Bentham, Fuller and classical pragmatism; 2) a discussion of the relationship between fictions and language; 3) a theoretical and historical examination and evaluation of fictions in the common law; and 4) an account of fictions in different practice areas and in different legal cultures. The collection will be of interest to theorists and historians of legal reasoning, as well as scholars and practitioners of the law more generally, in both common and civil law traditions.

In Western culture, law is dominated by textual representation. Lawyers, academics and law students live and work in a textual world where the written word is law and law is interpreted largely within written and printed discourse. Is it possible, however, to understand and learn law differently? Could modes of knowing, feeling, memory and expectation commonly present in the Arts enable a deeper understanding of law's discourse and practice? If so, how might that work for students, lawyers and academics in the classroom, and in continuing professional development? Bringing together scholars, legal practitioners internationally from the fields of legal education, legal theory, theatre, architecture, visual and movement arts, this book is evidence of how the Arts can powerfully revitalize the theory and practice of legal education. Through discussion of theory and practice in the humanities and Arts, linked to practical examples of radical interventions, the chapters reveal how the Arts can transform educational practice and our view of its place in legal practice. Available in enhanced electronic format, the book complements The Moral Imagination and the Legal Life, also published by Ashgate.

What role can resources that go beyond text play in the development of moral education in law schools and law firms? How can these resources - especially those from the visual and performing arts - nourish the imagination needed to confront the ethical complexities of particular situations? This book asks and answers these questions, thereby introducing radically new resources for law schools and law firms committed to fighting against the moral complacency that can all too often creep into the life of the law. The chapters in this volume build on the companion volume, The Arts and the Legal Academy, also published by Ashgate, which focuses on the role of non-textual resources in legal education generally. Concentrating in particular on the moral dimension of legal education, the contributors to this volume include a wide range of theorists and leading legal educators from the UK and the US.

The contributions in this volume pay homage to Zenon BaA"kowski, with a focus on problems concerning law's normalization and the revitalizing force of anxiety. Ranging from political critique to methodological issues and from the role of human rights in development to the role of parables and analogy in legal reasoning, the contributions themselves are testament to the richness of BaA"kowski's scholarship, as well as to the applicability of his core ideas to a wide range of issues. Divided into five parts, the book focuses on the role and methods of the jurist; conceptions of legality and the experience of living under rules; jurisprudential issues affecting exchange and the market; and the burden and methods of legal judgement. It also includes BaA"kowski's 2011 valedictory lecture and a bibliography of his work. Comprising all original contributions, the contributors represent a balance of established, leading figures and younger, emerging scholars in the field of legal and social theory.

MacCormick's `Institutions of Law' is the culmination of a lifetime's work in legal theory by one of the world's most respected legal theorists. Featuring an impressive collection of contributions from well-known legal theorists from around the world, all of whom are familiar with MacCormick's work, this collection provides a cutting edge account of the book's significance.

The contributions in this volume pay homage to Zenon BaA"kowski, with a focus on problems concerning law's normalization and the revitalizing force of anxiety. Ranging from political critique to methodological issues and from the role of human rights in development to the role of parables and analogy in legal reasoning, the contributions themselves are testament to the richness of BaA"kowski's scholarship, as well as to the applicability of his core ideas to a wide range of issues. Divided into five parts, the book focuses on the role and methods of the jurist; conceptions of legality and the experience of living under rules; jurisprudential issues affecting exchange and the market; and the burden and methods of legal judgement. It also includes BaA"kowski's 2011 valedictory lecture and a bibliography of his work. Comprising all original contributions, the contributors represent a balance of established, leading figures and younger, emerging scholars in the field of legal and social theory.

What role can resources that go beyond text play in the development of moral education in law schools and law firms? How can these resources - especially those from the visual and performing arts - nourish the imagination needed to confront the ethical complexities of particular situations? This book asks and answers these questions, thereby introducing radically new resources for law schools and law firms committed to fighting against the moral complacency that can all too often creep into the life of the law. The chapters in this volume build on the companion volume, The Arts and the Legal Academy, also published by Ashgate, which focuses on the role of non-textual resources in legal education generally. Concentrating in particular on the moral dimension of legal education, the contributors in this volume include a wide range of theorists and leading legal educators from the UK and the US.

In Western culture, law is dominated by textual representation. Lawyers, academics and law students live and work in a textual world where the written word is law and law is interpreted largely within written and printed discourse. Is it possible, however, to understand and learn law differently? Could modes of knowing, feeling, memory and expectation commonly present in the Arts enable a deeper understanding of law's discourse and practice? If so, how might that work for students, lawyers and academics in the classroom, and in continuing professional development? Bringing together scholars, legal practitioners internationally from the fields of legal education, legal theory, theatre, architecture, visual and movement arts, this book is evidence of how the Arts can powerfully revitalize the theory and practice of legal education. Through discussion of theory and practice in the humanities and Arts, linked to practical examples of radical interventions, the chapters reveal how the Arts can transform educational practice and our view of its place in legal practice. Available in enhanced electronic format, the book complements The Moral Imagination and the Legal Life, also published by Ashgate.

MacCormick's `Institutions of Law' is the culmination of a lifetime's work in legal theory by one of the world's most respected legal theorists. Featuring an impressive collection of contributions from well-known legal theorists from around the world, all of whom are familiar with MacCormick's work, this collection provides a cutting edge account of the book's significance.

This multi-disciplinary, multi-jurisdictional collection offers the first ever full-scale analysis of legal fictions. Its focus is on fictions in legal practice, examining and evaluating their roles in a variety of different areas of practice (e.g. in Tort Law, Criminal Law and Intellectual Property Law) and in different times and places (e.g. in Roman Law, Rabbinic Law and the Common Law). The collection approaches the topic in part through the discussion of certain key classical statements by theorists including Jeremy Bentham, Alf Ross, Hans Vaihinger, Hans Kelsen and Lon Fuller. The collection opens with the first-ever translation into English of Kelsen’s review of Vaihinger’s As If. The 17 chapters are divided into four parts: 1) a discussion of the principal theories of fictions, as above, with a focus on Kelsen, Bentham, Fuller and classical pragmatism; 2) a discussion of the relationship between fictions and language; 3) a theoretical and historical examination and evaluation of fictions in the common law; and 4) an account of fictions in different practice areas and in different legal cultures. The collection will be of interest to theorists and historians of legal reasoning, as well as scholars and practitioners of the law more generally, in both common and civil law traditions.

This book provides a collection of 11 cutting-edge essays by leading young scholars, challenging long-held assumptions and offering new research paradigms in Philosophy of Law, in five parts: 1) methodology/metatheory; 2) reasoning/evaluating; 3) values/the moral life; 4) institutions/the social life; and 5) the global/international dimension.

This book provides a collection of 11 cutting-edge essays by leading young scholars, challenging long-held assumptions and offering new research paradigms in Philosophy of Law, in five parts: 1) methodology/metatheory; 2) reasoning/evaluating; 3) values/the moral life; 4) institutions/the social life; and 5) the global/international dimension.

What is the value of fictions, metaphors, figures and scenarios in adjudication? This book develops three models to help answer that question: inquiry, artefacts and imagination. Legal language, it is argued, contains artefacts - forms that signal their own artifice and call upon us to do things with them. To imagine, in turn, is to enter a distinctive epistemic frame where we temporarily suspend certain epistemic norms and commitments and participate actively along a spectrum of affective, sensory and kinesic involvement. The book argues that artefacts and related processes of imagination are valuable insofar as they enable inquiry in adjudication, ie the social (interactive and collective) process of making insight into what values, vulnerabilities and interests might be at stake in a case and in similar cases in the future. Artefacts of Legal Inquiry is structured in two parts, with the first offering an account of the three models of inquiry, artefacts and imagination, and the second examining four case studies (fictions, metaphors, figures and scenarios). Drawing on a broad range of theoretical traditions - including philosophy of imagination and emotion, the theory and history of rhetoric, and the cognitive humanities - this book offers an interdisciplinary defence of the importance of artefactual language and imagination in adjudication.

What is the role and value of virtue, emotion and imagination in law and legal reasoning? These new essays, by leading scholars of both law and philosophy, offer striking and exploratory answers to this neglected question. The collection takes a holistic approach, inquiring as to the connections and relations between virtue, emotion and imagination. In addition to the principal focus on adjudication, essays in the collection also engage with a variety of different legal, political and moral contexts: eg criminal law sentencing, the Black Lives Matter movement and professional ethics. A number of different areas of the law are addressed (eg criminal law, constitutional law and tort law) and the issues explored include: the benefits and limits of empathy in legal reasoning; the role of attention and perception in judicial reasoning;, the identification of judicial virtues (such as compassion and humility) and judicial vices (such as callousness and partiality); the values and dangers of certain imaginative devices (eg personification); and the interactive and social dimensions of virtue, emotion and imagination.

This collection of original essays brings together leading legal historians and theorists to explore the oft-neglected but important relationship between these two disciplines. Legal historians have often been sceptical of theory. The methodology which informs their own work is often said to be an empirical one, of gathering information from the archives and presenting it in a narrative form. The narrative produced by history is often said to be provisional, insofar as further research in the archives might falsify present understandings and demand revisions. On the other side, legal theorists are often dismissive of historical works. History itself seems to many theorists not to offer any jurisprudential insights of use for their projects: at best, history is a repository of data and examples, which may be drawn on by the theorist for her own purposes. The aim of this collection is to invite participants from both sides to ask what lessons legal history can bring to legal theory, and what legal theory can bring to history. What is the theorist to do with the empirical data generated by archival research? What theories should drive the historical enterprise, and what wider lessons can be learned from it? This collection brings together a number of major theorists and legal historians to debate these ideas.

The relationship between law and science has developed apace over the last three decades. This collection brings together the most important and influential papers theorising that relationship, including papers that seek to protect law's autonomy against the perceived unwelcome inroads of science, and those that seek to shape and change law by incorporating the latest scientific developments. The papers span historical overviews of the attempts by legal scholars to model legal science on scientific methodology, to efforts by legal philosophers scrutinising the claims made on behalf of genetics and neuroscience as to their implications for law and legal concepts. The volume also includes a section on the famous debate within American case law over what constitutes good science. The volume contains a substantive introduction and detailed bibliography.

The papers selected for this volume offer a panorama of problems and methods at the intersection of legal theory and the humanities. All taken from the last three decades, the papers discuss issues such as the role of the emotions and the imagination in legal reasoning, and the protection of the diversity of voices and perspective in the name of community. Unduly neglected sources and resources for legal theory are also explored: images, still and moving; performance, aural and gestural; and space, old and new, from the Inns of Court to the World Wide Web. The articles balance renewed calls to humanise legal theory with those that analyse and explore the relevance of specific domains of the humanities - such as literature, architecture, music, painting, drawing and film - for law. The volume contains a substantive introduction and a detailed bibliography.

What is the role and value of virtue, emotion and imagination in law and legal reasoning? These new essays, by leading scholars of both law and philosophy, offer striking and exploratory answers to this neglected question. The collection takes a holistic approach, inquiring as to the connections and relations between virtue, emotion and imagination. In addition to the principal focus on adjudication, essays in the collection also engage with a variety of different legal, political and moral contexts: eg criminal law sentencing, the Black Lives Matter movement and professional ethics. A number of different areas of the law are addressed (eg criminal law, constitutional law and tort law) and the issues explored include: the benefits and limits of empathy in legal reasoning; the role of attention and perception in judicial reasoning;, the identification of judicial virtues (such as compassion and humility) and judicial vices (such as callousness and partiality); the values and dangers of certain imaginative devices (eg personification); and the interactive and social dimensions of virtue, emotion and imagination.

What can legal theorists learn from legal historians? What guidance can historians take from theorists? What theoretical questions underlie legal historical investigations? These are the questions explored and answered by the articles selected in this volume. Taken together, these papers show that the future of historical jurisprudence is a bright one. This is a jurisprudence that can yield insights about how to conceptualise legal change, how to give voice to those operating outside of legal officialdom, and how to understand the relationship between law and politics. The papers selected range from the challenge to legal positivism from the perspective of the history of the common law, to the latest methodological debates in socio-historical jurisprudence. The volume contains a substantive introduction and a detailed bibliography.

Ever since H.L.A. Hart's self-description of The Concept of Law as an 'exercise in descriptive sociology', contemporary legal theorists have been debating the relationship between legal theory and sociology, and between legal theory and social science more generally. There have been some who have insisted on a clear divide between legal theory and the social sciences, citing fundamental methodological differences. Others have attempted to bridge gaps, revealing common challenges and similar objects of inquiry. Collecting the work of authors such as Martin Krygier, David Nelken, Brian Tamanaha, Lewis Kornhauser, Gunther Teubner and Nicola Lacey, this volume - the second in a three volume series - provides an overview of the major developments in the last thirty years. The volume is divided into three sections, each discussing an aspect of the relationship of legal theory and the social sciences: 1) methodological disputes and collaboration; 2) common problems, especially as they concern different modes of explanation of social behaviour; and 3) common objects, including, most prominently, the study of language in its social context and normative pluralism.