"All readers interested in today's constitutional courts will profit from eavesdropping on this conversation."
--"Judicature"

This collection of essays on constitutional law is designed to introduce the reader to the range of issues concerning constitutional theory that occupy the attention of constitutional scholars in the United States today.

A look at First Amendment coverage of music, non-representational art, and nonsense The Supreme Court has unanimously held that Jackson Pollock’s paintings, Arnold Schöenberg’s music, and Lewis Carroll’s poem “Jabberwocky” are “unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment. Nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, and nonsense: all receive constitutional coverage under an amendment protecting “the freedom of speech,” even though none involves what we typically think of as speech—the use of words to convey meaning. As a legal matter, the Court’s conclusion is clearly correct, but its premises are murky, and they raise difficult questions about the possibilities and limitations of law and expression. Nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, and nonsense do not employ language in any traditional sense, and sometimes do not even involve the transmission of articulable ideas. How, then, can they be treated as “speech” for constitutional purposes? What does the difficulty of that question suggest for First Amendment law and theory? And can law resolve such inquiries without relying on aesthetics, ethics, and philosophy? Comprehensive and compelling, this book represents a sustained effort to account, constitutionally, for these modes of “speech.” While it is firmly centered in debates about First Amendment issues, it addresses them in a novel way, using subject matter that is uniquely well suited to the task, and whose constitutional salience has been under-explored. Drawing on existing legal doctrine, aesthetics, and analytical philosophy, three celebrated law scholars show us how and why speech beyond words should be fundamental to our understanding of the First Amendment.

The Hughes Court: From Progressivism to Pluralism, 1930 to 1941 describes the closing of one era in constitutional jurisprudence and the opening of another. This comprehensive study of the Supreme Court from 1930 to 1941 - when Charles Evans Hughes was Chief Justice - shows how nearly all justices, even the most conservative, accepted the broad premises of a Progressive theory of government and the Constitution. The Progressive view gradually increased its hold throughout the decade, but at its end, interest group pluralism began to influence the law. By 1941, constitutional and public law was discernibly different from what it had been in 1930, but there was no sharp or instantaneous Constitutional Revolution in 1937 despite claims to the contrary. This study supports its conclusions by examining the Court's work in constitutional law, administrative law, the law of justiciability, civil rights and civil liberties, and statutory interpretation.

In Making Civil Rights Law, Tushnet provides a chronological narrative history of the legal struggle that preceded the political battles for civil rights, in the thirties, forties, and fifties, waged by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund led by Thurgood Marshall. Tushnet brings clarity to the legal reasoning that animated this `Constitutional revolution', showing how the slow development of doctrine and precedent reflected an overall legal strategy of Marshall and the NAACP.

The casebook introduces students to the reasons for regulation, the ways in which regulation can go awry, the choice of legal institutions, the choice of regulatory instruments, and the art of statutory interpretation. The book uses several substantive subject areas as recurring themes, all involving the regulation of risk. The primary market for this casebook are law students taking a course on the Regulatory State; a secondary market may be found in schools of public policy.

In Making Civil Rights Law, Tushnet provides a chronological narrative history of the legal struggle that preceded the political battles for civil rights, in the thirties, forties, and fifties, waged by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, led by Thurgood Marshall. Tushnet brings clarity to the legal reasoning that animated this "Constitutional revolution", showing how the slow development of doctrine and prrecedent reflected an overall legal strategy of Marshall and the NAACP.

Designed as a supplement for constitutional law courses and seminars, Seidman and Tushnet use examples drawn from the popular press, public discussion and law articles to show how and why constitutional debate has evolved into the political conundrum it's become.

A look at First Amendment coverage of music, non-representational art, and nonsense The Supreme Court has unanimously held that Jackson Pollock's paintings, Arnold Schoeenberg's music, and Lewis Carroll's poem "Jabberwocky" are "unquestionably shielded" by the First Amendment. Nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, and nonsense: all receive constitutional coverage under an amendment protecting "the freedom of speech," even though none involves what we typically think of as speech-the use of words to convey meaning. As a legal matter, the Court's conclusion is clearly correct, but its premises are murky, and they raise difficult questions about the possibilities and limitations of law and expression. Nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, and nonsense do not employ language in any traditional sense, and sometimes do not even involve the transmission of articulable ideas. How, then, can they be treated as "speech" for constitutional purposes? What does the difficulty of that question suggest for First Amendment law and theory? And can law resolve such inquiries without relying on aesthetics, ethics, and philosophy? Comprehensive and compelling, this book represents a sustained effort to account, constitutionally, for these modes of "speech." While it is firmly centered in debates about First Amendment issues, it addresses them in a novel way, using subject matter that is uniquely well suited to the task, and whose constitutional salience has been under-explored. Drawing on existing legal doctrine, aesthetics, and analytical philosophy, three celebrated law scholars show us how and why speech beyond words should be fundamental to our understanding of the First Amendment.

The NAACP's fight against segregated education - the first public interest litigation campaign - culminated in the 1954 Brown decision. While touching on the general social, political, and economic climate in which the NAACP acted, Mark V. Tushnet emphasizes the internal workings of the organization as revealed in its own documents. He argues that the dedication and the political and legal skills of staff members such as Walter White, Charles Hamilton Houston, and Thurgood Marshall were responsible for the ultimate success of public interest law. This edition contains a new epilogue by the author that addresses general questions of litigation strategy, the persistent question of whether the Brown decision mattered, and the legacy of Brown through the Burger and Rehnquist courts.