The authors investigate whether the tenure of program managers contributes to Nunn-McCurdy breaches. They also examine the existing decentralized systems used to track cost growth to determine whether additional guidance and control are needed to make acquisition category II programs performance more transparent. Finally, they investigate whether key assumptions, so-called framing assumptions, could be useful risk management tools.

This volume presents a set of lessons learned from the United Kingdom's Astute submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Designing and building a submarine requires careful management and oversight and a delegation of roles and responsibilities that recognizes which party - the shipbuilder or the government - is best positioned to manage risks.

The United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers. This volume presents an overview of five submarine programs in the three countries - the UK's Astute program; the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia programs; and Australia's Collins program - and identifies lessons that apply to all of them.

This volume presents a set of lessons learned from Australia's Collins submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Collins was the first submarine built in Australia. RAND investigated how operational requirements were set for the Collins class; explored the acquisition, contracting, design, and build processes that the program employed; and assessed the activities surrounding integrated logistics support for the class.

The U.S. Navy asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers. This volume presents lessons from three U.S. submarine programs. The RAND team looked at how the programs were managed, the issues that affected management decisions, and the outcomes of those decisions. An overarching lesson from the three programs is the importance of program stability. One-liner: This volume presents an overview of lessons learned from three U.S. Navy submarine programs that could help inform future program managers.

This analysis uses data from Selected Acquisition Reports to determine the causes of cost growth in 35 mature major defense acquisition programs. Four major sources of growth are identified: errors in estimation and scheduling, decisions by the government, financial matters, and miscellaneous. The analysis shows that more than two-thirds of cost growth (measured as simple averages) is caused by decisions, most of which involve quantity changes, requirements growth, and schedule changes.Cost growth in major weapon-systems programs results from errors in estimation and scheduling, government decisions, financial matters, and miscellaneous sources, with decisions involving changes in requirements, quantities, and production schedules the dominant cause.

Explores the reasons for and ways to anticipate schedule delays in shipbuilding programmes. 450-character abstract: The Defence Procurement Agency, part of the UK Ministry of Defence, asked Rand to analyze how major shipbuilders and contractors monitor programme progress, to consider what information would be useful for shipbuilders to provide the agency, and to understand why ships are delivered late and why commercial shipbuilders maintain a much better schedule performance than do military builders. This monograph presents the researchers' findings and recommendations, which was based on surveys of major US, UK, and other European shipbuilders and other extensive industry research.

Assesses whether shipyards, other naval firms, and suppliers in the United Kingdom have sufficient capacity to meet the demands of the Ministry of Defence's construction of new ships and submarines over the next 15 years. The United Kingdom has many contracted and prospective shipbuilding programmes on the horizon over the next two decades. The UK Ministry of Defence wants to know whether its country's diminishing industrial base will be able to meet the requirements of this shipbuilding plan. Using extensive surveys and a breadth of data, RAND researchers look at the capacity of the UK shipbuilding industrial base and how alternative acquisition requirements, programmes, and schedules might affect this capability.

Examines ways in which the UK Ministry of Defence can reduce the whole-life costs and manpower requirements of the Royal Navy's two Future Aircraft Carriers (CVFs). In 2012 and 2015, respectively, the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence will replace its three Invincible-class aircraft carriers with two Future Aircraft Carriers (CVFs), the largest ships ever constructed for the Royal Navy. The research described in this report focuses on possible reductions in whole-life costs and manpower requirements of the carriers.

Building on prior RAND research, this monograph explores the need for and retention of technical skills in the UK1s maritime industry, particularly among designers and engineers involved with surface ship and submarine acquisition and support. The results reveal that the UK1s future naval programme likely will have to be modified or augmented to sustain these technical skills in the long term.