The sixteenth edition of Managerial Economics combines quantitative methods and economic analysis with a practical, problem solving approach to enable students to develop the skills required to make informed managerial decisions. The text's unique, integrative approach demonstrates the cohesive nature of organizations and how business decisions are interdisciplinary. Using economic concepts and tools applied to updated examples of real-world companies and management situations, the text provides a robust approach to the practical application of the academic principles of managerial economics.

This volume focuses on recent pricing puzzles in investments. The valuation of Internet companies, effects of firm size in takeover studies, and long-run performance of mergers in the telecommunications industry are all seen as riddles for the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. Explanations may be found in studies of the effects of differences in investor risk/return preferences, information and liquidity. Also featured are studies describing recent innovations in corporate finance, such as an experimental study of discount rates, an analysis of issues related to the estimation of internal cash flows, corporate payout policy, and the use of convertible and warrant bonds by Japanese firms.

Papers in this volume focus on corporate governance broadly defined as the system of control that helps corporations effectively manage, administer, and direct economic resources. Questions of what and how to produce become equally important as organizations strive to better serve demanding customers. As a result, the design and control of effective organizations have become an integral part of financial economics. Traditionally, organization structure has been described by the vertical and horizontal relationships among the firm, its customers and suppliers. More recently, researchers have come to understand that the efficiency of firms depends upon the ability of participants to find effective means to minimize the transaction costs of coordinating productive activity. As financial economists have learned, resource allocation will be efficient so long as transaction costs remain low and property rights can be freely assigned and exchanged. An important problem that must be addressed is the so-called agency problem resulting from the natural conflict between owners and managers. Agency costs are the explicit and implicit transaction costs necessary to overcome the natural divergence of interest between agent managers and principal stockholders. The value-maximizing organization design minimizes unproductive conflict within the firm. Papers in this volume show how corporate control mechanisms inside and outside the firm have evolved around the world to allocate decision authority to that person or organization best able to perform a given task.

This volume, in the series "Advances in Financial Economics," discusses such topics as the global variation in financial ratios, trading costs of target firms around corporate takeovers, and economic activity measures in nonlinear asset pricing.

Advances in Financial Economics publishes peer reviewed quality manuscripts on any aspects of financial economics including corporate finance, financial institutions and markets and microeconomics.

This volume contains fourteen research papers with theoretical and empirical treatment of important financial aspects of corporate governance. The papers cover major corporate governance issues such as the role of the board of directors, ownership structure, ownership concentration, and the influence of outside blockholders. Another salient feature of this collection is that it offers substantial international evidence, including that from the United States of America, Australia, Germany, Saudi Arabia, China, India, and Malaysia.

The contribution of research and development to a company's market value has grown considerably in recent years. In the mid-1970s, accountants were able to capture on their ledgers 90-95% of a firm's book value, but by 2000 the importance of intangible assets had grown to the point where they could account for only 13-15%. Financial economists and accountants have investigated the link between a firm's market value and its R&D spending, and various factions advocate a variety of positions on the amount and rate of investment, investors' ability to capture returns on that investment, and ways to measure value, investment, and returns.
'Tech Stock Valuation' extends the R&D literature by providing detailed direct evidence on the market value implications of inventive and innovative output. Specifically, the book demonstrates that stock-price effects of patent output are most pronounced in the case of of high-quality patents, where patent quality is measured by scientific merit. Scientific measures of patent quality give tech stock investors and R&D managers a valuable new tool that can be used to measure R&D program effectiveness. At the same time, it gives investors a new tool to help them assess the value of hard-to-measure intangible assets.
*Provides detailed direct evidence on the market value implications of inventive and innovative output
*Based on recent research, much of which Dr. Hirschey has pioneered
*Gives financial professionals a new tool for assessing R&D quality and its relation to market valuation

While "Advances" continues to publish papers from any area of Finance, the focus of this issue is on corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps corporations and other organizations effectively manage, administer, and direct economic resources. Papers of this title deal with the role played by boards of directors, impact of ownership, executive compensation, and investor protection. Other papers deal with stock repurchases, default, banking, financial sector development, and the Asian financial crisis. Papers cover a wide range of international experience, including evidence from the U.S., Japan, Israel, Malaysia, China, and New Zealand. Papers cover a wide range of international experience with this issue focusing on corporate governance. This book series is available electronically at website.

While Advances continues to publish papers from any area of Finance, the focus of this issue is on corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps corporations and other organizations effectively manage, administer, and direct economic resources. Included in the volume are papers focusing on: the impact of deregulation and corporate structure on productive efficiency; the effectiveness of the fraud triangle and SAS; board monitoring and access to debt financing; institutional investors; and managerial stability and payout policy.

Advances in Financial Economics publishes peer reviewed quality manuscripts on any aspects of financial economics including corporate finance, financial institutions and markets and microeconomics.

Papers in this volume focus upon corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps the corporation effectively manage, administer and direct economic resources. Questions of what and how to produce become equally important as organizations strive to better serve demanding customers. As a result, the design and control of effective organizations structure has been described by the vertical and horizontal relationships among the firm, its customers and suppliers. More recently, researchers have come to understand that the efficiency of firms depends upon the ability of participants to find effective means to minimize the transaction costs of coordinating productive activity. As financial economists have learned, resource allocation will be efficient so long as transaction costs remain low and property rights can be freely assigned and exchanged. An important problem that must be addressed is the so-called agency problem resulting from the natural conflict between owners and managers. Agency costs are the explicit and implicit transaction costs necessary to overcome the natural divergence of interest between agent managers and principal stockholders. The value-maximizing organization design minimizes unproductive conflict within the firm. Papers in this volume show how corporate control mechanisms inside and outside the firm have evolved to allocate decision authority to that person or organization best able to perform a given task.