This volume brings together many of the world's leading theorists of free will and philosophers of law to critically discuss the ground-breaking contribution of David Hodgson's libertarianism and its application to philosophy of law. The book begins with a comprehensive introduction, providing an overview of the intersection of theories of free will and philosophy of law over the last fifty years. The eleven chapters collected together divide into two groups: the first five address libertarianism within the free will debate, with particular attention to Hodgson's theory, and in Part II, six contributors discuss Hodgson's libertarianism in relation to issues not often pursued by free will scholars, such as mitigation of punishment, the responsibility of judges, the nature of judicial reasoning and the criminal law process more generally. Thus the volume's importance lies not only in examining Hodgson's distinctive libertarian theory from within the free will literature, but also in considering new directions for research in applying that theory to enduring questions about legal responsibility and punishment.

This volume brings together many of the world's leading theorists of free will and philosophers of law to critically discuss the ground-breaking contribution of David Hodgson's libertarianism and its application to philosophy of law. The book begins with a comprehensive introduction, providing an overview of the intersection of theories of free will and philosophy of law over the last fifty years. The eleven chapters collected together divide into two groups: the first five address libertarianism within the free will debate, with particular attention to Hodgson's theory, and in Part II, six contributors discuss Hodgson's libertarianism in relation to issues not often pursued by free will scholars, such as mitigation of punishment, the responsibility of judges, the nature of judicial reasoning and the criminal law process more generally. Thus the volume's importance lies not only in examining Hodgson's distinctive libertarian theory from within the free will literature, but also in considering new directions for research in applying that theory to enduring questions about legal responsibility and punishment.

Traditionally, legitimacy has been associated exclusively with states. But are states actually legitimate? And in light of the legalization of international norms why should discussions of legitimacy focus only on the nation-state? The essays in this collection examine the nature of legitimacy, the legitimacy of the state, and the legitimacy of supranational institutions. The collection begins by asking: What sort of problem is legitimacy? Part I considers competing theories, in particular the work of John Rawls. Part II looks at the legitimacy of state apparatus, its institutions, officials, and the rule of law, and the future of state sovereignty. Part III expands the scope of legitimacy beyond the state to supranational institutions and international law. Written by theorists of considerable standing, the essays in this volume will be of interest to students and scholars of law, politics, and philosophy looking for ways of approaching the problem of how extra-territorial affairs affect a state's written and unwritten agreements with its citizens in a world where laws and norms with legal effect are increasingly made beyond the state.