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Showing 1 - 13 of 13 matches in All Departments
This book brings together moral and legal philosophers,criminologists and political theorists in an attempt to address the interdependence of the study of punishment and of political theory as well as specific issues, such as freedom, autonomy, coercion and rights that arise in both. In addition to new essays on the compatibility of rights and utilitarianism and of autonomy and coercion in Kant's theory, the book contains an extended treatment of the idea of punishment as communication. This theme is taken up in arguments over whether punishment is communicative, in the questions of what the content of any such communication could be in a pluralist society, and whether communicative accounts can make sense of the use of 'hard treatment'. By combining the techniques and expertise of different disciplines, the essays in this book shed new light on the problem of punishment. They also demonstrate the usefulness of that problem as a testing ground for legal and moral philosophy.
In addressing democracy, equality, and justice together, the book stimulates discussions that go beyond the sometimes increasingly technical and increasingly discrete literatures that now dominate the study of each concept. The chapters fall into four categories: on justice and democracy; justice and equality; justice and community; and justice and the future. Concerns of justice unite all the chapters in this volume. However, these concerns now manifest themselves in interesting and new directions. Politically, the book confronts urgent problems of democracy, equality, community, and of how to respond to potentially catastrophic climate change. The response to these problems cannot only be pragmatic and piecemeal. What emerges are a number of interlinking questions and themes that together constitute the central core of contemporary political philosophy. This book was previously published as a special issue of the Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy.
The state's use of the threat, and imposition, of punishments to regulate conduct is thought (or at least said) by many to be legitimised by the idea that the criminal law's burdens only fall on those who are blameworthy for their conduct. However, the formal concept of 'blameworthiness' needs to be made substantive. This puts various ideas regarding the criminal law's person at the heart of debates about blame, guilt, and responsibility. How is the criminal law's person constructed, by whom, and with what disciplinary norms? How is it threatened by new 'knowledge', and how do those threats play out amongst the various stakeholders who claim the criminal law's person as 'theirs'? To address these and cognate questions, this volume brings together an international group of academics to engage with the criminal law's person from a range of disciplinary perspectives.
The problem of how we are to live together in morally and culturally diverse democratic societies is central to modern life. Over the last thirty years, an extensive philosophical literature has developed around the idea of toleration as a way of engaging with that problem. However, recent years have witnessed a growing backlash against the idea of toleration, which is often considered too 'thin', or too unambitious an aspiration for liberal democracy. This timely collection of essays from an international field of experts in the history and philosophy of toleration takes stock of this debate and offers a distinctive reassessment of the place of toleration in contemporary political life. Against the general climate of scepticism, the message that emerges from these essays is that toleration remains an extremely powerful idea, and one that must remain central to the political enterprise of forging social unity amid diversity in the twenty-first century. This book was originally published as a special issue of Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy.
In the last thirty years, the USA and the UK have witnessed a
profound change in the way in which we think about and respond to
crime and social control. Crime has become part of everyday life
as, for many citizens, has imprisonment.
In the last thirty years, the USA and the UK have witnessed a
profound change in the way in which we think about respond to crime
and social control. Crime has become part of everyday life as, for
many citizens, has imprisonment. "Politics and the Culture of
Control" brings together criminologists, social theorists, and
philosophers to consider what explains these changes and what they
tell us about ourselves and the way in which we live. Inspired by
David Garland's recent book on this subject, the authors consider
the pervasive, the obvious, and the covert ways in which crime and
social order has come to structure social discourses and social
life, from mass imprisonment to zero tolerance, to on-the-spot
fines.
The problem of how we are to live together in morally and culturally diverse democratic societies is central to modern life. Over the last thirty years, an extensive philosophical literature has developed around the idea of toleration as a way of engaging with that problem. However, recent years have witnessed a growing backlash against the idea of toleration, which is often considered too 'thin', or too unambitious an aspiration for liberal democracy. This timely collection of essays from an international field of experts in the history and philosophy of toleration takes stock of this debate and offers a distinctive reassessment of the place of toleration in contemporary political life. Against the general climate of scepticism, the message that emerges from these essays is that toleration remains an extremely powerful idea, and one that must remain central to the political enterprise of forging social unity amid diversity in the twenty-first century. This book was originally published as a special issue of Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy.
In addressing democracy, equality, and justice together, the book stimulates discussions that go beyond the sometimes increasingly technical and increasingly discrete literatures that now dominate the study of each concept. The chapters fall into four categories: on justice and democracy; justice and equality; justice and community; and justice and the future. Concerns of justice unite all the chapters in this volume. However, these concerns now manifest themselves in interesting and new directions. Politically, the book confronts urgent problems of democracy, equality, community, and of how to respond to potentially catastrophic climate change. The response to these problems cannot only be pragmatic and piecemeal. What emerges are a number of interlinking questions and themes that together constitute the central core of contemporary political philosophy. This book was previously published as a special issue of the Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy.
This collection brings together essays by distinguished political philosophers which reflect on the detailed arguments of What We Owe to Each Other, and comment critically both on Scanlon's contractualism and his revised understandings of motivation and morality. The essays illustrate the uses of Scanlon's contractualism by applying it to moral and political problems and in so doing they provide an assessment of the ability of Scanlon's contractualism by applying it to other forms of ethical theory. The resulting volume makes an important and original contribution to the literature on Scanlon, on contractualism and on contemporary political philosophy.
The idea of a cultural defense in criminal law is often ridiculed as "multiculturalism run amok ". To allow someone charged with a crime to say "this is my culture " as an excuse for their action seems to open the door to cultural relativism, to jeopardize the protection of fundamental rights, and to undermine norms of individual responsibility. Many scholars, however, insist that cultural evidence is appropriate, indeed essential, for the fair operation of the criminal law. The criminal law is society's most powerful tool for regulating behaviour, and just for that reason we apply strong safeguards to ensure that criminal sanctions are applied in a fair way. When it comes to individuals, we want our rules for judging responsibility and punishment to track the actual blameworthiness of the specific individual being prosecuted for a specific action in the past. Cultural evidence may help improve our judgements of individual blameworthiness and desert; indeed, cultural evidence might even be necessary if the practice of punishing individuals is to be legitimate and equitable. According to its proponents, the use of cultural evidence when judging individual blameworthiness is a natural extension of the logic of existing criminal law doctrines regarding defences, and of the logic of current philosophical theories of responsibility and agency. This volume brings together scholars of both criminal law and philosophy to rigorously assess these ideas. Each of the chapters addresses a different dimension of the issue, from a range of perspectives, with varying degrees of sympathy or scepticism regarding cultural defences. The result is an important and original contribution to the literature. It explores why cultural diversity raises distinctive challenges in the criminal law context, not found in other domains of the multiculturalism debate, while also exploring how this particular context raises fundamental issues of agency and responsibility that are at the heart of broader debates in legal, social and political philosophy.
This book aims to answer the question: 'why, and by what right,do some people punish others?' With his groundbreaking new theory, the author argues that the justification of punishment must be embedded in a larger political and moral theory. The author uses the problem of punishment to undermine contemporary accounts of justice.
The state’s use of the threat, and imposition, of punishments to regulate conduct is thought (or at least said) by many to be legitimised by the idea that the criminal law’s burdens only fall on those who are blameworthy for their conduct. However, the formal concept of ‘blameworthiness’ needs to be made substantive. This puts various ideas regarding the criminal law’s person at the heart of debates about blame, guilt, and responsibility. How is the criminal law’s person constructed, by whom, and with what disciplinary norms? How is it threatened by new ‘knowledge’, and how do those threats play out amongst the various stakeholders who claim the criminal law’s person as ‘theirs’? To address these and cognate questions, this volume brings together an international group of academics to engage with the criminal law’s person from a range of disciplinary perspectives.
This collection brings together essays which reflect on the detailed arguments of What We Owe to Each Other, and which comment critically both on Scanlon's contractualism and his revised understandings of motivation and morality. The essays illustrate the uses of Scanlon's contractualism by applying it to moral and political problems and in so doing they provide an assessment of the ability of Scanlon's contractualism by applying it to other forms of ethical theory. So, the central questions are: What is the best interpretation of the theory advanced in 'What We Owe to Each Other?'; How does the theory, so interpreted, stand up to criticism?; and How does contractualism handle certain difficult problems in politics and ethics?. To answer these questions, the collection includes the work of distinguished political philosophers. The resulting volume will make an important and original contribution to the literature on Scanlon, on contractualism and on contemporary political philosophy.
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