This book introduces a new theoretical framework that examines Iran in relation to the theological concept of Anfal, a confiscatory regime seen in Iran since 1979 where public assets belong to the leader of Iran. Through analysing the economic impacts of Anfal, the effects of political capitalism and destructive coordination and how they lead to the economics of hoarding and the flight of capital and labour are highlighted. The economics of predation, ecological disaster, and cooperative coordination are also discussed. This book aims to highlight the economic consequences of Anfal and its role in sustaining destructive condition and shaping the Islamic political capitalism. It will be relevant to students and researchers interested in the political economy, Middle Eastern and Islamic studies.

Still in the early stages of development, conflict theory presents a growing interest in understanding the economic costs and benefits of conflicts. In this book, Mehrdad Vahabi analyses one type of conflict in particular: manhunting, or predation, in which a dominant power hunts down its prey and the goal of the prey is to escape and thus survive. This contrasts with traditional warfare, in which two (or more) powers enter into a conflict and the goal is to fight to win domination. The economics of escape casts light on costs and benefits of predatory activities, and explores the impact of violence as an impediment to developing countries with respect to assets structure. This book is unprecedented in its research and thought, and develops a new theory of predation in economics that makes a significant contribution to the field.

Still in the early stages of development, conflict theory presents a growing interest in understanding the economic costs and benefits of conflicts. In this book, Mehrdad Vahabi analyses one type of conflict in particular: manhunting, or predation, in which a dominant power hunts down its prey and the goal of the prey is to escape and thus survive. This contrasts with traditional warfare, in which two (or more) powers enter into a conflict and the goal is to fight to win domination. The economics of escape casts light on costs and benefits of predatory activities, and explores the impact of violence as an impediment to developing countries with respect to assets structure. This book is unprecedented in its research and thought, and develops a new theory of predation in economics that makes a significant contribution to the field.