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This volume presents a set of lessons learned from Australia's
Collins submarine program that could help inform future program
managers. Collins was the first submarine built in Australia. RAND
investigated how operational requirements were set for the Collins
class; explored the acquisition, contracting, design, and build
processes that the program employed; and assessed the activities
surrounding integrated logistics support for the class.
The United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia asked the RAND
Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous
submarine programs that could help inform future program managers.
This volume presents an overview of five submarine programs in the
three countries - the UK's Astute program; the U.S. Navy's Ohio,
Seawolf, and Virginia programs; and Australia's Collins program -
and identifies lessons that apply to all of them.
Advises how the United Kingdom should best use modern outsourcing
and outfitting practices for shipbuilding in the years to come. The
United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence (MOD) is preparing for the
construction of the Royal Navy's two new Future Aircraft Carriers
(CVFs), slated to enter service in 2012 and 2015, respectively. The
CVFs will be the largest warships built in the United Kingdom in
decades. At the request of the MOD, the RAND Corporation looked at
the risks of current contractor plans and estimated the cost
implications of using alternative manufacturing options in the
coming years.
The authors investigate whether the tenure of program managers
contributes to Nunn-McCurdy breaches. They also examine the
existing decentralized systems used to track cost growth to
determine whether additional guidance and control are needed to
make acquisition category II programs performance more transparent.
Finally, they investigate whether key assumptions, so-called
framing assumptions, could be useful risk management tools.
This volume presents a set of lessons learned from the United
Kingdom's Astute submarine program that could help inform future
program managers. Designing and building a submarine requires
careful management and oversight and a delegation of roles and
responsibilities that recognizes which party - the shipbuilder or
the government - is best positioned to manage risks.
This analysis uses data from Selected Acquisition Reports to
determine the causes of cost growth in 35 mature major defense
acquisition programs. Four major sources of growth are identified:
errors in estimation and scheduling, decisions by the government,
financial matters, and miscellaneous. The analysis shows that more
than two-thirds of cost growth (measured as simple averages) is
caused by decisions, most of which involve quantity changes,
requirements growth, and schedule changes.Cost growth in major
weapon-systems programs results from errors in estimation and
scheduling, government decisions, financial matters, and
miscellaneous sources, with decisions involving changes in
requirements, quantities, and production schedules the dominant
cause.
Explores the reasons for and ways to anticipate schedule delays in
shipbuilding programmes. 450-character abstract: The Defence
Procurement Agency, part of the UK Ministry of Defence, asked Rand
to analyze how major shipbuilders and contractors monitor programme
progress, to consider what information would be useful for
shipbuilders to provide the agency, and to understand why ships are
delivered late and why commercial shipbuilders maintain a much
better schedule performance than do military builders. This
monograph presents the researchers' findings and recommendations,
which was based on surveys of major US, UK, and other European
shipbuilders and other extensive industry research.
Assesses whether shipyards, other naval firms, and suppliers in the
United Kingdom have sufficient capacity to meet the demands of the
Ministry of Defence's construction of new ships and submarines over
the next 15 years. The United Kingdom has many contracted and
prospective shipbuilding programmes on the horizon over the next
two decades. The UK Ministry of Defence wants to know whether its
country's diminishing industrial base will be able to meet the
requirements of this shipbuilding plan. Using extensive surveys and
a breadth of data, RAND researchers look at the capacity of the UK
shipbuilding industrial base and how alternative acquisition
requirements, programmes, and schedules might affect this
capability.
Examines ways in which the UK Ministry of Defence can reduce the
whole-life costs and manpower requirements of the Royal Navy's two
Future Aircraft Carriers (CVFs). In 2012 and 2015, respectively,
the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence will replace its three
Invincible-class aircraft carriers with two Future Aircraft
Carriers (CVFs), the largest ships ever constructed for the Royal
Navy. The research described in this report focuses on possible
reductions in whole-life costs and manpower requirements of the
carriers.
Building on prior RAND research, this monograph explores the need
for and retention of technical skills in the UK1s maritime
industry, particularly among designers and engineers involved with
surface ship and submarine acquisition and support. The results
reveal that the UK1s future naval programme likely will have to be
modified or augmented to sustain these technical skills in the long
term.
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